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Abstract
This thesis examines the emergence and politicization of ethnic identity in the Kurdish
populations of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Through a historical analysis of Kurdish revolts and
nationalist movements the late imperial and colonial eras, it demonstrates that ‘Kurdishness’, or
Kurdayetî, has been instrumentalized as ethnonationalism primarily in a defensive capacity, in
response to external coercive pressures forcing the Kurds to ‘think like a state’ and view
themselves in increasingly ethnopolitical terms. By illustrating the extent to which
ethnonationalism was imposed upon the Kurdish people and the limited appeal it enjoyed in the
first half of the twentieth century, I aim to repudiate a ‘cliched constructivism’ prevalent in
explanatory international relations as problematized by Rogers Brubaker. While most
contemporary scholars of nationalism acknowledge the artificiality of the state, many depict
‘ethnic ties’ as the ostensibly ancient and natural proclivities upon which modern political
communities are constructed. An objective analysis of early Kurdish nationalism, however, will
demonstrate that ethnic linkages had little relevance in the emergence of Kurdish political
sentiments and that the retrospective misunderstanding of Kurdish separatism as naturally
occurring is rooted in a groupist doxa upheld by the socialized reinforcement of the
ethnonational state as the default unit of political organization. Building upon this historical
analysis, the thesis will proceed to examine the emergence of contemporary Kurdish political
parties and separatist movements, all the while placing them in the local and global political
contexts that produce them. It will demonstrate that, despite a perception by governments and
scholars alike that Kurds would form collaborative co-ethnic dyads when given the opportunity,
disparate Kurdish political parties prioritize their own strategic interests over those of their
ethnic brethren, even when doing so requires the subjugation or elimination of rival Kurdish
forces. Ultimately, the project will conclude by applying the theoretical and historical
frameworks discussed above to two transversal dyads impacting the ‘Kurdish question’ in the
Middle East today. By evaluating the similarities between the KRG’s relationship with the PYD
and KDP and previous instances of pan-Kurdish interaction, this thesis will provide insights into
the future of Kurdish movements in the Modern Middle East, which are likely to be plagued by
the same structural constraints and a lack of organic solidarity that has inhibited transversal
collaboration between the Kurds for more than a century.
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Abbreviations
ADYÖD: The Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (Ankara Demokratik Yüksek
Öğrenim Derneği), a short-lived socialist activist organization in Ankara and predecessor of the
PKK co-founded by Öcalan in 1974.
ASLA: Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, a Marxist-Leninist militant
national liberation movement that cooperated with the PKK throughout the 1980s.
CKI: Committee for Kurdish Independence (Kurt Istiqlal Djemiyeti), a proto-nationalist
organization formed by Kurdish elites in Erzurum in 1922.
CUP: Committee of Union and Progress (İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti), a revolutionary militant
coup that came to power during the Young Turk Revolution and ruled as a de facto one-party
state from 1913 to 1918.
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Syrian-backed national liberation
movement based in Lebanon led by Nayif Hawatmah and another early ally of the PKK.
HEP: People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek Partisi), the first legal explicitly Kurdish party in
Turkey’s history, founded in 1990.
ICP: Iraqi Communist Party, a leftist party founded in 1934 and a frequent political partner of
Kurds in Iraq.
ISIL/IS: The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, now just the Islamic State. A fundamentalist
radical non-state organization that emerged from the conditions created by the United States in
occupied Iraq and threatened much of the Kurdish ‘homeland’ in the aftermath of the Arab
Spring and Syrian Civil War.
JK: Society for the Revival of Kurdistan (Komalay Jiyanaway Kurdistan), a Kurdish nationalist
organization formed in 1942 with heavy Soviet influence following occupation.
KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê), the dominant Kurdish
nationalist party since roughly 1958 and the main steward of the contemporary autonomous
Kurdish region in Iraq.
KDPI: The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran, originally the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Founded in 1946 by Qazi Muhammed and Ibrahim Ahmed to govern the Mahabad Republic, and
was subsequently suppressed by both the KDP and Iranian authorities in subsequent decades.
KDPS: The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria, a Barzani-inspired nationalist organization
founded in 1957 and marginally active ever since, though it has been largely overshadowed by
the ascension of the PYD during the civil war.
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KDPT: The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey, a marginal offshoot party of the KDP that
drew criticism and suppression from the PKK.
KRG: The Kurdistan Regional Government, the political entity established in 1992 to govern the
Kurdish region of Iraq.
KRI: The Kurdish Region of Iraq, also called Southern Kurdistan or Basur. The area of northern
Iraq predominantly inhabited by Kurds and given formal autonomy in Iraq’s 2005 constitution.
KTTJ: The Kurdish Society for Mutual Cooperation and Progress (Kurd Teʿavun ve Terakki
Jemʿiyati), a cultural organization founded in 1908 that some scholars identify as
proto-nationalist, an assessment I dispute.
NLM: National Liberation Movement, a term used to describe a diverse array of “socio-political
movements which share the aim of establishing an independent state for what they consider their
nation within the borders of a territory recognized by the international community.”1
PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan), the second dominant actor
in Kurdish politics. The organization is an NLM founded primarily by Abdullah Öcalan in 1979
that rejects the legitimacy of ‘sovereign boundaries’ altogether and has engaged in a
decades-long insurgency against the Turkish state, supported by its mountain bases in the KRI.
PUK: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (Yekîtiya Nîştimanî ya Kurdistanê), the main ideological
and practical rival of the KDP in competition for control of the KRG and broader regional
influence. Though founded in 1975, it has its roots in a 1964 split between Barzani and several
leaders after the former signed an autonomy agreement without consulting the party leadership.
PYD: The Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat), a PKK inspired (or possibly
controlled) organization in the Kurdish region of Syria that has taken a leading role in the
establishment of Rojava following the Syrian Civil War.
SAK: The Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan (Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti), a political
group founded in Istanbul in 1918 and possibly the earliest example of mobilized advocacy for
Kurdish ‘national’ autonomy or independence.
SAVAK: The Organization of National Security and Information (Sāzemān-e Ettelā'āt va
Amniyat-e Keshvar), Iran’s infamous intelligence and secret police service under Shah Reza
Pahlavi.
SCP: The Syrian Communist Party (al-Ḥizb aš-Šuyūʿī as-Sūrī), a frequently Kurdish-friendly
leftist organization that existed from 1927 to 1986.
TWP: The Turkish Workers Party (Türkiye İşçi Partisi), an ally of Kurdish activists and a
proponent of ‘Eastism’ in Turkey during the 1960s.
1

Amin, S. 2015.International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition). Amsterdam:
Elsevier, p. 241.
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Maps of the Regions inhabited by Kurdish Communities
Depicting Kurdistan cartographically is an inherently challenging process, not only because “all
maps are abstractions of reality”, but also because the demographic dispersion of Kurdish
communities in each of their respective states are subjects of great contestation and controversy.2
As a result, no accurate census data exists, and the precise distribution of the Kurdish population
remains unknown. Nevertheless, while boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative,
the maps represent the best possible estimate for where Kurdish populations reside, and serve as
useful references for better understanding transversal interactions throughout the remainder of
the thesis.3

2

O'Shea, Maria Theresa. 2004. Trapped Between the Map and Reality: Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan.
London: Routledge, p. 156.
3
All maps accessed in Stansfield, Gareth and Shareef, Mohammed, eds. 2017. The Kurdish Question Revisited.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Introduction
The Kurdish people, comprising a loosely defined ethnocultural community inhabiting a
mountainous territory encompassing parts of Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, have frequently been
identified by scholars of the Middle East and International Relations as the largest stateless group
in the world, unjustly denied opportunities for self-determination by the careless partition of the
Ottoman Empire and the parochialism of nationalizing states in the region. In the popular and
academic discourse, the Kurdish story is one of repeated tragedy and betrayal, wherein the
Kurdish people have defiantly and persistently fought for their own autonomy and
self-governance in the face of massive external opposition. This narrative and depiction of
Kurdish identity certainly contains objective truths- it is impossible to deny that the Kurds, by
nature of their minority status in a modern state system based on the concept of congruent
ethnopolitical units, have frequently been the subject of subjugation and violent erasure at the
hands of their respective states. It is also true that the bravery of the Kurdish people in
overcoming these obstacles while maintaining political organization and a sense of identity is a
testament to the resiliency of marginalized communities in nationalizing states, and that in recent
decades, Kurdish nationalist ambitions have in fact been constrained by exogenous forces.
A depiction of the Kurds as ‘a nation denied’ or as a distinct, bounded social group that
has fought for independence and freedom since the imposition of the state system itself,
however, is an ahistorical and oversimplified depiction of how differential expressions of
Kurdish identity have been forged, challenged, broken, and reforged in the crucible of brutality
that has been the Modern Middle East.4 In the first half of this thesis, I undertake a historical
analysis of Kurdish national movements in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, with the objective of

4

McDowall, David. 1992. The Kurds: A Nation Denied. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
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contextualizing the emergence of the Kurdish nation within the national and regional dynamics
impacting political mobilization in the region. I argue that the ‘ethnification’ of Kurdishness was
adopted in a primarily defensive capacity against encroaching ethnonational ideologies in the
first half of the twentieth century, but that an externally-imposed insistence by states in the
region to pursue ethnic homogeneity in their respective territories caused them to view Kurdish
populations as a threat to national unity. As a result, Kurdish cultural identity was preemptively
denied where pragmatically possible, leading to a ‘dialectic of denial’ which in itself proved the
central impetus for the development of a Kurdish ethnonationalism.
After establishing the emergence of Kurdish ethnopolitical identity as a reactionary,
rather than spontaneously-occurring phenomenon, I proceed to an examination of the bifurcated
evolution of Kurdish national movements along both regional and linguistic lines. Following
another historical analysis examining the conditions that led to the establishment of ‘traditional’
ideology in Southern and Eastern Kurdistan and ‘radical’ ideology in the West that reiterates the
contextually-dependent nature of ethnopolitical identity and challenges ex post depictions of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as organizations arising
from spontaneous expressions of ethnonational sentiment. The transversal interactions between
these competing figureheads of the Kurdish cause, as well as cross-border dynamics throughout
Kurdish history, indicate that ethnic solidarity plays only a minimal role in motivating the
strategic priorities of Kurdish political groups on the ground. Although Kurdish organizations
may make cross-border intra-ethnic alliances or even lend each other military assistance in
extraordinary circumstances, an examination of the relationships between prominent Kurdish
parties in the region will reveal that pragmatic considerations of self-interest and ideology far
outweigh any sentiment of ethnic ‘groupness’ bringing Kurdish activists together. On the
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contrary, this thesis will argue that intra-Kurdish reactions have had a net detrimental effect on
the security and well-being of Kurds in the region as a whole, since competition between rival
groups has frequently undermined the prospects for peace, federalism, or reconciliation with
existing states in the region.
In all, then, the message of my thesis could be seen as rather defeatist or pessimistic,
given my assertion that Kurdish political groups pursue their own strategic interests regardless of
the consequences for their constituencies or ‘ethnic brethren’ as a whole. It is true that I do not
view Kurdish political elites as dedicated champions for the cause of Kurdish nationalism, but I
believe the critical instrumentalist analysis I have applied to the process of national construction
in Kurdistan is the framework that should be utilized in analyses of all states which are, by their
nature, an elite-imposed process of power centralization through propaganda. This fact, however,
is not to discount the salience of ethnonationalism in Kurdistan or elsewhere, and it should not
diminish the real struggle and suffering that the Kurds and other marginalized communities have
experienced at the hands of fierce ‘imagined communities’.5
My aim in this thesis is therefore simultaneously circumscribed and highly expansivewhile I aim to trace the historical contours of the Kurdish nationalist movements in states across
the Middle East, my analysis is limited in it’s failure to examine the true impacts of these
dynamics on everyday Kurds, for whom ideas of community and ethnicity likely look very
different to those espoused by official party ideologies. It is also limited in its failure to translate
and incorporate primary sources from the Kurdish region itself, which would prove invaluable in
ascertaining the true motivations of Kurdish decision makers throughout the time period
examined. Another factor that confines me in this academic project is my lack of extended

5

Anderson, Benedict. 1991. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. New
York, NY: Verso.
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independent research experience in the Kurdish region or indeed at all, given the relative
immaturity of my academic career as an undergraduate student. As such, I find it important to
clarify that while my rhetoric is at times iconoclastic, it is not my intention to discredit or
denounce established modernist scholars of Kurdish identity, almost all of whom have more
experience studying this topic than I do myself. Nevertheless, I stand by my assessment that the
academy continues to overestimate the significance of ethnicity and underestimate the
significance of specific context in its examinations of Kurdish identity, just as it does throughout
other case studies in ethnic conflict and secessionism churned out by scholars of explanatory IR.
Given this fact, I will continue in my analysis identifying deficiencies where I perceive them, but
simultaneously acknowledging the qualifications and experience of the scholars whom I aim to
challenge. Even within my own analysis, regardless of how concerted an effort I make to
expunge ‘groupist’ assumptions from my lexicon and analytical process, I find it likely that I
may at times revert to assumptions of cliched constructivism, given simply the epistemological
ease and ubiquity of that theoretical framework. By ‘deconstructing’ Kurdish identity and
writing about it as a tangible concept, I am myself “actively tak[ing] part in the construction, and
creation of the forms of identity [I] set out to study, analyze, categorize, explain and write
about''- a paradox I suspect other modernist scholars of Kurdish identity have struggled with in
their own analyses.6 In spite of all these factors complicating and clarifying the positionality of
my study, the only way to avoid making mistakes in an analysis of social science as confounding
and controversial as this one is to avoid writing it altogether, so in this thesis I have established
as complete and objective a picture of how Kurdish ethnic identity has been constructed and
instrumentalized in the modern era as effectively as possible.

Černy, Hannes. 2018. Iraqi Kurdistan, the PKK and International Relations: Theory and Ethnic Conflict. New
York: Routledge, p. 83.
6
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In order to position my argument within the broader discourse on nationalism and
ethnicity, I begin in my literature review by outlining the current state of International Relations
as a field and the deficiencies it harbors with respect to analysis of ethnic conflict. I engage in a
brief survey of sociological and anthropological literature on the discursive construction of
objective ‘truth’, and demonstrate the ways in which the [ethnonational] state has been imposed
as the unchallenged ‘common sense’ modality of social organization in political discourse.
Building upon this analysis, I provide an overview of dominant theories of nationalism arising
from the works of Hobsbawm, Smith, and others during the 1980s, arguing that while these
works make progress in acknowledging the artificiality of the ‘state’, many revert to ambiguous
‘ethnic bonds’ as the state’s supposed antecedent and enabler, an assumption that reflects an
adoption of strategic essentialisms and a clichéd constructivism that merely absconds the
difficult question of identity from the structural concept of state to the abstract field of ethnicity. I
join Rogers Brubaker in his calls to move ‘beyond groupism’ in studies of social science and
towards a “constitutive discourse analysis” based on Karin Fierke’s depiction of ethnicity as “a
complex matrix of identities and interests without a hierarchical sequence”, entirely dependent
on specific political contexts and not on objective ties.7 I briefly recontextualize my research
question and place Kurdish scholars of nationalism in the context of the field of identity politics
more broadly before engaging in the bulk of my analysis in the six substantive chapters of the
thesis.
I begin with an analysis of Kurdish political mobilization in the Imperial Era, arguing
that, despite the overtures of some essentialist Kurdish scholars, expressions of Kurdish
‘distinctiveness’ or a desire for freedom should not be retroactively deemed early expressions of
Kurdish nationalism. ‘Nationalism’ in the manner we understand it today is an entirely modern
7

Fierke, Karin M. 2015. Critical Approaches to International Security. Cambridge: Polity, p. 81.
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and constructed phenomenon, and would not have been a concept early Kurdish poets and
scholars would have been familiar with, much less advocates of. Instead, religion served as the
most salient nexus of personal identity for Kurds under both the Qajar and Ottoman Empires, as
‘ethnic affiliation’ had little relevance when compared with one’s religious adherence. As such,
most efforts at political mobilization in the imperial power were centered around religious
Sheikhs and tribal leaders, who capitalized on resistance to ‘westernization’ and ‘secularization’
during the tanzimat reforms to lead revolts challenging the empire for more personal autonomy.
These revolts, exemplified by characters like Sheikh Ubeydullah and Ismail Simko, served as an
early instance of ethnified Kurdishness in response to exogenous forces, but at this early
historical stage Kurdish ‘nationalism’ remained a concept foreign to the multitude, employed by
only a select few elites with exposure to European discourses in their efforts to expand their own
individual power and influence. Even if some rebellions in the imperial era adopted the rhetoric
of Kurdish nationalism, this chapter argues that such invocations were strategic overtures to gain
external support rather than genuine expressions of ethnonational sentiment.
A disconnect between the Kurdish multitude and elite continued throughout the
interregnum period, as detailed in the second chapter of this work. Although Kurdish parties
made what little effort they could to advocate for their interests at the Versailles peace
conference, the fact that Mustafa Kemal’s promises to protect the Kurds and the ‘caliphate’ from
the West proved more convincing to the Kurdish population than nationalist proposals again
reveals the lack of a natural proclivity towards ethnic mobilization in the Kurdish population. It
was only when Kemal engaged in a policy of brutal ethnic cleansing and Kurdish erasure that
Kurdish nationalist organizations sprung up in response, indicating that only the denial of
Kurdish cultural rights resulted in the formation of a coherent ethno-political Kurdish identity.
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This pattern is reflected in colonial Iraq, where a lack of coercive opportunity structures led to a
relatively late-developing Kurdish nationalist project, which even then only formed again as a
reaction to the Mahabad Republic and exogenous shocks in the region. Chapter three details the
formation of the KDP and the brutal erasure of the Kurds in Turkey, all the while continuing to
support my argument that Kurdish nationalism rarely if ever arises spontaneously, or even in
response to ‘opportunities’, but almost always in response to a perceived external threat to the
very idea of Kurdishness itself.
As explained in the fourth chapter, Kurdish national movements have in the post-colonial
era bifurcated into ‘traditional’ and ‘radical’ elements, both of which emerged in response to the
specific political contexts of their domestic environments. The PKK in Turkey was borne from a
long history of Kurdish activists being excluded from legal avenues of dissent and a chaotic
environment of political violence in 1970s Turkey, which resulted in the formation of numerous
radical leftist political groups even beyond the PKK itself. The KDP, on the other hand, can to an
extent trace its lineage back to pre-state and tribal ties of loyalty and has traditionally pursued a
policy of negotiation and rapprochement with neighboring states. This chapter demonstrates that
while transversal Kurdish collaboration or communication has the potential to inspire and
‘reignite’ Kurdish movements, it does not have the staying power to influence them
meaningfully when compared to domestic political contexts, as illustrated by the case of the
KDP’s Radio Broadcasts in East Anatolia. Furthermore, chapter four repudiates the ethnic
alliance model through an analysis of KDP-KDPI relations, concluding that Barzani’s
willingness to persecute his ideological and ethnic brethren for Iranian support undermine
notions of a pan-Kurdish solidarity.
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Although rival spheres of Kurdish liberation developed in relative isolation throughout
the 60s and 70s, from the 1980s on the parties have engaged in cross-border collaboration,
conflict, and betrayal, the contours of which are explored in the final two chapters of this
volume. Drawing on Hannes Černy’s pioneering study of transversal Kurdish relations, chapters
five and six evaluate the significance of ethnicity in motivating the interactions between these
spheres, ultimately concluding again that objective ethnic ties play a minimal role when
compared with Kurdish parties’ realist, even pathological, obsession with their own self interest. 8
Although the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and KDP both entered into tenuous
alliances with the PKK when political expediency required it, the brief period of alliance
between the parties of Iraqi Kurdistan and the PKK serves as an exception to the general state of
affairs between the groups, not the normal state. Marriages of convenience made between the
camps between 1979 and 1983 were transgressed, first by the PKK and then the KDP, in favor of
alliances with states hostile to their rival Kurdish organization. The final chapter engages in an
analysis of contemporary dynamics and recent developments in the field of Kurdish studies,
identifying Öcalan’s post-1999 philosophy of ‘democratic confederalism’ and that project’s
reification in Rojava for the past decade as one ripe source for new transnational Kurdish
cooperation and contestation.9 Never before have two Kurdish semi-autonomous entities had
such formal control over a shared international border, and the opportunities provided by
trans-Kurdish collaborations appear to be greater than they have been at any prior time in the
region's history. Despite this fact, it still appears that the ideological division between the two
governing philosophies and the KRG’s increasing economic dependency on Turkey serve as
insurmountable obstacles to the establishment of a genuine and ongoing Kurdish partnership
8

Hosseinoun, forthcoming
Hasan, Harith, and Khaddour, Kheder. 2021. “The Making of the Kurdish Frontier: Power, Conflict, and
Governance in the Iraqi-Syrian Borderlands.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, p. 7
9
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spanning the Syrian-Iraqi borderlands. Throughout the historical analysis contained within this
thesis, I aim to repeatedly demonstrate the fallacy of relying upon ethnic bonds or ‘essentialist
ties’ as motivators of Kurdish political action, contending that Kurds in the region have
displayed no tendency to provide preferential treatment or consideration to their neighbors across
the border by virtue of their ethnicity alone. The consistency and tenacity of this refusal to adopt
ethnicity as the determining variable for political mobilization and collective action indicates that
the weight theorists of International Relations lend to shared ethnicity in their studies of
nationalism, identity, and violence are in dramatic need of reconsideration.
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Literature Review
‘Clichéd Constructivism’ and Contested Roots of Ethnonational Identity
The field of International Relations is, at its core, an analysis of interactions between
socio-political units and the conflicts that arise among them. In the contemporary global political
landscape, these groups most frequently take the form of modern, centralized nation-states with
wide institutional reach and cultural power, the governments of which rhetorically claim to
represent the will of citizens in amalgam. The roots of nations and nationalism remain deeply
contested topics within the field, with arguments ranging from primordialist depictions of
identity as ancient and intrinsically imbued in the individual to constructivist conceptions of
national identity as an inherently modern phenomenon, brought about through the homogenizing
institutions of the nation-state. While the field of nationalism has made significant progress in
acknowledging Benedict Anderson’s characterization of modern states as ‘imagined
communities,’ even progressive scholars who rhetorically adhere to a critical interpretation of
nation-building as an act of discursive construction tend to treat groups, once formed, as static
and unchanging entities. Scholarly titans, including the likes of Anthony Smith, Ernest Gellner,
and Eric Hobsbawm, whose works have defined the axes of contemporary debates on
nationalism, acknowledge that national communities cannot be formed without institutions of
mass socialization enabled by the proliferation of capitalist economies and popular media. They
still subscribe to the assumption, however, that nationalism builds upon pre-existing group
divisions in society, often depicting ethnopolitical groups as naturally emerging social sects,
rooted in deep histories and retaining enduring significance to the present day. In doing so, these
scholars have perpetuated the normalization of a now dominant ‘clichéd constructivism’ in the

Constructing Kurdistan: Cross-Border Kurdish Relations and Ethnic Identity

22

field of International Relations by implicitly endorsing the formation of ethnic and national
groups as grounded in a “pre-existing, historically inherited proliferation of cultures.”10
Sociologist Rogers Brubaker deems this approach to social science as ‘groupism’, the
tendency to take discrete, bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, chief protagonists
of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social analysis.11 Despite advances to the contrary in
the fields of sociology and anthropology, scholars of International Relations and Security
continue to reify groups and treat them as quasi-natural and deeply constituted social entities,
“framing accounts of ethnic, racial, and national conflict in groupist terms as the struggles ‘of’
ethnic groups, races, and nations.”12 This perspective on global politics is perhaps best reflected
in Samuel Huntington’s infamous ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which predicted that conflicts in the
post-Cold War era would take place along the boundaries between ethnocultural groups as a
result of natural and ancient grievances. This essentialist depiction of identity politics, one of the
most frequently assigned readings for undergraduate IR students, was integral in shaping the
axes of debate in American foreign policy and popular culture in recent decades, despite its
tenuous-at-best relationship to historical reality. Despite a perception at more liberal institutions
in the United States that ‘constructivism’ has become the dominant epistemological framing for
studies of International Relations, the enduring strength of groupism is “made plain by a study of
the required reading lists for general IR theory courses at the PhD level of the top ten US
political science departments from 2005 until 2007 conducted by Thomas Biersteker”, which
concluded that out of 809 different publications and a total of 454 authors, 69 per cent of
readings can be categorized as unambiguously rationalist positivist, 10 percent as systemic
constructivist, and only two out of ten reading lists featured authors dubbed ‘radical’– post10
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structuralist, feminist or critical constructivist.”13 Although progress in academia has doubtless
been made been made in the past decade, it remains the case that scholars themselves are not
immune to a lifetime of socialization in overtly and covertly political environments, which by
their nature engage in we/they othering and contribute to a groupist ontology. Our process does
not occur “in a social vacuum, unfiltered through the media, the advocacy of think tanks via
political decision makers”, and processes of socialization more broadly.14 The perception,
therefore, of ethnic and national groups as ‘common sense’ sources of social bifurcation is not
intrinsic to human interaction but instead stems from the omnipresence of ethnonational
narratives in the modern world.15 Nevertheless, as “analysts of naturalizers” scholars of identity
must be cautious not to become “analytic naturalizers”, unintentionally reifying ‘common sense’
understandings of vernacular categories.16
Antonio Gramsci’s concept of common sense in the subaltern consciousness is a useful
theoretical framework through which to examine this apparent invisibilization of groupism,
which is disseminated out of political necessity by economic and social elites to legitimate the
national project itself. Although Gramsci’s depiction of hegemonic narratives was squared firmly
in the Marxist-Leninist school of thought and concerned itself primarily with the mobilization of
the industrial proletariat, his description of contradictions in the political sociology of
working-class citizens proves remarkably pertinent to contemporary constructivist approaches to
nationalism and ethnicity.17 Just as many scholars rhetorically adhere to constructivism while
furthering essentialist assumptions in their work, the “theoretical consciousness [of the worker]
13
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can indeed be in opposition to his activity. He has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one
contradictory consciousness), one which is implicit in his activity and unites him with all his
fellow-workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or
verbal, which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed.”18 In this sense, the
‘theoretical consciousness’ of clichéd constructivism can be viewed as working in opposition to
a more holistic and objective understanding of ethnopolitical identity, which identifies all
supra-local bonds as constructed in response to macropolitical contexts.
Bordieu terms the imposition of a cultural habitus by a regime of power as doxa, “the
drawing of the line between the field of that which is explicitly questioned…and of that which is
beyond question and which each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact of acting in accord with
social convention.”19 Similarly, Foucault famously stated “that power produces knowledge, and
that knowledge is never neutral but a function of existing power structures.” The construction of
“knowledge linked to power … assumes the authority of ‘the truth,’ but also has the power to
make itself true”.20 This has been the case in the dissemination of modern nationalism, where an
ahistorical epistemological justification for the ethnonational state has been fabricated by elites
in order to legitimate a top-down process of power centralization.
These invisible and integral influencers of sociopolitical discourse are not limited to the
manipulation of the multitude: they also have clearly influenced perceptions and practices of
scholars in the field of identity for decades without sufficient scrutiny. It is a central aim of this
thesis to problematize those social boundaries which are essentialized in our cultures, and to
adopt a cognitive approach to nationalism and ethnicity that challenges “taken-for-granted
background knowledge, embodied in persons and embedded in institutionalized routines and
18
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practices, through which people recognize and experience objects, places, persons, actions, or
situations as ethnically marked or meaningful.”21
This project is necessarily challenging for this reason—it explicitly calls into question
many markers of difference we recognize in our day-to-day sociopolitical discourses,
encouraging a post-structuralist approach to studying identity formation.

Support for a Critical Interpretation of Group Identity

Although depicting national and ethnic groups as wholly-constructed modalities of social
organization remains a challenge for contemporary constructivist scholars, some theorists have
furthered a cognitive and objective approach to group formation since the emergence of social
science as a discipline. Max Weber, universally considered a seminal thinker in politics,
economics, and sociology, briefly broaches the subject of ethnicity in his influential tome
Economy and Society. Despite the highly racialized nature of dominant discourses on the subject
of race and ethnicity in Weber’s macropolitical context of early twentieth-century Germany, he
decisively argues for the artificial origin of ethnic differences, stating that “ethnic membership
does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind—particularly in the
political sphere.”22 Taking inspiration from the ancient world, Weber backs up his claim with the
observation that Greek tribes (phylai) and their subdivisions took on highly ethnicized
connotations, despite being formed out of political expediency by Cleisthenes. In this instance,
he contends that “ethnic fictions were a sign of the rather low degree of rationalization of Greek
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political life”, a framework which might be extended to the present day in that groups
peripheralized from the state-building process often view ethnic divisions as especially salient.
Ultimately, though, Weber’s conclusion that “ethnically determined social action
subsumes phenomena that a rigorous sociological analysis would have to distinguish carefully”
fell on the deaf ears of an academy that preferred instead to extract from his work those passages
that would reinforce the uncritical approach to the world necessary to justify colonial
exploitation.23 Thus, Weber has frequently been deemed an ethnic primordialist based in part on
his definition of “nations” as including “notions of common descent and of an essential, though
frequently indefinite, homogeneity”, but also because of some substantialist concessions he
makes to legitimate his work in the eyes of his contemporaries. For example, his depiction of
ethnic solidarity as the integral factor shaping the politico-nationalist claims of Spain, Holland,
and Sweden in the face of receding Christian universalism in the sixteenth century does little to
problematize ethnic construction in a European context.24 Brubaker further suggests that
“Weber’s contribution was largely ignored until recently [because] for Anglophone readers, the
force of his critique has been blunted by translation problems.”25 Whatever the reasons for the
omission of Weber’s nuanced conception of ethnicity from mainstream discussions of identity
politics, the clarity of his argument in favor of moving ‘beyond groupism’ at an early stage in the
development of the social sciences demonstrates that viewing ethnic delineations as almost
entirely fabricated is not purely a modern intellectual framing of the concept.
The field of anthropology, which concerns itself primarily with the study of human
culture by examining individual activities through ethnography, has similarly been influenced by
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societies that encourage essentialist depictions of ethnic and national identity. Nevertheless, the
works of Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian anthropologist who conducted his doctoral dissertation on
political organization in Iraqi Kurdistan during the early 1950s, contributed significantly to
understandings of ethnicity by focusing on the impact of artificial boundaries imposed between
communities.26 In his introduction to Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, Barth reiterates the fact that
constructed ethnic groups primarily “provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying
amounts and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems. They may be of great relevance
to behavior, but they need not be; they may pervade all social life, or they may be relevant only
in limited sectors of activity”—furthering the Weberian argument that ethnicity matters only
when instrumentalized by societal elites, and is politicized primarily in response to external
factors and opportunity structures.27
Crucially, however, Barth emphasizes the critical role that borders, both internally and
externally imposed, play in the construction of disparate ethnicities and group formation. Even if
a given community retains broad cultural similarities, differing political contexts will lead to
different manifestations of group identity. Of course “the same group of people, with unchanged
values and ideas, would surely pursue different patterns of life and institutionalize different
forms of behavior when faced with the different opportunities offered in different environments,”
an asymmetry that is necessarily reflected in the political arena.28 Barth focuses on how ‘cultural
ecologies’ and geographic factors bifurcate group identities through case studies in Baluchistan
and Papua New Guinea, but he also alludes to the impact that politically-imposed territorial
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segregation can have on ethnic boundaries “generally in a colonial context”, especially when
asymmetries of relative power exist across borders.29
Colonial divisions and constraints on cross-group interactions contribute to differing
constructions of identity, but importantly, it becomes “the ethnic boundary that defines the group,
not the cultural stuff that it encloses” [original emphasis].30 As a result, “ethnic boundaries could
be maintained in the absence of major cultural distinctions [and] conversely, substantial cultural
heterogeneity was perfectly compatible with ethnic commonality.”31 Even if circumstances
change and lead to greater inter-ethnic contact and economic interdependence, categorical
we/they distinctions persist despite a flow of personnel across borders. Ultimately, Barth’s
contribution that “interaction in such social systems [need] not lead to their liquidation” is
valuable because it challenged prevailing assumptions of ethnicity as “biologically
self-perpetuating… realized in overt unity in cultural forms.”32 Instead, he believed ‘cultural’
boundaries would be maintained through a process of social conformism and discipline,
maintaining normative differences between arbitrarily divided communities.
This insight has proved increasingly relevant in recent years as trans- and anti-national
political movements have challenged colonial borders in the Middle East in particular, and his
work remains influential in his field, making anthropologists “now very skeptical that ascriptive
boundaries closely correspond to ‘culture’ boundaries” in recent decades. 33 Despite these
advances in the fields of sociology and anthropology, dominant schools of thought in
International Relations and Security are lagging behind the pace, implicitly and explicitly
29
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embracing essentialist depictions of ethnic groups while simultaneously examining the
constructed nature of the political institutions which ostensibly naturally arise from them.34
While most scholars of nationalism have at this point reached an uneasy consensus that
“some nations may be more ancient than others, but all nations emerge in relation to the power of
[modern, constructed] state institutions”, they often still resort to essentialist and substantialist
presumptions of ethnic identities, frequently depicting them as the ‘underpinnings’ of the modern
nation-state.35 In practice, primordialism has by no means disappeared from the scholarly
discourse on nationalism. Rather, it has obfuscated and entrenched its influence by retreating to
the less-understood and less-easily examined arena of ethnic identity. The apparent dichotomy
between ‘naive primordialists’ espousing explicitly racial or genealogical claims and
‘enlightened constructivists’ no longer holds water in contemporary IR: constructivists boldly
identify themselves, but their supposed opponents apparently publish no articles. As Brubaker
says, an analysis of recent publications in the field of nationalism demonstrate that at least in a
rhetorical sense, “we are all constructivists now”. Let us waste no more time repudiating those
who “argue that modern nations are a natural continuum of distinct [ethnolinguistic]
communities and a natural consequence of their development”.36 Since all serious scholars
acknowledge at least some level of constructivism in the statebuilding process, the foci of the
debate clearly require rejuvenation and revision.37 An analogy might be made to the ‘good/bad
binary’ described by Robin DiAngelo with reference to racial narratives in the United States.
While the “open proclamation [of] belief in white racial superiority” is a significant transgression
34
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in most American social contexts, depicting the mere rejection of such beliefs as sufficient to
solve racial issues obscures the structural nature of racism itself.38 Similarly, while overt
declarations of primordialism are rejected in the academy, many scholars’ rejections of
essentialist assumptions are rhetorical and fail to interrogate the structural nature of groupism.

Dominant Macrodevelopmentalist Theories of Nationalism in International Relations

To demonstrate the lasting significance that groupist and ethnically essentialist
explanations for national identity have in the field of International Relations today, I wish here to
briefly review the works of a few scholars whose work on nationalism established constructivism
(however clichéd) as the dominant analytical framework for state-building. Throughout the
1980s, scholars Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson, Anthony Smith, and Eric Hobsbawm all
released their own individual and authoritative accounts of the macro-political contours of
national identity development, and while each thinker’s conviction that states serve as drivers
rather than reflectors of ethnic identity supports the constructivist conception, each ultimately
finds himself reverting back to the groupist assumptions which underlie perceptions of the social
world in various degrees. The earliest of these works is Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism, in
which the author “delights in subverting nationalist ontologies” by chastising all those “who take
the tacit assumptions of nationalism for granted erroneously [and] credit them to humanity at
large” while failing to interrogate his own ‘commonsense’ understanding of ethnic groupism. 39
Gellner argues that the development of the state and nationalism is inextricably tied to a
transition from agrarian to industrial political economy, furthering the Rousseauian view that
38
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‘agrarian man’ was a natural species in harmony with his environment. By contrast, the
‘industrial man’ is artificially produced and incubated by the institutions of nation, which
provides the individual with a central focus of community identity and a higher quality of life
through the provision of state services and infrastructure. Once the material benefits of
modernization have been realized by a population, it is difficult if not impossible to return to a
‘pre-nationalist’ social ontology and organization, just as the privileges of the state are depicted
as inexorably altering human consciousness and group behavior in Rousseau's Discourse on the
Origins of Inequality.40 Ethnic and national identity is further reinforced through the
dissemination of standardized education and the imposition of hegemonic narratives by political
elites, through which national divisions can eventually become ‘naturalized’ and implicitly
accepted within political populations.41
While Gellner concedes the purely synthesized nature of the modern nation-state and its
associated institutions, he still maintains a conviction that the state must be built upon a
foundation of essentialized common culture. He broadly endorses Hobsbawmn’s laconic decree
that “nations create nationalism, not the other way around”, but while he interrogates the
construction of the modern nation itself, he fails to extend this constructivist critique to the
creation of social groups more broadly, asserting that “mankind has always been organized in
groups, of all kinds of shapes and sizes, sometimes sharply defined and sometimes loose,
sometimes neatly nested and sometimes overlapping or intertwined.” Therefore, while the
imposition of nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon made necessary by evolving means
of production and centralization in developing societies, it requires the presence of “pre-existing,
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historically inherited proliferation of cultures or cultural wealth, though it uses them very
selectively, and it most often transforms them radically.”42 To Gellner, nationalism is a form of
self-deception and self-worship codified and instrumentalized by state institutions, but it is
ultimately still built upon bounded ethnic groups. In nationalizing societies, the benefits and
power of industrial development are distributed unequally amongst the population, frequently
empowering members of one ‘group’ while disenfranchising another. Since the nation-state by
definition strives for ethnopolitical congruence, the ‘in’ group emboldened by modernity can
institutionalize their identity through the forms of modern communications identified above.43
Those who are not established as members of the dominant group are forced either to assimilate
to homogenizing national narratives or resist assimilation altogether and instead assert autonomy
for their own ethnic group under the rhetorical auspices of a separate nation. In Gellner’s view,
“if there is not a shared ‘ethnicity’, then assimilation will not occur but rather [disenfranchised
groups] are excluded from society.”44 Thus, while he makes the case for the nation as a social
construction, he maintains the assumption that ‘men have always lived in groups’, and that some
form of patriotism, abstractly conceptualized, has played a perennial part in human perceptions
since a time immemorial.45 In doing so, Gellner reifies the very abstract concepts he aims to
debunk in his work while still contributing meaningfully to a halting evolution of the scholarly
discourse towards constructivism.
The intersections and relative weights of ethnocultural and political conditions and
identities with respect to the development of states bear clear relevance to the field of
International Relations and geopolitical realities more broadly, but many scholars incorrectly
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subsume the ethnic within the political or vice versa, instead of treating them as separate yet
interconnected factors influencing reproductions of identity. Despite a turn towards constructivist
theories in more recent scholarship, there remains “little agreement about the role of ethnic, as
opposed to political, components of nation; or about the balance between ‘subjective’ elements
like will and memory, and more objective elements like territory and language, or about the
nature and role of ethnicity in national identity.”46 This apparent gap in the literature spurred
theorists like Anthony Smith to address more explicitly the challenges purportedly posed by
ethnic bonds to constructivist conceptions of nation through his influential work The Ethnic
Origins of Nations, which aimed to integrate primordial understandings of identity while
concurrently employing a modernist critique of the state and its associated institutions. Smith
defines the nation as “a named human population sharing a historical territory, common
memories, and myths of origin, a mass standardized public culture, a common economy, and
territorial mobility, and common legal rights and duties for all members”, notably combining
essentialist characteristics of ethnic reification with modernist aspects of the centralized state.47
Smith further distinguishes between the two concepts by naming the state as a “legal and
institutional concept” as contrasted with the fundamentally “cultural and social” nature of the
primordial “nation."48 Since an integral aspect of the modern nation-state is, as the name dictates,
to make the political and national unit congruent, the distinction between the ostensibly
naturalized and historically rooted nation and the institutionalized state requires further
interrogation.
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A central framework utilized by Smith in resolving the internal conflicts in his theories of
identity is that of ethnosymbolism, which seeks to ‘square the circle’ by contending that both
historically bounded ethnic cultures and modern institutionalization contribute to the
construction of national identity, as nationalizing societies draw upon pre modern historical,
cultural, and linguistic ties unrelated to the state as a means of mobilizing populations and
gaining legitimacy and popular support for political objectives. Ethnosymbolism is ultimately an
iteration of constructivism in that it views the state as an artificial entity, but it also has the effect
of legitimating the primordialist conviction that “assumed blood ties, race, language, region,
custom” constitute the basic group identity.49 Nonetheless, ethnosymbolist scholars acknowledge
the divide between ethnic group identity and full-fledged nationalism, and frequently locate their
research interests in the chasm between the two phenomena.
Smith describes pre-national cultural ties in the contemporary era as ethnie, which he
defines as “human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an
association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.”50 He further distinguishes between
ethnie and ‘fully fledged’ nations without sovereignty, drawing a distinction between fully
stateless groups and those with codified and institutionalized national governments as in the case
of Scotland or Catalonia. While some ethnie strive for independent sovereignty or federalist
reformation, other groups are content to maximize their influence and privileges within their
existing nation-state as a minority group. Smith acknowledges that the geopolitical landscape
born of these overlapping and competing identities is a mixed and confusing one, in which it
becomes difficult to draw a neat boundary between ethnie and nations, but in which the power of
nationalist aspirations has transformed the nature and relations of all states and ethnie.51
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In the modern state era, where national sovereignty confers protection and legitimacy in
the eyes of the international community, Smith contends that “many people, as a result of the
nationalist drive, find themselves divided in their allegiances between loyalty to the state to
which they belong, and a lingering but explosive solidarity to the ethnie of their birth and
upbringing.” The operative question of contemporary national development to Smith, therefore,
is how and why some ethnie transition to fully-fledged statehood while others do not. While
structural and international factors are often the most cogent factor in suppressing ambitions of
national self-determination for stateless groups, Smith emphasizes the central role of the
statesman or nationalist in transforming ethnic communities into national communities. In short,
nations need nationalists, who can mobilize their respective groups around immutable ‘perennial
bonds’ and act as ‘social and political archeologists’ to mythologize their imagined community. 52
Much in the same vein as Smith, theorist Eric Hobsbawm distinguishes between
‘proto-national bonds’ and nationalism, critically contending that the former does and should not
necessarily lead to the latter.53 Hobsbawm clearly identifies the gap in modernist literature he
seeks to address through ethnosymbolic frameworks in the introduction of his work Nations and
Nationalism Since 1780, where he pushes back against depictions of ethnicity and nation as
wholly modern phenomena furthered by “a new wave of social scientists and historians” whom
he viewed as peripheralizing the “important role for ethnic ties and sentiments from earlier
periods of history.” As a constructivist, Hobsbawm believes that national bonds can be
artificially constructed even in territories without shared histories or ethnic bonds, especially in
the case of recently created settler states like Israel, America, or Australia. Furthermore, he
argues that on occasion we can observe “a total non-congruence of proto-nationalism and
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nationalism even when the two exist simultaneously and in combination.”54 In these cases,
exemplified in Hobsbawm's view by the emergence of Greece to the modern state system in the
nineteenth century, the national narrative of political and literary elites is entirely disconnected
from the daily realities of the multitude. Nonetheless, “however great the differences between the
two”, the state was still able to successfully centralize and institutionalize its power through the
invocation of “existing symbols and sentiments of the proto-national community… mobilized
behind a modern cause” through the invention and manipulation of factitious traditions and an
emphasis on Greece’s ancient prominence as a political entity.55 In the Greek case, the use of
strong and apparently universal pre-national sentiments shared by the group allowed for the
emergence of a modern state, even in the absence of widespread popular support for the
contemporary nationalist project.
While the ethnosymbolic approach to nation-building has historical antecedents and
proves effective at creating a strong emotional bond between the individual and the state in many
modern communities, Hobsbawm is careful to clarify that proto-national bonds alone are “clearly
not enough to form nationalities or nations, let alone states”, for the simple reason that “the
number of national movements, with or without states, is patently much smaller than the number
of human groups capable of forming such movements… and certainly smaller than the number
of communities with a sense of belonging together which is difficult to distinguish from
proto-national.”56 Thus, Hobsbawm argues that different stages of national identity can be
influenced by internal factors and domestic elites, but contends that the ultimate codification of a
nation in the international system, regardless of the extent to which that community fulfills the
54
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requisites of a nation-state, is largely determined by structural factors shaping the geopolitical
landscape more broadly. This incongruity between national identity and state recognition is
perhaps best evidenced by the Palestinian case, where a distinct ethnic group shares a sense of
solidarity and a will for self-determination accompanied by the governing infrastructure of a
state but is denied that classification due to the asymmetries of power in global politics.
Within proto-national bonds, Hobsbawm further distinguishes between supra-local and
political bonds as builders of group identity, ultimately asserting that communities experiencing
premodern forms of political group association are more likely to materialize into nation-states in
the modern era than groups who share only a common ethnicity or language. This assertion runs
counter to dominant theoretical frameworks of International Relations in that it portrays ethnic
divisions as secondary to political ones in the formation of group identity, but captures the
realities of state formation more accurately than the theories preceding it. Hobsbawm supports
his argument by demonstrating the relative historic congruity of political communities in Russia,
Spain, and England during the imperial era with the contemporary state system, arguing that
pre-established feudal systems of social stratification and and centralization better-prepared
communities to adopt bureaucratized state control. While substate political bonds often stem
from economic pragmatism and convenience, more cultural supra-local bonds of association
take the form of shared beliefs and practices, especially in the spheres of language, religion, and
ethnicity.57 Something Hobsbawm acknowledges, but does not emphasize, is the extent to which
supra-local bonds become politicized in reaction to the external imposition of the ethnonational
project. This omission is likely in part due to the Eurocentrism of Hobsbawm and similar
scholars’ analyses of nationalism, as reactionary ethnification proves especially prevalent in
colonial and post-colonial contexts. Hobsbawm challenges the assumption that linguistic
57
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proto-national bonds serve as a salient factor of distinguishing between communities by arguing
that the widespread and often forceful adoption of a ‘national language’ succeeds rather than
precedes the creation of the state.58 It is precisely the modern communications infrastructure of
the state that makes linguistic homogeneity possible through standardized education and mass
media, so judging emergent communities’ worthiness as a state based on a shared language is, in
a sense, putting the cart before the horse. As Benedict Anderson demonstrates, the assumption of
linguistic homogeneity as a precursor to nationalism is an ahistorical myth, as compellingly
illustrated by the enduring diversity of regional dialects in France throughout the twentieth
century.
Although religious bonds of group association undisputedly predate national
communities, Hobsbawm points out that, unlike other markers of group identity that serve to
exclude the ‘other’, many religions are explicitly anti-national, aiming to transcend differences
between disparate individuals in the name of a common faith and encompassing all of humanity.
Thus, utilizing religious rhetoric in the process of state formation is a complex and challenging
process, and is not typically used as a major justification of national identity. In cases where we
see religion playing a significant role in the perpetuation of ethnic conflict (as in former
Yugoslavia or the south Asian subcontinent), it is generally only made possible through the
pre-existence of robust state apparatuses which can be used to socialize and pervert religious
ideologies for political objectives.59
If both language and religion are reproduced by the state as markers of identity rather
than intrinsic characteristics imbued in a given population, the true root of group identity
becomes increasingly difficult to ascertain. While the ‘state’ in its modern form is demonstrably
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a social construction, we cannot altogether disregard the possibility that the sociological roots of
ethnic groups themselves may indeed be ‘buried deep’ and intertwined with the external
influences of the modern world. Any conclusive assertion that sociopolitical identity can be
attributed singularly to the process of modernization or ethnic construction does not take into
account the scale and nuances of the topic at hand. Any individual’s sense of group identity is
deeply personal and unique, and one person’s reason for embracing or refusing ‘nationalist’
ideologies might very well be entirely different from their neighbors’. As scholars, we cannot
directly access the minds of millions across the world in disparate communities and situations,
especially when studying societies organized differently from our own with diverse histories and
cultures. For this reason, Hobbsbawm warns that “the real relations between proto-national
identification and subsequent national or state patriotism must remain obscure[d].” Interviews
and discursive analyses can be invaluable in helping researchers to better understand a
population’s grassroots sentiments, but analyses of nationalism are necessarily doomed to be
imperfect by nature of the size, scope, and abstract nature of the field’s mandate.60 While group
formation is primarily dictated and instrumentalized by social elites, it cannot be understood
“unless also analyzed from below, in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and
interests of ordinary people, which are not necessarily national and still less nationalist.”61
Prioritization of the grassroots manifestation of ethnic and national identity can be well
observed in Benedict Anderson’s 1983 work Imagined Communities, which is more effective
than its contemporaries in integrating sociological and anthropological theories of group
formation within an analysis of the nation-state framework. Like Smith and Hobsbawm,
Anderson acknowledges the dramatic influences that forces of modernity have played in
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centralizing and homogenizing populations, placing special emphasis on the role played by print
capitalism. The decline of Latin as a sacred language and the increasing availability of
standardized print media rapidly encouraged citizens to think about themselves and relate
themselves to others in profoundly new ways through the discursive construction of identity,
frequently within territorial or linguistic borders.62 To Anderson, the “confluence of the invention
of the printing press, the stirrings of capitalism, and the rise of vernacular languages” together
led to people's ability to conceive of communities larger than their immediate social environment
in the form of national and social groups.63 Unlike many of his ostensibly constructivist peers,
however, Anderson consciously applies his designation of ‘imagined communities’ not only to
nations but also to “all other communities that are larger than face-to-face groups”, resisting the
urge to distinguish between communities not “by their authenticity, but [instead] by the way in
which they are imagined.”64 In other words, ethnicity is not more authentic or essential than
nationalism, but rather another manifestation of elite manipulation and mass solidarity frequently
emphasized in communities peripheralized by the state-building process. Perhaps ‘primordial
bonds’ could be maintained between the inhabitants of a small and self-sufficient isolated village
or at most an extensive ‘kin group’, but a “naïve assumption that each tribe and people has
maintained its culture through a bellicose ignorance of its neighbors” was “no longer
entertained” in the field of anthropology even at the time of Barth’s studies a half-century ago.65
While Hobsbawm’s 1990 warning against minimizing the “important role for ethnic ties
from earlier periods of history” in contemporary politics was directed only in part at Anderson,
Stephen Cornell’s 1996 article “The Ties that Bind” more explicitly challenged Anderson’s
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wholly modernist depiction of ethnic bonds.66 Cornell deemed the “circumstantial (and the
constructionist) argument as essentially valid but insufficient” in explaining the continued
persistence and relevance of ethnic divisions in society, particularly in the immediate aftermath
of the dissolution of the USSR.67 Although Cornell accepts the importance of ethnic boundaries
in defining ethnic groups and behavior, describing Barth’s contribution as “invaluable in
overcoming prevailing notions of the fixed and unchanging nature of ethnic identities… and
[understanding] the logic of political mobilization along ethnic lines”, but simultaneously
cautioning the field not to lose sight of what ‘the stuff’ within cultural boundaries really was and
to examine more closely ethnicity’s continued relevance in the political sphere.68 Anderson and
other modernists, however, might suggest in response that the prevailing significance of ethnicity
in shaping the aspirations and claims of political communities reflects the continued relevance of
ethnonational legitimation in the international system rather than a grassroots gravitation towards
ethnopolitical expression.69
Regardless of these internal debates and tensions, nearly all major scholars in the field of
nationalism agree that the dissemination of mercantile capitalism and the European nation-state
model across the globe through Western expansion since the mid-sixteenth century has
irrevocably transformed relations between communities through instrumental constructions of
identity across and within boundaries. In the words of Fearon and Laitin, “economic
modernization and the creation of ethnonational communities through modern mass media are
processes that have affected all groups”, though rarely in an equal or equitable manner.70
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Universal agreement, however, rarely leads to meaningful progress or productive
discourse, so the “resolutely macroanalytic [studies] tracing the long-term formation of nations…
through profound socioeconomic, political, and cultural transformations” exemplified by the
aforementioned works of the 1980s and further reinforced in contemporary scholarship have
remained dominant frameworks of analysis in the field of nationalism and identity for decades.71
While a “developmentalist” temporal register is helpful to simplify and understand the
complex processes of state formation, it also has the ultimate effect of portraying nations or
ethnic groups, once formed, as static and substantial entities.72 It seems that mainstream schools
of International Relations conceive (perhaps subconsciously) of national development as some
form of sociological enzymatic reaction—a great deal of effort must be exerted by political elites
to overcome initial popular pushback to ‘thinking like a state’, but once that resistance is
catalyzed with institutions of modernity and reaches its activation energy through the continued
imposition of hegemonic cultural narratives, citizens ostensibly adopt reproductions of national
identity with little scrutiny or adaptation.

Moving ‘Beyond Groupism’ in Studies of Social Science

In line with this way of imagining political communities, both Gramsci and Bourdieu
observed a tendency for “history to be seen as something that happens to cultures, rather than
cultures being seen as themselves the ever-shifting products of history”.73 In response to this
perceived misconception, Brubaker encourages scholars to shift understandings of group
formation and ethnic identity from things that are to things that happen or do not happen as
71
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events, in some cases through a “reputational cascade” triggered by an exogenous event and
leading quickly to high levels of ‘ethnification’.74 In response to political circumstances In these
instances, ethnic identities “may not reflect individuals’ intrinsic preference at all, but rather their
concern to protect their reputations by signaling ethnic affiliation in a dynamic environment”
where others are increasingly doing so. Frequently, ethnification was adopted not only to protect
the ‘reputations’ of a leader or political group, but also to ensure survival through collective
action in an environment that encouraged mobilization in ethnic terms.75 The First World War
and its aftermath might present the most striking example of a ‘cascading event’, when the
collapse of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Ottoman empires flung millions of
people into a modern state system that rhetorically prioritized the legitimation of ethno-political
units. In such instances, we should not conceive of ‘opportunity structures’ enabling the natural
development of ethnonationalist claims, but rather ‘coercive factors’ forcing political
communities into such claims in order to acquire legitimacy and international recognition.
Assumptions that ethnic and racial divisions underpin and predate nationalist bifurcations
are especially prevalent in the field of International Security and studies of ‘ethnic conflict’,
which have in recent years increasingly invoked ‘ancient hatreds’ and essentialist reasoning to
account for the political instabilities that ultimately stem from inequalities in the geopolitical
system. This attitude is exemplified in Western responses to innumerable crises and conflicts in
the last decades, as reflected in simplistic depictions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Yugoslav War,
Sierra-Leonean Civil War as stemming from natural and immutable ethnic and religious
rivalries.76
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The necessity of a ‘cognitive turn’ away from essentialism and towards a dynamic and
multidisciplinary understanding of identity formation is especially pressing for studies of
ethnicity, because the concept so frequently serves as the ‘underpinnings’ of the contemporary
nation-state for ostensible constructivists. Even as the ‘natural characteristics’ of states have
come under increasing interrogation by academics, a similar critical approach to ethnic
construction has generally not been employed. This can be clearly demonstrated in theories of
ethnic conflict, which remain profoundly influenced by outdated models of group substantialism
including Barry Posen’s ethnic security dilemma and Davis and Moore’s ethnic alliance model.77
These dominant analytical frameworks consider ethnicity to be the “pre-eminent, determining
variable in relations between and within assumed ethnic groups, and equate ontologically those
presupposed ethnic groups with states in their analyses of the internationalization of ethnic
conflicts,” clearly subscribing to groupist assumptions of naturally-occurring intra-group
solidarity, obfuscating the political realities that shape identity, secessionism, and conflict in
practice.78 While they acknowledge that even fully formed states maintain internal heterogeneity
and disparate political communities, they do not extend this approach to definitions of ethnicity,
which continues to be debated most often in essentialist terms.
Although studies of nations and nationalisms are prone to groupist depictions couched in
constructivist rhetoric and terminology, contemporary studies of ethnic groups and ethnicity
sometimes brazenly reject the premises of constructivism altogether and lay bare the
primordialist ontologies and essentialist assumptions which continue to influence understandings
of inter-group interactions in the field of International Relations and Security. Anticipating ethnic
conflict as the natural result of multi-ethnic societies interacting within or across borders is based
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on unsubstantiated assumptions that pluralism necessarily leads to bellicosity. Despite the
warnings of Huntington and his adherents, the state-formation process in the aftermath of the
USSR’s dissolution was, in retrospect, relatively peaceful. Similarly, in contrast to a broad
cultural perception that ethnic conflict is ‘everywhere on the rise’, most evidence suggests an
overall decline in ethnic conflict, as evidenced by a historic decrease in failed states and refugee
crises in recent decades.79
Even if we accept the reification of ethnic groups, when diverse ethnic communities
separated by boundaries interact, “co-operation, not conflict, remains the norm”; recalling
Barth’s reminder that cross-border mobility between sociopolitical groups need not lead to either
ethnic conflict or confluence. Tensions and violence that result from cross-border interaction
more frequently stem from ideological divisions or external machinations than internal
animosity.80 Bruce Gilley, in his article “Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict”, observes with
palpable frustration that “time and again predictions of ongoing ethnic violence based on
immutable structural conditions have been disproved. Prominent predictions of ethnic violence
or break-up in the Ukraine, for example, were disproved as structures changed”, reflecting the
importance of utilizing a temporally flexible rather than developmentalist approach to study of
ethnic identity construction.81 The Ukrainian example specifically might require re-examination
in light of recent events, but it should be noted that the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian conflict is
framed in ideological, imperial, and geopolitical terms far more than ethnic ones. The central
flaw of the field to him is an implicit understanding that “ethnicity in identity and ethnicity in
conflict” are congruent and interchangeable. Without distinguishing between ethnicity as it
happens for people and ethnicity as it is instrumentalized for political purposes, “ethnic conflict,
79
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in the end, becomes not a concept at all but a messy descriptive label for a bunch of unrelated
phenomena” beyond the scope of political science as a discipline.82 While these integral
contradictions and challenges in the field ultimately lead Gilly to argue in favor of “severely
limiting the field of ethnic conflict studies [in political science], if not abandoning it altogether”
and leaving research on the topic to “historians, sociologists, and anthropologists”, he maintains
that analyzing ethnicity, for reasons discussed throughout this chapter, remains important both to
the development of group identity and political conflict.83 Therefore, it remains entirely relevant
to the scope of this study, and I believe that examining and improving poorly-operationalized
concepts of ethnicity and national identity through multidisciplinary analysis instead of
rehashing “tried and true notions like class and security” through established frameworks has the
potential to yield useful future research directions in the field of International Relations.84
The debates outlined above in the field of nationalism, ethnicity, and identity are globally and
comparatively applicable to a plurality of issues and conflicts impacting contemporary political
society, relevant to the politics of state and sub-state communities alike in developed and
underdeveloped settings. A number of scholars in recent years have utilized these theories of group
formation, boundary maintenance, and ethnic constructivism in analyses of diverse sociopolitical
groups and interactions, through “a growing body of work that has framed these ostensibly separate
fields as a single integrated family of forms of cultural understanding, social organization, and
political contestation.”85 To name just a few examples pertinent to this thesis, David Campbell
utilizes post-structuralist theoretical frameworks in his enlightening analysis of foreign policy and
the discursive construction of the enemy through social disciplines and categorical we/they
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distinctions in the American political landscape, and race scholars Michael Omi and Howard Winant
expand upon the consequences of ethnic divisions in pluralistic contexts in their analyses of the
theoretical status of race as a concept and racial formation in the United States.86
Internationally, ‘groupism’ has been notably problematized by David Laitin in the context of
Soviet successor states, and by Andrew Fisher and Matthew O’Hara in their analysis of racial
identities in colonial and post-colonial societies in Latin America. 87 A cognitive approach to ethnic
constructivism has also been employed as a useful tool to examine political mobilization in
diasporadic and immigrant communities, through analyses of groupism and its manifestations in
Australia, Finland, Denmark, Sweden, and other countries—though most of these studies square
their focuses in how minorities from the global south navigate and resist hegemonic racialized
narratives in Western political environments rather than how those narratives themselves are
created.88

Debated Roots of Kurdish Identity and Interaction

While the theoretical framework of post-structuralist constructivism and the analytical
questions that arise from it can easily be adapted to societies across cultural and geographic divides,
the ‘group’ in contemporary politics which arguably proves most relevant to a discussion of ethnic
construction and its consequences is the Kurdish people, frequently identified as the largest stateless
group in the world with a population of at least thirty million individuals dispersed in a mountainous
region encompassing the sovereign territories of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. The development of
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Kurdish nationalism has historically faced a litany of obstacles, stemming from both external and
colonial machinations and internal ideological divisions. Nevertheless, the course of the twentieth
century has seen the rise of robust and powerful Kurdish nationalist movements, both within the
territorial boundaries of sovereign states and in transnational contexts. This thesis traces the
development of Kurdish ethnification and nationalism in the analytical vein of post-structuralist
constructivism, illustrating that Kurdish culture was initially ethnicized and politicized as a survival
strategy, employed in response to external factors priviliving the recognition of ethnonationalist
claims. Taking inspiration from Barth’s boundary theory, a historical account of Kurdish nationalism
with an emphasis on transversal dynamics will reveal that territorially-bounded analyses of Kurdish
identity are inherently limited, and that Kurdish identity has developed precisely through the
vacillating rejection and reinforcement of arbitrary ‘sovereign’ boundaries with real consequences.
Ultimately, a historical examination of Kurdish transnational solidarity will reveal that
political contexts and ideologies, not ethnicity, serves as the determining factor influencing
intra-Kurdish relations. While a shared Kurdayetî exists and fosters solidarity between Kurds on a
cultural and emotional level, this common ethnicity plays only a minimal role in determining the
behavior of Kurdish political parties and elites.89 Despite this, many contemporary analyses of
transnational Kurdish dynamics in the wake of the Syrian Civil War and the emergence of the
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) revert to groupist assumptions in predicting and
portraying Kurdish behavior. Although the ascension of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq
(KRG) and weakening states across the region have facilitated a recent increase in cross-border
Kurdish interactions, this thesis concludes that such collaborations do not reflect a rekindling of
ancient ethnic bonds, but rather a strategy of political expediency employed by Kurds on both side of
89
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the border. Kurdish elites frequently espouse pan-Kurdish rhetoric to lend legitimacy to their
political objectives, but an impartial analysis of Kurdish behavior in the war against ISIL and
interactions between the KRG and its compatriots in Turkey, Syria, and Iran over the past decade
clearly demonstrates that such considerations have little relevance to political practices or outcomes.
The fragmentation of Kurdish nationalism is a natural result of the territorial divisions imposed upon
the region by imperial powers, but the reintegration of Kurdish nationalism in an era of state
weakness is not a foregone conclusion, even with considerable diasporadical and international
support. Assumptions that cross border Kurdish interactions will facilitate cooperation or cohesion
reflect prevailing groupist and essentialist ontologies legitimating ethnic ties as natural avenues of
mobilization, and this thesis’s assertion that ideology and external manipulation surpass ethnicity as
motivators for Kurdish statebuilding activities encourages the field of International Relations to
reexamine the assumed role of ethnicity in nationalism, both in the Middle East and elsewhere.
Although the following section of this piece will enter into a more detailed analysis of
Kurdish identity development from the imperial era to the modern day, beginning with a brief
historic overview of the Kurdish condition in their respective states is necessary to set the stage for
the forthcoming analysis and provide a brief overview of the complex Kurdish independence
movement. Under the Ottoman and Qajar Empires, the Kurdish people were not viewed as a distinct
ethnic minority due to the theocratic organizational structure of the caliphate. Ottoman Kurds were
viewed as practically equivalent to their Turkish counterparts based on their status as Sunni
Muslims, though the Kurdish region did historically suffer from underdevelopment and economic
disenfranchisement.90 Similarly, Shi’a Kurds were readily integrated into the Qajar elite, and while
Sunni Kurds faced persecution based on their religious affiliation, they resisted this subjugation in
tandem with other religious minorities, not fellow Kurds. While a distinct Kurdish culture and way
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of life existed and was readily acknowledged, this difference did not take on any meaningful
political significance.
As the Ottoman Empire, the ‘sick man of Europe’, ailed throughout the globalizing and
centralizing forces of the nineteenth century, limited subsections of the Kurdish intellectual elites
began the process of ethnonational identity construction inspired by their exposure to the European
system. Famously, Sheikh Ubeydullah revolted against his Ottoman superiors in the name of
Kurdish nationalism in 1880, though his patriotic motivations were likely in name only. These early
stirrings of Kurdish self-assertion, represented individual political aspirations and did not extend to
any subsection of the Kurdish population, who far preferred to remain part of the dominant group in
the Ottoman millet system.91 Even after the First World War, when it became clear that ethnic
self-determination was quickly being established as the raison d’etre for emergent political
communities, Kurdish civil society was reticent to adopt the auspices of ethnonationalism, clinging
to the idea of the caliphate even after the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) coup and
subsequent secularization.
It was only after the hegemony of ethnonationalism became painfully clear to the Kurds
through Kemalist suppression, Iranian centralization, and mandatory subjugation at the hands of
colonial powers that Kurds reluctantly adopted the premise of ethnic nationalism, proliferating
advocacy and solidarity organizations across the region in the first half of the twentieth century.
Many of these groups were transnational by design or necessity, since the variable and unpredictable
political contexts of relevant states gave different Kurdish regions opportunities to express
nationalist claims at different times.92
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Kurds in Turkey were initially welcomed into the governing fold during the formative years
of the Turkish War of Independence, with Mustafa Kemal “advancing the idea of a unified Sunni
Muslim community in which the Kurds and Turks were both a part”, and describing himself as a
co-religionist, sending photographs of himself in religious garments and facillitating meetings with
Kurdish tribal Sheikhs all while promising to “save the caliphate from the West”.93 As soon as the
Republic of Turkey was established and Kemal’s grasp on power was reasonably secure, however,
he acted on entrenching his racialized and secularized ethnic Turkish identity in a Western-style
nation-building project through the brutal erasure of a nascent Kurdish identity. This pattern of state
suppression continues to this day and has been integral in shaping the ‘radical’ political ideologies of
contemporary Kurdish movements in the country—though democratization and limited
consociationalism have provided alternative avenues to express ethnopolitical dissent.94
Kurds in pre-Baathist Iraq, by contrast, were afforded de facto autonomy, allowing them to
experiment with the creations of political parties and unify under the charismatic leadership of
Mustafa al-Barzani throughout the 1950s and ‘60s. Kurdish ethnonationalism was bolstered by the
creation of institutions furthering Kurdish identity and interests, from the news daily Kha-Bat and an
active radio station in the social sphere to the formation of a ‘revolutionary council’ with
parliamentary powers of jurisprudence and tax collection and the formation of the Peshmerga
guerilla army with an internal monopoly on the use of justified force in Southern Kurdistan.95 These
modalities of social organization were highly ethnicized and served to disseminate, reproduce, and
refine everyday expressions of Kurdish culture for political means. During Saddam Hussein’s rule,
the creation of a ‘fierce state’ in Iraq denied Kurdish autonomy, and the threat posed by an
alternative to the regime’s structures of governance led Saddam to embark on the genocidal Al-Anfal
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campaign in an effort to dismantle Kurdish identity altogether.96 This cycle of co-option and coercion
has altered and reformed Southern Kurdish identity, but the tangible benefits euro-centric
ethnonational frameworks have brought the population in mandate Iraq and following the Gulf War
have had the ultimate effect of perpetuating a more traditional and conservative approach to political
mobilization in the KRG’s dominant Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).
While the political contexts of Iran and Syria have produced fewer and less-robust Kurdish
social movements than those of Turkey and Iraq, in these states too we can observe constructions
and reconstructions of Kurdish ethnicity and identity. Parties like the PYD in Syria and the KDPI in
Iran have aimed to mobilize their populations around a Kurdish ethnonationalist message, but, in
these cases, strategies of nation-building have been shaped primarily through cross-border
interactions with neighboring Kurdish populations.97 The extent to which Kurdish communities have
been differentially operationalized and instrumentalized by elites in respective states supports a
constructivist perception of the origins of Kurdish nationalism, but the prevalence of cross-border
interactions and enduring ideological bifurcations arising from them despite relative cultural
similarity suggest that the theories of Barth, Brubaker, and others remain relevant to Kurdish
ethnicity, particularly in the globalized context of regional instability which has paved the way for
increasing Kurdish autonomy in recent decades.
The demonstrable impacts that territorially bounded divisions have had on the development
of Kurdish identity all but invalidate genuinely primeval depictions of a pan-Kurdish national project
extending to a past immemorial, which frequently point to Median empire or Buwayhid Daylamites
for evidence of early Kurdish political organization and the scholarly works of Idris-î Bitlis or
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Ahmeî Xanî’s Mam u Zîn as early manifestations of Kurdish nationalism.98 Abbas Vali, a preeminent
theorist of Kurdish politics and society, a career sociologist, and the current vice-president of the
prominent Institut Kurde de Paris, is in line with most contemporary scholars in his assertion that
Kurdish national identity is a distinctly modern phenomenon brought about by the dissemination of
the centralized nation-state as the hegemonic modality of social organization.99 Modernist scholars of
Kurdish identity sometimes contend that Kurds have resided in relative geographic isolation and
cultural homogeneity throughout their early history, but they universally agree that Kurdish
nationalism was not ethnicized or politicized in a meaningful way until at least Sheikh Ubeydullah’s
rebellion against the Ottoman empire in 1880100—or, as this thesis will argue, not until significantly
later. Thus, just as Gellner, Smith, and Hobsbawm were successful in dispelling notions that nations
were historical continuations of existing communities, Abbas Vali, Hakan Özoğlu, Denise Natali,
Hamit Bozarslan, and other modernists have been successful in refuting assumptions of a genetic or
biological pan-Kurdish national sentiment rooted in ethnic ties from time immemorial. Universal
adoption of constructivist premises, however, is rife with pitfalls and contradictory avenues of
inquiry, as demonstrated by the ongoing debates in the literature above. While an acknowledgment
that political contexts and processes of modernization have been integral in disparate constructions
of Kurdish ethnopolitical identity is certainly preferable to the alternative essentialist ontology, a
broad endorsement of constructivist premises alone does not insulate the field from subtle influences
stemming from a globally-perpetuated ethnicized doxa and the groupist assumptions which arise
from them. This issue is manifested in two recurring flaws which continue to impact studies of
Kurdish ethnicity.
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Central Deficiencies and Areas for Growth in the Field of Kurdish Studies

First, there remains in the literature a vestigial depiction of the Kurdish people as unjustly
politically separated but somehow culturally or morally homogenous, which reifies ethnic
constructions by implying that cross-border interaction or changing structural conditions would
necessarily lead to a confluence of Kurdish identity rooted in ancient cultural similarities.101 Such
depictions are furthered by David McDowall, arguably the most prominent Western scholar on
Kurdistan, in his 1992 book The Kurds: A Nation Denied, where he portrays the Kurdish people as
“wrestl[ing] between the strength of their long-standing and traditional identity, and the weaknesses
of political development”.102 Similarly, while International Security theorist Gerard Chaliand
engages in a concise but accurate account of how shifting structural conditions have differentially
impacted Kurdish nationalism in the twentieth century in the introduction to his anthology A People
Without A Country, he quickly reverts to referring to the “Kurdish movement” as uniform and
homogenous in the abstract, falling back on the inclination to think of human organization in group
terms.103
Even firm modernists of the subject like Denise Natali, a long-time lecturer at the Kurdish
University of Salahaddin who argues for a “direct relationship between ethnicized political
boundaries and Kurdish ethnonationalism”, can resort to terminologies that involuntarily reinforce
groupist notions.104 In the eyes of Huseyin Tunc, Natali’s writings on Kurdayetî, literally translated
as ‘Kurdishness’, conflated the proto-national and instrumentalized ties of ‘common custom’ with a
full-fledged Kurdish nationalism, while barely “describing, contextualizing, or even defining” the
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concept. Manipulating the meaning of Kurdayetî without proper conceptualization engenders
confusion, and furthers groupist and essentialist assumptions that shared culture equates to
nationalism in an exergonic process.105 Natali identifies herself clearly as a constructivist, aiming in
her work to “challenge views of Kurdish nationalism that focus on essentialist features of
Kurdishnesss” and instead demonstrate how Kurdish nationalism emerges differentially accordion to
boundaries and opportunity structures in disparate political contexts. At the same time, her language
frequently reveals her assumption of an intrinsic and powerful ethnic identity underlying the national
project. Just as Anthony Smith considers ethnicity to be the ‘roots’ of nationalism, Natali argues that
the proper sociopolitical contexts can ‘awaken’ ethnic groups’ “distinct historical trajectories and
objective group characteristics…that provide a pre-existing basis for national identity”.106 Though
Natali’s constructivist depiction of Kurdish-state relations presents a fantastic depiction of how the
Kurdish ethnonational project has been driven by external forces and ideological divisions, I would
problematize her vestigial assumption of naturally-occuring Kurdish confluence or solidarity, an
undertone that might reflect the success of rhetorical pan-Kurdish nationalism in the KRG today, the
context of which likely influenced her work.
Thus, even as the broad adoption of basic constructivist premises has attained
near-hegemonic status in recent years, some constructivism in the field remains ‘clichéd’—albeit at
times unintentionally. Only by acknowledging that the ‘ethnic ties’ bonding Kurdish populations
together are equally as constructed as the ‘political ties’ of all modern states can we move towards a
deconstructive understanding of Kurdish identity, one which “critically examines the discursive
processes of materialization that produce settlements; such as the idea of pre-given subjects…in this
case the ethnic group”.107 In his study of PKK/KDP relations, Hannes Černy contends that many
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studying Kurdish ethnicity and ethnic conflict more broadly “subscrib[e] unquestioningly to these
strategic essentialisms, and by doing so reproducing their logic and reifying the politics of ethnic
division they set out to describe”.108 Both ethnonationalist elites and IR scholars studying them are
protagonists of ethnic conflicts; yet while elites, by essentializing the group they claim to represent,
are acting within the confines of their supposed social roles, we as scholars are responsible for
problematizing such assertions—and not becoming ‘analytic naturalizers’ as cautioned by Bordieu.
The second central deficiency in Kurdish studies that this thesis aims to address is the
tendency of constructivist scholars to focus on territorially-bounded Kurdish identity development as
case studies of national development in relative isolation, which also unintentionally contribute to
the groupist assumptions such theorists intend to dispel. Most books published on Kurdish
ethnonationalism in recent years approach the complicated Kurdish question by dividing their
analysis into subsections: ‘Kurds in Iraq, Kurds in Iran’, and so on.109 Although this structural
approach is pragmatically convenient and does run contrary to essentialist pan-Kurdish assumptions,
it has the effect of minimizing the influence of boundaries and cross-boundary interaction in the
formation of Kurdish identity. Transnational cooperation and conflict has been a driving force in
fostering or undermining Kurdish nationalism, but the plethora of international interactions that have
guided the course of Kurdish political mobilization inevitably fall into the cracks of a broader
analysis with its attention focused on the interactions between Kurds and states in their respective
environments, not on the interactions between Kurds and Kurds in disparate contexts. Even the
modernist, authoritative, and impressive Cambridge History of the Kurds relegates an analysis of
‘transversal dynamics’ to the final chapters of the thousand-page volume, minimizing the permeating
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significance of transnational interaction throughout Kurdish national development.110As a result of
this structural marginalization, attention paid to ethnic boundaries and the frontiers of discursive
construction are frequently relegated to the introductions, conclusions, and footnotes of works on
Kurdish nationalism when they should be placed at center stage. The works of David Romano,
David Phillips, and Hannes Černy in recent years have made progress in establishing a chronological
and thematic rather than territorial approach to analyses of Kurdish nationalism, but geographically
segregated analyses still dominate the bulk of the literature on the subject.111
Barth’s theories of ethnic group formation illustrate that such a segregated approach to
understanding Kurdish ethnicity is fundamentally flawed, because it is precisely challenges to and
reinforcements of ethnic boundaries themselves which define and shape communities.112 This
literature underestimates too the influence of a prominent Kurdish diaspora in the global north,
which like other expatriate communities frequently advocate for pan-ethnic [Kurdish] mobilization
without engaging with the politics of the community on the ground, in a process Salehyan describes
as ‘long distance nationalism’.113 Nuanced approaches to development within respective Kurdish
territories are valuable and necessary, but too strong a macro analytic and developmentalist focus
can obfuscate the temporal flexibility of identity and risk losing the context of the Kurdish question
more broadly.
Despite the contradictions and complications of Kurdish ethnonationalism in cross-border
conflicts, recent years have seen a budding growth of new scholarship utilizing a cognitive approach
to understanding Kurdish ethnicity, though the relative nascence of the post-structuralist approach to
ethnicity limits the existing body of literature. Although Natali’s book The Kurds and the State
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follows the aforementioned state-by-state organizational structure, it still provides valuable insights
into “the significance of transnational spaces” in reshaping Kurdish identity “at home”, and a 2004
article of hers addresses the transnational networks of Kurdish elites directly, primarily through the
lens of a newly-autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan.114 Abbas Vali has and continues to advocate for an
understanding that the origins of Kurdish nationalism arise from “disparate and dissenting things
with diverse histories, which escape the authority of essentialist meanings”.115 Furthering Barth’s
theories of ‘cultural ecologies’, Maria O’Shea and Ariel Ahram emphasize the role that geographic
realities play in the relative isolation of Kurdish groups, and their persistent resistance to
state-backed campaigns of violence and erasure.116
Most relevant to this thesis, however, Hannes Černy applies specifically the theories of
Rogers Brubaker and his call to problematize groupism to the Kurdish case, engaging in an in-depth
analysis of PKK, KDP, and the PUK in his masterful 2017 book “Iraqi Kurdistan, The PKK, and
International Relations”. In this volume, as in his previous works, Černy challenges dominant
models of International Relations theory and ‘common sense’ ascriptions of the ‘internalization of
ethnic conflict’, encouraging scholars of Kurdish nationalism to analyze developments in the region
without ascribing to culturally-ubiquitous and naturalized essentialist assumptions.117 This thesis
seeks to expand upon Černy’s directive first by depicting the historically constructed and
trans-national nature of Kurdish identity politics as described above. A more nuanced understanding
of how Kurdish nationalism has evolved differently and transversally in response to domestic,
international, and transnational conflicts and opportunity structures will allow this project to
examine in greater depth contemporary cross-border Kurdish activities in Iraq, Turkey, Syria, and
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Iran, and make informed predictions about how Kurdish nationalism will evolve in an era of
instability and globalization. Ultimately, a historical and contemporary analysis will reveal that
ideological and external factors are likely to continue impeding the emergence of a unified Kurdish
nationalism in the foreseeable future, and conclude that while increasing cross-border Kurdish
interaction has the potential to stimulate new and diverse nationalisms rejecting the validity of
colonial boundaries, such a confluence stemming from ethnic similarity is neither a natural or
inevitable result of increasing Kurdish autonomy.
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Chapter One
The Emergence of Kurdish Identity in the Late Imperial Era

If you were to walk down the streets of Diyarbakir, Erbil, Kermanshah, or any number of
cities located within the roughly defined Kurdish homeland and spoke to an average patriotic
citizen about their thoughts on the root of Kurdishness, it is likely that the response you receive
will be a primordialist depiction. The mainstream Kurdish nationalist views the Kurdish nation
as a “primeval and natural formation rooted in the nature of every Kurd, defining the identity of
people and communities throughout history”, with ethnic commonality serving as the central
impetus for social organization.118 It is certainly true that the Kurdish people feel a sense of
cultural distinctiveness and a strong connection to their established territory, but the historicist
conception of primordial Kurdish nationalism today should be correctly identified as a strategic
reconstruction of the past undertaken by Kurdish elites rather than a reflection of actual reality.
Widespread acceptance of essentialist Kurdish nationalism in popular and political discourses,
moreover, reflects the successes of Kurdish elites in constructing a mythical national identity in
their relative spheres of influence.
As discussed in the previous section, the origins of nationalism are frequently more
modern and artificial than is commonly believed in states around the world, and this appears to
be especially true in the Kurdish case. Abbas Vali, a highly influential Kurdish modernist,
reminds his readers that the “historical past is a discursive construct [used to create] myths of
uniform historical origins and identities” for political purposes, and the example of the Kurds is
no exception to this general theoretical perspective.119 Contemporary Kurdish nationalists have
much to gain from an agreed-upon national origin story, which proves a useful tool for political
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mobilization and lends legitimacy to ethno-territorial claims. Given this fact, it is perhaps not
surprising that many modern Kurds claim direct descendency from the ancient Median empire,
while the true historic origins of the Kurds are complex and shrouded in uncertainty.120
Although sporadic references to tribes with familiar names including Kardu, Kharduchi,
and Kar-Da inhabiting the mountains of Central Asia can be found in the records of antiquity,
Ofra Bengio and Jack Eller agree that by the time the word Kurds was first used to identify a
group by Arab leaders in the seventh century, it was a term used “as basically a regional or even
socioeconomic term—meaning something like ‘mountain people’ or ‘nomad’—rather than an
ethnic one”.121 Similarly, Michael Eppel identifies the etymology of Kurd as originally meaning
‘shepherd’, while simultaneously acknowledging that “debates on the meaning of the signifier
Kurd and the relationship between modern Kurdish nationalism and the ancient population of the
mountains of Kurdistan have continued among scholars for more than one hundred years”—and
are unlikely to be resolved in the immediate or distant future.122 Regardless of the name’s specific
origin, most historians agree that the term had little ethnicized meaning until the nineteenth
century, repudiating Smith’s assertion that pre-national modalities of group formation were
primarily ethnie based.123
The reality of the matter is that the regional political landscape in the imperial region was
not ethnicized, so ethnicity rarely emerged as a locus for powerful self-identification, let alone
widespread political mobilization. Both the Ottoman and Iranian empires conceived of ‘minority’
populations in almost entirely religious terms, with ethnic background having limited relevance
in sociopolitical life. In the Ottoman Empire, Sunni Muslim ideology assumed “a central role in
120
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centrally administered institutions”, and the millet system differentiated populations specifically
according to religious affiliation rather than ethnicity.124 Indeed, through much of the empire’s
history, Sunni Muslim Kurds were afforded positions within the Ottoman bureaucracy, and
would almost certainly have felt far more politically aligned with their Arab Sunni peers than
with a Yazidi Kurd. In the Qajar dynasty, the thirty percent of the Kurdish population that was
Shi’a were provided special incentives to integrate with other non-Kurdish Shi’a groups in order
to maximize their benefits from the clerical bureaucracy, while non-Shi’a groups preferred to
organize collectively with other religious minorities rather than on the basis of ethnicity.
Furthermore, even Sunni Kurds were frequently “provided with opportunities as part of the tribal
community”, compensated by the state for defending the empire’s borders in land and
government posts.125 The imperial political landscape, therefore, did not encourage Kurds to
view themselves in an ethnic sense, and actively discouraged political mobilization on ethnic
rather than religious grounds. As Hobsbawm notes, the theocratic mode of organization is
explicitly anti-national, since religious ideology can be adopted regardless of heritage and
culture. For this reason, the meaningful social divisions for the Kurds in the imperial era were
between Sunni, Shi’a, and Christians, not between Kurds, Arabs,Persians, and Armenians.
This is not to deny, however, that Kurdish peoples prior to this period felt a sense of
cultural distinctiveness and distinguished themselves from neighboring populations. Trapped
between the borders of the rival Ottoman and Safavid empire for centuries, the immensely
diverse Kurdish people retained similar cultural practices and cultivated some form of group
consciousness, as evidenced by Ahmedî Xanî’s famous 1695 poem Mam u Zîn, which was
provocatively written in native Kurmanji and contained a passage lamenting the ongoing
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subjugation of Kurds by neighboring empires. While Xanî’s hope for a single leader of “us… to
reduce to vassalage Turks, Arabs, and Persians… [and] to perfect our religion, our state” can
certainly be read as an appeal to ethnonationalism and has indeed become the ‘national epic of
the Kurds’ in the eyes of modern nationalists, Hakan Özoğlu deems it misleading to label Mam u
Zîn as nationalist literature since Xanî’s mere resentment of Ottoman and Persian rule does not
constitute a claim for ethno-territorial sovereignty, a concept which would not have existed at the
time. Although scholar Amir Hassanpour’s developmentalist argument that the expressions of
identity in Mam u Zîn and other literature of the era constitute stirrings of an awakening Kurdish
ethnie has some merit and deserves consideration, Özoğlu’s assertion that it is “not the epic, but
the political and the intellectual environment of the [contemporary] nationalist era that
retrospectively qualified this piece of literature as nationalist” better represents the modernist
viewpoint of the historical past as a discursive construct.126 While it is unlikely that Mam u Zîn
was an assertion of Kurdish nationalist claims by modern standards, Xanî was indisputably a
Kurd and felt a sense of shared distinctiveness with his compatriots, however he defined them.
This certainly supports Smith’s assertion of pre-national and spontaneous expressions of ethnic
solidarity, but as Eppel and others suggest, it is likely that ‘Kurd’ to Xanî was a sociocultural
rather than ethnic term, and his definition of ethnicity would look dramatically different to those
espoused by modern Kurdish nationalists. Instead, it is primarily the discursive reconstruction of
history through the lens of ethnonationalism, something that did not occur until the latter half of
the twentieth century in the Kurdish political space, that contributes to perceptions of Xanî’s
work as nationalistic or secessionist.127
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Stirrings of a ‘Passive Revolution’: Sheikh Ubeydullah’s Revolt of 1880

While a historic survey reveals that Kurdish populations have in some form expressed
their cultural distinctiveness and a sense of Kurdayetî since the pre-nationalist era, Kurdish
nationalism in its modern sense arose only in response to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and
the partition of the Middle East in the aftermath of WWI. Even in the early twentieth century, the
rhetoric of Kurdish nationalism was used almost exclusively by urban elites and religious
figures, who quickly recognized that an ethnoterritorial claim to statehood was important to
security and international support in the emerging modern state system and could provide them
with considerable personal power. Many scholars of Kurdish nationalism and history from a
diversity of analytical backgrounds date the origins of the movement to the 1880 rebellion of
Sayyid Ubeydullah, a prominent Kurdish notable and religious leader who revolted against both
the Ottoman and Qajar states, ostensibly “in the name of Kurdish nationalism and Islam” with
the aim of establishing a Kurdish state.128 In reality, though, an analysis of Ubeydullah’s rebellion
and its circumstances quickly reveals that ethnic solidarity was a peripheral motivator of his
actions at best and that his true allegiances were to the Ottoman state and personal profit.
Even if Ubeydullah was not the progenitor of modern Kurdish nationalism as some
suggest, the fact that he draped his communications with foreign audiences with the rhetoric of
ethnic nationalism demonstrates the permeating power of European-style sociopolitical ideology
in the Ottoman empire, a phenomenon that would increase exponentially over the following
decades. To understand Ubeydullah’s motivations, it is important to first understand the factors
that suddenly swept him to power and allowed him to mobilize Kurdish tribal leaders more
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effectively than his predecessors. Sayyid Ubeydullah was a member of the Semdinan family, a
highly respected lineage with considerable trans-tribal influence and ancestral links to the
Prophet himself.129 This religious authority alone was highly significant and applicable to
theocratic power structures, but it was further supplemented by the power vacuum and economic
opportunities provided to Kurdish elites by the tanzimat reforms, which opened the Ottoman
Empire to Western markets and influence.
The reforms coincided with Sultan Mehmet II’s policies of economic centralization and
direct taxation, which put an end to semi-autonomous Kurdish vilayets in the region throughout
the 1830s and 40s.130 At the same time, the empires’ increasing links to Europe and policies of
secularization adopted as a part of the tanzimat “left a void in its relations with the Kurds, which
was structurally based on a religious understanding” as codified in the millet system.131 The
weakening of the link between Islam and authority in the Ottoman Empire led Kurds to feel
“increasingly disconnected from the imperial core”, especially since the abolishment of the
vilayets was not replaced with state services or security, leading to a period of relative instability
and, in the opinion of anthropologist Martin Van Bruinssen, “a step backward in social evolution,
away from the creation of a potential state”.132 Despite Van Bruinssen’s depiction of national
development as a developmentalist process inevitably culminating in the nation state, the fact
that the emergence of Kurdish identity was stunted and reversed at times through external
intervention reflects Olson and Tucker’s early post-structuralist assertion that nationalism is not a
one-directional, inevitable, or irreversible process.133 Even if the Ottoman reforms under Mehmet
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II were negative for the Kurds in general, wealthy latifundists like Ubeydullah could reap huge
profits from his access to new global agricultural commodity markets that had been unattainable
prior to the tanzimat..
The Şemdinan family had already established wealth through the spice trade and
donations from followers, but during the 1870s and 80s Ubeydullah began buying large tracts of
land and villages from both the Ottoman and Qajar authorities, creating pastures and crop fields
spanning the border between the empires. The average value of land increased by 75% in the
reform period Ubeydullah took advantage of, and it is likely he was able to leverage his position
to profit from globalizing agricultural markets. Although Ottoman Kurds were in a position to
accept centralized leadership and Ubeydullah was equipped to supply it, the central catalyst of
the 1880 rebellion was the 1878 Russo-Ottoman War, its aftermath, and the resultant Treaty of
Berlin. A resounding defeat in the war demonstrated to the Kurds the “debility” of the Ottoman
forces and the weapons provided to Kurdish troops during the conflict armed the population for
the upcoming conflict.
When the Empire signed the capitulatory Treaty of Berlin in July 1878, the West imposed
provisions that required the Ottomans to provide protection for Armenians and other Christians
and continue further reform.134 Ubeydullah immediately reacted, writing to an Ottoman official:
“What is this I hear, that the Armenians are going to have an independent state in Van, and that
the Nestorians are going to hoist the British flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will
never permit it, even if I have to arm the women.”135 Though it is true that Ubeydullah badly
wanted to prevent an Armenian ascendancy, this can be attributed more to Armenian territorial
claims encroaching on the Sheikh’s property than it could be to genuine patriotism. In fact,
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Ubeydullah initially framed his rebellion as “an attempt to restore peace and order in the region”,
not a nationalist endeavor. Even more strikingly, he sought the support of Nestorian Christians
against the Persian and Ottoman states “by complaining that these two states had done nothing to
stop the aggression of two rival Kurdish tribes—namely, the Shekak of Persia and the Herki of
the Ottoman Empire”.136 Soliciting military support from the Nestorians at the expense of fellow
Kurds does not reflect the behavior of a Kurdish nationalist, only a Kurdish individual
maximizing the benefit he can gain from his circumstances.
In 1879, tensions reached a boiling point when an Ottoman regional governor imposed
prison sentences on a group of Kurds loyal to Ubeydullah for looting a village. In response, he
called for a revolt against the tyranny of the regional governor, and after an apparently
underwhelming military stalemate the two sides reached an agreement once the governor was
dismissed at Ubeydullah’s request.137 This interaction distinctly lacks the flavor of national
rebellion. Even his 1880 invasion of Qajar Iran, ostensibly undertaken for the nationalist
objective of fighting “the suppression of the Kurds by the Shiʿite Iranian authorities, the harm
done to the tribal notables, the monetary penalties imposed on the Kurdish population, and the
assault on the honor of Kurdish women by Iranian officials”, was not devoid of personal
motivations.138 Eppel notes that Ubeydullah had loyal supporters in many Qajar Kurdish tribes
and villages, and owned many orchards and agricultural lands which had recently begun to be
taxed by the provincial authorities. The previous year, the Qajar governor had also arrested
nobles loyal to Ubeydullah, so yet again it seems likely that personal considerations played a
significant role in what was ostensibly a nationalist revolution.139 Some Western and Turkish
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scholars further assert that the Ottoman Empire funded the invasion and provided Ubeydullah
with additional weapons to frustrate their imperial rivals.140 Still, when Ubeydullah did cross the
border in 1880 with an impressive force of Kurds and Christians under his control, the results of
the rebellion were relatively underwhelming—though the force briefly captured Mahabad, it was
swiftly dispelled by a Qajar military force, supplemented by rival Kurdish tribes.141 Even upon
his return, Ubeydullah’s men were not immediately disarmed, and rather than execute the leader
and risk further inflammation, the Porte chose to exile the Sheikh to Medina, where he would
reside until his death in 1883.
Given this apparent lack of nationalist motivations, how can we account for a perception
within academia that Ubeydullah’s revolt constituted “the origin of the Kurdish nationalist
struggle”, or Robert Olson and William Tucker’s claim that Ubaydallah's rule was characterized
by nationalist goals?142 A contributing factor is certainly the tendency of academics to interpret
the past through an ethnicized lens, a bias imposed by socialization in ethnicized political
spheres. Ubeydullah himself, however, also presented his revolt in nationalist terms—especially
to Western audiences. In a letter written to an American missionary named Cochran, the sheikh
lamented the “Kurdish nation” as “a people apart” in need of self-determination. He warns:
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“We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders
we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations… otherwise the whole
of Kurdistan will take the matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these
continual evil deeds and the oppression which they suffer at the hands of the [Persian and
Ottoman] governments.”143

Although this threat clearly reflects a desire for territorial autonomy, historian Wadie
Jwaideh’s claim that such statements “certainly [leave] no doubt as to his strong nationalist
sentiments” fails to consider the possibility that the rebellion was personally or economically
motivated, and that Ubeydullah was strategically utilizing nationalist rhetoric to gain
international support. Primary sources from British consulates at the time depict the Sheikh as
“more or less personally loyal to the Sultan”, and even describe Ubeydullah’s plan to send his
son to Constantinople in an effort to literally purchase his de facto authority over the Kurdish
population from the Ottoman authorities.144 Although Olson points to the Sheikh’s creation of a
‘Kurdish league’ bringing together over two hundred tribal leaders as evidence of early
nationalistic sentiments, the salience of that organization was minimal at best, and historian
David McDowall suggests that the Kurdish league may have even been simply a rumor—it
“certainly never accomplished anything or made any statements”.145 Ultimately, Ubeydullah’s
rebellion is most accurately described as an effort to maximize his control of the region, not an
effort to liberate the Kurds from imperial despotism. The Sheikh demanded territorial autonomy,
but not all autonomous movements can be considered nationalist. Critically, “nationalist
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movements are concerned more with the self-rule of a community than a territory” by definition,
and Ubeydullah’s aspirations were primarily latifundistic.146
Even though a constructivist analysis of Ubeydullah’s rule suggests that it should not be
considered a manifestation of Kurdish nationalism, his ascendency, and subsequent exile did
serve the function of centralizing the Kurdish people and exposing Kurdish elites to the rhetoric
of ethnonationalism, though its scope was still limited and institutional conditions did not
support its perpetuation. In the Imperial Era, it is clear that the Kurdish multitude endorsed
religious, rather than modern, structures of authority, even while Kurdish elites exposed to
European nation-building utilized the rhetoric of ethnonationalism to support their personal
claims.

Kurdish Elites and the State in the Final Decades of the Ottoman Decline

This pattern only accelerated while Ubeydullah remained in exile, as Sultan Abdulhamid
II utilized the armed Kurdish population as a defensive force against Russian and Qajar forces,
and as the sharp end of the spear in the Empire’s campaign of ethnic cleansing of Armenians.
Organized into the powerful and influential Hamidye cavalry, Kurdish forces were provided with
greater opportunities for social mobility and patronage from the Porte in exchange for acting as
the border guard of the Empire. The state further used membership in the cavalry as a means of
controlling Kurdish tribes and preempting the development of nationalism, making “every
Hamidiye commander a derebey (large landowner), similar to the [Kurdish] emirates that had
existed until 1847. Affiliation to the Hamidiye once again superseded any expression of
pan-Kurdish solidarity. Every grievance and feud was settled in favor of the Hamidiye Kurdish
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tribes”, which confiscated the land of Alevis and the Kurds unaffiliated with the Ottoman state. 147
Even following Ubeydullah’s revolt, ethnopolitical sentiments in the broader population were all
but irrelevant, and integration to the Empire was a more tantalizing proposition than separatism.
At the same time, however, participation in the Hamidiye contributed to the development
of Kurdish national identity among the intelligentsia and upper salariat—or at the least exposed
them to the ethnonationalism rampant in European discourses at the time. Hamidiye regiments
were utilized heavily in the Balkan Wars and interacted consistently with Arab and Turkish
commanders, environments where nationalism was a major social phenomenon. Although
“research on this topic is scarce, the Kurds, especially the officers who had been trained in the
schools established by Abdulhamid, became aware of the international politics that had
contributed to the Balkan wars'' and became familiar with the tenets of ethnonationalism. The
Hamidiye further provided educational opportunities to Kurdish elites, who at this time were
educated in secular military schools and, on occasion, even studied abroad in France and
Switzerland.148 Although the cavalry allowed the Kurds to ‘see the world’, what they saw was a
political environment dominated by the doctrine of nationalism, which was subsequently
internalized and disseminated within Kurdish communities. Mere exposure to ethnic nationalism,
though, did not result in a cascading ethnification of Kurdish identity, as elites continued to
prefer remaining in partnership with their Ottoman patrons.
Even following the deposition of Sultan Abdulhamid II in the Young Turk Revolution of
1908, Kurds did not aim to take advantage of the instability to espouse ethnicist claims. In fact,
Kurds were instrumental in the founding of the Young Turks’ infamous Committee for Union
and Progress, and occupied some of the highest spaces in the Ottoman parliament and military at
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the time of the coup. In the brief period between 1908 and the First World War, Kurdish
nationalism was tolerated and even encouraged at times by the new regime, although the Young
Turks began to suppress public expressions of Kurdish culture as time went on. The Young
Turks’ ideological emphasis on ethnic nationalism and their aim to establish “ethnic Turkishness
as the central axis around which the Ottoman state revolved” impacted Kurdish perceptions of
self and ethnicity, and encouraged notables to think of themselves in increasingly ethnic rather
than religious terms, marking a departure from the imperial status quo.149
Critically, the Young Turk Revolution superseded the Islamic concept of umma, replacing
it with secular concepts of ‘nation, society, and national differentiation’.150 This cognitive shift
was reflected in a proliferation of Kurdish cultural clubs, publications, and language centers that
emerged in urban centers across the empire. At this point, “opportunity structures” emerged for
the creation and dissemination of Kurdish national ideology. These ‘opportunities’, however,
were not embraced by the majority of Kurds, for the simple reason that ethnically-based social
mobilization does not arise unless it does so out of necessity. Since the CUP, despite being more
secular than its Ottoman predecessor, did not explicitly exclude Kurds from its political project
on an ethnic basis, there was no reason for Kurds to view themselves through the lens of
ethnicity precisely because it is not an intrinsically political phenomenon.
Most of the Kurdish institutions that did take advantage of these new avenues of political
expression were less nationally-minded than they might appear at first glance. The Kurdish
Society for Mutual Cooperation and Progress (KTTJ), founded by Sheikh Ubeydullah’s son
Sayyid Abdulakir (who had become integrated into the Ottoman elite and served as a Hamidiyan
commander), is one of the most prominent examples of a quasinationalistic Kurdish institution.
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The organization served essentially as a ‘cultural club’ for Ottoman Kurdish nobility, and while it
did produce Kurdish language journals and publications, these “were never intended to reach the
rural areas or common Kurds in Istanbul”.151 Although modernist Denise Natali states that the
dissemination of Kurdish nationalism was a central goal of the organization’s newspaper Kurd
Te’avun ve Terakki Gazetesi, historian Michael Eppel contests that claim, instead describing “the
KTTJ and its paper [as] clearly Ottomanist in nature, present[ing] the Kurds as loyal to the
Empire and the Sultan”.152 Even the fiery urgings of intellectuals, like Said Nursî’s call for Kurds
to “wake up from their five hundred years of sleep and develop national solidarity” ultimately
advocated for greater minority rights within Ottoman institutions and education rather than
ethnic separatism.153 During the imperial period, Kurdish elites on the whole appeared to be
uninterested in the coordinated pursuit of a Kurdish national project. Although a few of these
activists may have dreamed of heading a Kurdish nation-state, “the separatist vision—that is,
secession from the Ottoman Empire and an independent Kurdish state—was shared by only a
few”.154
Nevertheless, these civil organizations present a likely antecedent to Kurdish nationalism,
and Denise Natali describes several incidents in which the rhetoric of these groups attained a
distinct ethnonational flavor.155 It is critical to remember in our analysis, however, that this
ethnonationalism did not naturally emerge from an innate ethnic commonality or desire for
cooperation. Instead, Kurds were encouraged to conceive of themselves in ethnic terms by the
increasing encroachment of external ideologies, and the reality that ‘ethnic groups’ were
becoming increasingly salient as units of autonomy and political mobilization. Ethnicizing
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Kurdishness was not a choice made by Kurds themselves—it was a delineation imposed upon
them by external powers. Although the primordialist (or even the clichéd constructivist)
approach to Kurdish history might lead one to expect Kurds to take advantage of any opportunity
to assert ethnic distinctiveness, in reality, Kurdish nationalism was adopted reactively, not
proactively, by elites. In an analysis of the late imperial period, Hakan Özoğlu ultimately
concludes that “only when the Ottoman state began to collapse did Kurdish notables begin to
articulate a nationalist ideology as a way to legitimize the perpetual desire for self-rule in
Anatolia… Kurdish nationalism was not a cause but, rather, a result of the Ottoman Empire’s
disintegration”, further noting that the Kurds were the last of the millet populations of the Empire
to espouse ethnonationalist claims.156
In conclusion, the experiences of Kurdish populations in the late imperial era
comprehensively demonstrate that a politicized ethnic Kurdayetî did not exist at this time, and
that those limited ‘nationalist’ movements that did arise did so from a confluence of external
factors and Ottoman Kurdish elites pursuing their own interests. Critically, Kurds did not
‘naturally’ flock to aspects of their shared culture or language when navigating the Imperial
political space, instead preferring to maneuver within the religion-based millet system when
advocating for regional rights and development. The ethnification of Kurdishness happened in
fits and bursts, reflecting Abbas Vali’s depiction of national development as halting, stuttering,
and omnidirectional. Ultimately, while miniscule subsections of the Kurdish intelligentsia were
exposed to the rhetoric of ethnonationalism through their international exploits, the majority of
the Kurdish population did not embrace these frameworks of social organization, only beginning
to do so as a survival strategy following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, the
First World War and subsequent Ottoman Partition can correctly be viewed as an influential
156

Özoğlu 2001, p. 404.

Constructing Kurdistan: Cross-Border Kurdish Relations and Ethnic Identity

75

exogenous event impelling the ‘reputational cascade’ of Kurdish nationalism in the 1920s, as
Kurdish elites and peasants realized that in a world dictated by nation-states, the only avenue to
survival was the formation of an ethnonational project.
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Chapter Two
Incipient Kurdish Nationalism in the Transition to the Modern State System
Although the Kurdish region was only a secondary front in the devastating global conflict
that was the First World War, the Kurdish people and others in Eastern Anatolia experienced
immense suffering throughout the hostilities, due in part to their position precisely at the
intersection of Ottoman, British, and Russian forces. Hundreds of thousands of civilians were
forced to flee from their homes, and those who remained were forcibly conscripted by the
Ottoman Army and sent as cannon fodder to the Caucasian front, resulting in up to 150,000
Kurdish casualties. Scorched earth tactics employed by advancing and retreating armies and
Ottoman food confiscation policies led to severe and widespread famine in the region.
Michael Eppel estimates that up to two-thirds of the population in dozens of Kurdish
villages starved to death, even in settlements such as Sulaymaniyah that were removed from the
worst of the fighting.157 Further casualties stemmed from smaller clashes between Kurdish and
Armenian forces, the latter seeking vengeance for earlier massacres committed by the
Kurdish-dominated (but Ottoman-controlled) Hamidye cavalry in the later imperial period.
Though these more local disputes might at first glance appear to be an early instance of
‘spontaneous’ ethnic discord, it is important to note that this animosity, too, was based on
religious rather than ethnocultural grievances, and driven primarily by the political machinations
of the Ottoman and Russian empires aiming to gain prominence in contested territory.
Nevertheless, these killings contributed to the development of a distinct Kurdish ethnic identity,
and the Russian-and-British-influenced Armenian national project increasingly presented
ethnicity as a framework for political mobilization and legitimacy.
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Throughout the war, despite the obvious military inferiority of the Ottoman Empire and
the privileged treatment of Turkish soldiers over Kurdish ones by military leaders, “a
considerable portion of the Kurds remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire as an Islamic state”, by
means of both cooption and coercion. Many Kurds had no choice but to take up arms for the
empire, but some did so willingly out of fear of Armenian retribution or existing loyalties to
tribal leaders.158 Kurdish elites had a vested interest in maintaining the Ottoman status quo,
which still offered considerable social and economic opportunities for tribal latifundista. Not
oblivious to broader geopolitical shifts, however, Kurds also aimed to forge ties with both Britain
and Russia, hoping to ensure their own safety under a European protectorate after the war.
Despite the Russian state entertaining a Kurdish envoy and promising material support to
ameliorate the devastation in Kurdistan, Czarist Russia did not seriously entertain thoughts of a
close partnership with the Kurds, and Russian commanders (some of whom were of Armenian
descent) on the ground outright rejected the proposition, having “far more in common with
Armenian Christians than with Muslim Kurdish tribesmen”.159 The rejection of Russo-Kurdish
cooperation by a majority of both Russian and Kurdish elites reflects the enduring significance of
religious linkages in the late imperial period, as Islamic loyalties usurped realist attempts to align
with the eventual victors of the conflict.
Even as the majority of Kurds retained Ottoman loyalties, an increasingly ethnicized
political sphere during the war led to the creation of the first bona fide Kurdish nationalist
groups. Some of the earliest groups included the Kurdistan Ta’ali Jamiyati (Society for the
Recovery of Kurdistan), an Istanbul-based organization that advocated for Kurdish autonomy
according to Wilsonian principles of self-determination, and the Kürdistan Teali Cemiyeti
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(Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan or SAK)), founded in December 1918. 160 Like the
KTTJ before them, these institutions were intended to foster an appreciation for Kurdish culture
and distribute tangible aid to Kurds in need—but unlike the KTTJ, their explicit raison d'etre was
to advocate for Kurdish autonomy or independence in ethnic terms.161 Again, these societies
were founded and patronized by only limited strata of the Kurdish intelligentsia, most of whom
would have been intimately familiar with the ethnonationalist politics of twentieth-century
Europe and could have inferred that the post-war partition of the Ottoman Empire would be
approached in ethnic terms. Therefore, such organizations were a rational response to the
political context, and as ethnification metastasized in the early nineteenth century, increasing
numbers of Kurds endorsed the autonomist/secessionist movement, though Wilsonian principles
of self-determination had not yet been encountered or adopted by the vast majority of the
ordinary population.162

Consequences of an Underdeveloped Kurdish National Sentiment in the Interregnum

The relative ‘immaturity’ of Kurdish nationalist development can be further evidenced in
the findings of the King-Crane Commission, a group of researchers sent by the United States to
the Levant to evaluate the various nationalist claims arising from and imposed upon the region.
While imperial depictions of local culture and aspirations should always be viewed with
suspicion and taken with a grain of salt, the commission’s demographic and local political
research was relatively high-quality and included innumerable meetings with tribal leaders and
local elites addressing the topic of national determination. Ultimately, the commission
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recommended that separate Turkish, Armenian, and Syrian states be created under the tutelage of
American mandates, which they believed would ensure the safety of minority groups and
facilitate development.
On the topic of Kurdish independence, however, the commission was less confident in
the prospects for immediate nationalization. While full statehood was recommended as the
eventual mode of organization for other political communities, the Kurds were deemed as
requiring only “a measure of autonomy… under close mandatory rule, with the object of
preparing them for ultimate independence or for federation with neighboring areas in a larger
union”.163 Despite the Kurds having a larger population than other communities examined by the
commission, their existence is only sporadically addressed throughout its pages—suggesting that
as the researchers traversed the Middle East in search of grassroots nationalists, few Kurds
answered their call. Furthermore, the King-Crane commission viewed the topic of Kurdistan’s
desired ethnic homogeneity with suspicion, proposing that a Kurdish state could only become a
reality if it included ‘voluntary exchange[s] of comparatively small numbers of Turks and
Armenians’—further imposing upon the Kurds eurocentric ideals about the importance of ‘ethnic
homogeneity’ in political organization. 164
The reality of the matter is simply that Kurdistan’s geographic location and
religiously-motivated sociopolitical integration within the Ottoman ancien regime stunted the
proliferation of Kurdish ethnonationalist sentiments, despite the efforts of elites to portray the
Kurdish nation as ethnically unified and politically coherent to outside powers. Even if there was
an element of popular nationalism emerging in the immediate post-war context, the death of as
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many as 700,000 Kurds during the war and the resultant turmoil in Kurdistan made any
impactful campaign for Kurdish independence at the Paris Peace Conference an impossibility.165
When the time eventually came for the Ottoman Empire’s formal rendering at the hands
of European powers at Versailles, the Kurds were unable to assemble a united and coherent
diplomatic force advocating for Kurdish independence. General Sharif Pasha served as the
representative for the Kurdish delegation on behalf of the SAK, which had been formed less than
a year prior to negotiations. Notably, Pasha himself did not speak Kurdish and had never visited
Kurdistan. Pasha was a member of the Ottoman elite, but had lived in Europe for over a decade
at the time of negotiations after dissent resulted in his expulsion from the CUP in 1909. Pasha
did represent Kurdish interests to the best of his ability at the conference, but his nationalism was
unlikely to have arisen from a deep personal linkage to Kurdish ethnicity or culture—instead,
Eppen speculates that “his loss of status [following his exile] was apparently the reason he turned
toward Kurdishness and Kurdish nationalist activity” as he saw a chance to regain influence in
the transitionary period. Another event in the negotiations that merits attention is Pasha’s efforts
to cooperate with the Armenians—a surprising choice of ally given the protracted and violent
Kurdish-Armenian conflicts that had plagued the region over the previous decades.
Repudiating contemporary historical depictions of these interactions as natural ethnic
discord, Pasha asserted that hostilities were caused by “Turkish incitement”, an account further
corroborated by Armenian delegate Bogos Nubar Pasha’s willingness to enter into a
Kurdish-Armenian commission and draw the border between the territories in collaboration.166
Ultimately, Kurdish diplomatic efforts, particularly Pasha’s repeated appeals to British notable
policymakers in the Middle East including Winston Churchill and Percy Cox, were rewarded in
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the Treaty of Sevres’ support for Kurdish autonomy. 167 The treaty made provisions in Articles
62-64 that required a consociational “commission [be made] that shall draft within six months [
… ] a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas [to] decide what
rectifications if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier”, with a further requirement that a
Kurdish autonomous region could become a state within a year by petitioning the league of
nations.168 Although this treaty was immensely significant in that it codified the Kurdish ‘nation’
in international law for the first time, it did not ultimately provide any great boon to Kurdish
self-determination efforts due to a litany of concerns regarding the treaty’s legitimacy and
enforcement.

Divided Loyalties and Ethnonational Ambivalence Towards the Treaty of Sevres

Among Kurds themselves, there was widespread discord regarding the treaty and the
territorial boundaries it imposed upon Kurdistan. Emir Amin ʿAli Bedir Khan, co-founder and
vice-president of the SAK at the time of the negotiation, was furious that Pasha had made
territorial concessions that favored Armenia and Iran out of ‘sober political pragmatism’. 169 This
ideological schism in the SAK mirrored an earlier debate between autonomists and secessionists
in the society, and eventually led to its dissolution only a few years later. Hakan Özoğlu
compellingly argues that this bifurcation occurred according to pre-existing tribal divisions, as
supporters of the influential Semdinan and Bedirhan families ascribed to their respective
nationalist objectives. Özoğlu states that the SAK case demonstrates the significance of
‘primordial’ ties in mobilizing populations behind a tribal leaders’ political ideology, setting the
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groundwork for popular Kurdish nationalism implemented through local elites in coming
decades.170
Just as the SAK was divided on recognizing the legitimacy of the treaty, the Kurdish
intelligentsia was similarly skeptical of the validity of its territorial delineations. Most Kurds
were rightly suspicious of externally-imposed political ideologies and borders, and preferred to
instead retain the status quo within the post-Ottoman space with a millet-system-like model of
tribal and religious authority. As early as 1919, Mustafa Kemal was making active attempts to
co-opt Kurdish elites in his struggle for Turkish independence. As a rising star in the CUP, he
traveled to Eastern Anatolia and presented himself as the “savior of Kurdistan” and the “defender
of the Muslim lands soiled by the impious Christians”, all the while emphasizing the “fraternity
between Kurds and Turks or the Ottoman nation in conflict with foreign occupation forces”.171
Kemal frequently sent photographs of himself to tribal Kurdish Sheikhs wearing Kurdish
garments, and emphasized his religiosity through promises of protecting the caliphate from the
‘West’.172 The success of these efforts is evidenced in the Erzurum Congress of July 23rd-August
6th, 1919, in which fifty-four delegates from five Kurdish vilayets neighboring Armenia agreed
to fight under Turkish officers along Turkey's northern front, thus winning the “first major
military victory of the Turkish War of Indepence”. 173
This Turkish-Kurdish cooperation continued throughout the interregnum periodbelieving Kemal’s false promises, a majority of Kurds rejected the terms of the treaty and lent
him military assistance in the Turkish War of Independence, actively fighting to retain a
sociopolitical system based on religion rather than ethnonationalism. Even in the aftermath of
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World War I and the emergence of a small but persistent Kurdish nationalist movement, the
Kurds’ apparent willingness to integrate into a multi-ethnic Caliphate further supports the
argument that ethnicized Kurdish nationalism is a distinctly modern phenomenon primarily
imposed by outside forces. Despite the successful cooperation between the Kurdish and
Armenian delegates in Sevres, two diplomats who understood that the rhetoric of ethnic
nationalism was quickly becoming hegemonic in the post-war world, regular Kurds still
overwhelmingly identified with “the other Muslims of Anatolia”, and were compelled to
cooperate with Mustafa Kemal in large part due to “their fears of falling within an Armenian,
and therefore Christian, state”.174
It was only after Kemal had consolidated power that he ruthlessly pursued his
Western-inspired objective of a secular capitalist state with ethnonational homogeneity, in doing
so employing policies of brutal ethnic cleansing against the Kurds. Mustafa Kemal’s duplicitous
but successful consociational rhetoric took advantage of Kurdish hopes that the post-Ottoman
political space could resist externally-imposed ethnonationalism. Although a small minority of
Kurdish intelligentsia correctly determined that ethnicizing Kurdishness and advocating for
Wilsonian-style self-determination could provide security and autonomy for the Kurdish people
in an increasingly exclusionary political landscape, “for the vast majority of the Kurds,
‘Kurdishness’ was in fact another way of expressing their Muslim and Ottoman affiliation”, not a
political identifier. Even when this ‘cultural nationalism’ formulated ‘political claims’, such
claims generally “understood Kurdishness in the conceptual framework of a renewed Ottoman
contract, without formulating claims to sovereignty and independence.175
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The lack of local, grassroots Kurdish seperatist and independence movements outside the
spheres of Westernized elites in the transitional period reflects the reality that ethnicity did not
serve as a natural or even preferred method of political mobilization for the Kurdish people.
Despite a proliferation of local revolts, an open political space, and the existence of established
‘Kurdish nationalist organizations’ patronized by elites, there was no ‘reputational cascade’ in
the interregnum period organically proliferating throughout the multitude. This is simply because
most Kurds saw no need for such a political project, since Kemal’s promises had suggested they
could thrive in an independent, Islamic, co-ethnic Turkey.
Even had local Kurds seen through Mustafa Kemal’s lies and mobilized en masse to
fiercely advocate for a Kurdish state, it is still unlikely that the promises made at Sevres would
be kept by European powers due to external instability. Weary and financially strained from the
grueling conflict, the British and French in the post-war era were reticent to engage in any
military activity, and putting down Kemal’s revolt would have required resources and lives they
were unwilling to expend. The British themselves “kept virtually all that they had wanted”, but
“they were not prepared to negotiate for the Armenians, or for the Kurds” beyond guaranteeing
control of oil-rich Mosul, fully aware that doing so would require military enforcement in a
difficult climate and country, and run contrary to the desires of the British public and
newly-elected leadership.176 Furthermore, the primary foreign-policy objective in post-war
Britain quickly became countering Bolshevik expansion, so allowing a West-friendly Turkish
state to emerge with as little animosity as possible quickly became a higher priority than keeping
promises made to the comparatively insignificant Kurds.177
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While these political machinations were clear to see, the British Foreign Office made its
flexibility explicit to Kemal in a letter dated March 1921, in which it indicated that “in regard to
Kurdistan the Allies would be prepared to consider a modification of the Treaty … in conformity
with the existing facts of the situation, on condition of facilities for local autonomies and the
adequate protection of Kurdish interests”—backtracking on earlier promises to ensure an
“independent Kurdish State”.178 Similarly, France’s decision to “re-establish friendly relations
with Turkey” a year before the Turkish military victory concretely demonstrated that the West
was willing to tolerate an independent Turkey provided it served as a bulwark against
Bolshevism. This further emboldened Mustafa Kemal, who now faced little opposition in
securing his control of Anatolia and centralizing power. In short, the Kurds as a whole were at
best ambivalent on the validity of the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey ignored it, and colonial powers
declined to enforce it.
At what was essentially the re-negotiation of Sevres at the Lausanne Conference of
1922-23, the British agreed with little resistance to drop Articles 62-65 of the previous
agreement, relinquishing calls for Kurdish independence in exchange for Turkey joining the
newly-formed League of Nations to complete the isolation of Bolshevik Russia.179 In the new
Treaty of Lausanne, the Kurds were not mentioned by name, and no Kurdish nationalists openly
advocated for Kurdish autonomy. Some Kurdish tribal leaders did appear at negotiations to
advocate against their own independence and in favor of integration with the Turkish Republic,
indicating the success of Kemal’s collaborative efforts. The delegation justified its rejection of
statehood on the grounds that ‘Turks and Kurds were not racially separable’, foreshadowing later
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official state rhetoric and demonstrating the early entrenchment of ethnonational ideology in
international discourses about cultural and minority rights.180
Just as Brubaker states that national identity does not necessarily constitute an ethnic one,
Jorgenden and Akkaya note “the fact that a growing national consciousness does not
automatically foster state consciousness is illustrated by the stance of the Kurds at Lausanne ''.181
Thus, the window of opportunity for an independent Kurdistan in East-Anatolia, home to a
majority of the overall Kurdish population, disappeared as soon as it had come. Again, Kurdish
willingness to integrate into an ostensibly multiethnic independent Turkey may have been a
tragic miscalculation in retrospect, but at the time it further demonstrated Kurdish recalcitrance
towards the ethnonational project. The Treaty of Lausanne was not renegotiated, and the borders
imposed by that agreement officially divided the Kurdish people between the borders of four
separate and (nominally) sovereign states, all with different dominant groups, levels of colonial
occupation, and nation-building strategies.
The majority of Kurds were now under the legal jurisdiction of the Turkish republic, with
the remainder dispersed across northwest Syria, northern Iraq, and northeast Iran. The arbitrary
delineations established by the Treaty of Lausanne remain unchanged to this day, and the
disparate political environments in each of the four states with significant Kurdish populations
have contributed to the development of disparate Kurdish nationalisms. As previously noted,
however, even though Kurdistan was nominally divided and borders did have the effect of
isolating once interconnected Kurdish communities, Kurdish nationalism and identity did not
develop in four respective vacuums. On the contrary, transnational collaboration and conflict
have played a major role in the development of Kurdish identity, both on a pan-Kurdish and local
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level. Broadly speaking, though, the sociopolitical contexts of Kurds in the years following 1923
can be divided into two broad categories— the ‘hands off’ approach frequently taken by the
British and French in Iraq and Syria respectively, and the violent statebuilding policies of
repression and ethnic erasure employed by nationalizing independent states in Turkey and Iran.
Though each Kurdish population was subject to differing levels of brutality at the hands of their
respective states, all centralization and statebuilding processes were violent affairs, and the
Kurds were frequently a target of subjugation and oppression.
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Chapter Three:
The Political Ethnification of Kurdayetî in the Colonial and Early State Period
The division of the Kurdish space into newly formed territorial states in the aftermath of the first
World War created new structures of opportunity and coercion for Kurds, in the context of four
distinct imagined political communities with disparate ideologies and attitudes towards their
Kurdish minorities. Given the permeating influence of these new equally unique and complex
political incubators on the development of separate Kurdish identities, scholars including Jordi
Tejel, Abbas Vali, and Hamit Bozarslan have previously emphasized the difficulty of expressing
a non-parochial Kurdish history in comparative perspective.182 Nevertheless, the chronological
and transnational approach to historical analysis undertaken in this thesis identifies several major
themes in the development of a Kurdish identity, the most central of which is that objective
ethnicity has rarely served as a meaningful unifying force or catalyst for popular mobilization in
the Kurdish political space. This section will argue that throughout the colonial and early-state
period, the Kurdish ‘distinctiveness’ that emerged in the contexts described above was ethnified
and politicized only in response to the threats posed by the imposition of external ethnonational
sentiments or ideologies, and never spontaneously simply as a result of an open political space or
‘opportunity structures.’ Furthermore, even when Kurdish elites were driven to national
advocacy as a means of self-preservation or personal advancement, the multitude of Kurds did
not organically flock to ethnically-oriented political organizations, but instead preferred to retain
tribal and religious structures of authority wherever possible. Such an assertion is supported not
only by the ethnopoliticization of Kurdishness as a direct response to the attempted erasure of
Kurdish identity in Kemalist turkey, but also by the failure of Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Syria to
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develop ethnonational sentiment or secessionist aspirations when their political contexts were
theoretically rich for such an emergence.

The Violent Erasure of Kurdish Identity in Kemalist Turkey

In the earliest years of the Independent Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal continued to nominally
support a level of Kurdish autonomy while simultaneously suppressing the creation of Kurdish
nationalist movements, foreshadowing his increasingly violent suppression of Kurdish identity as
he consolidated the Turkish state. Despite his promises as late as 1923 to grant “a kind of local
autonomy to the provinces inhabited by the Kurds” and include “the deputies of both Kurds and
Turks” in the Grand National Assembly with “unified interests and fates”, the Kemalist regime
consistently suppressed Kurdish advocacy throughout the war for independence, smothering
nascent organizations in Diyarbekir and Kotchguiri in 1919 and 1921, respectively.183 The
Kemalist regime employed increasingly ethnonational rhetoric, exemplified by minister of
justice Mehmet Bozhurt’s claim that “the Turk must be the only lord, the only master of this
country [while] those who are not of pure Turkish tock have only one right, the right to be
servants and slaves”.184
In response to this threat, Kurdish elites skeptical of consociational promises established
the Kurt Istiqlal Djemiyeti (Committee for Kurdish Independence, CKI) in Erzurum sometime in
late 1922. Unlike the insular organizations that preceded it, the increasingly obvious threat posed
to Kurdish survival by the Kemalist regime stimulated an unprecedented popular proliferation of
Kurdish nationalism outside urban intellectual centers. Fears that the Turkish government would
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adopt the Unionish policies “induced even sheikhs and religious leaders to join the Committee as
early as 1923, exemplified by the membership of Sheikh Said of Piran, Sheikh Sherif of Palu,
and Sheikh Abdullah of Melkan''. 185 Supporting the argument that Kurdish nationalism was
adopted as a defensive mechanism to pre-empt exclusionary claims of Turkish ethnonationalism,
Abbas Vali asserts that “the Kurdish dignitaries realized, even before any concrete Kemalist
measures were initiated against them, that the project of a nation-state meant the [ethnic]
homogenization of a country by coercion, and indeed, when necessary, by massacre”. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, prominent Kurds who had participated in the Armenian massacres and the
Hamidiye cavalry were among the earliest members of the anti-Kemalist Kurdish opposition,
having observed firsthand the proliferation of ethnonationalism and its violent consequences.186
The worst fears of these Kurdish leaders were confirmed on March 3rd, 1924, when the
Kemalist government formally abolished the Caliphate and issued a decree that “banned all
Kurdish schools, associations, publications, religious fraternities, and medressehs”, making the
break between Kemalism and the Kurds formal and absolute.187 The new legislation even
outlawed the use of the words “Kurdish” or “Kurdistan” altogether, referring to Kurds as
‘mountain Turks’ in official state discourses and folklore. Although a widespread anti-Kemalist
reaction was already emerging in the Kurdish region, the secularization of the state even more so
than the explicit denial of Kurdishness “was seen as further proof of the betrayal of the initial
project of independence”, and the absolute dissolution of the religious institutions that made up
the backbone of Kurdish society prompted fierce resistance from Kurdish elites and masses alike.
Kemal explicitly reversed his earlier promises of a unified Muslim community, stating that “the
Turkish nation cannot become a nation of sheikhs, dervishes, religious fanatics, and charlatans.
185
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The most correct and truest parth to the nation is the path of contemporary civilization”- that is,
one based on ethnic rather than religious exclusion.188 The CKI had been preparing for military
struggle since its formation two years prior, anticipating the abolition of the Caliphate and
suppression of Kurdishness as a consequence of Kemalist statebuilding. Its leader, Sheikh Said
of Piran, travelled throughout rural Kurdistan giving speeches and issuing fatwa claiming that
“Mustafa Kemal and his companions have denied God and His Prophet and driven out the
caliphate”, thus making “the overthrow of the illegitimate regime” an obligation for every
Muslim, not just every Kurd.189
Although the framing of political grievances through the lens of Islam illustrates the
enduring significance of religious rather than ethnic ties, there can be little doubt that Said’s goal
was the creation of an independent Kurdish state, and Kendal argues that “nationalism was the
core of the whole issue, as was quite clear to various lucid [contemporary] observers who would
hardly qualify as agents of imperialism,” indicating that a robust and popular Kurdish identity
was developing in response to Turkish bellicosity.190 Said utilized some religious rhetoric in his
attempts to mobilize the Kurdish population in opposition to Ankara, but so too did Mustafa
Kemal in his own independence struggle against the West, despite his ultimate national project
explicitly rejecting religious authority. The most important factor in the Sheikh Said revolt was
the fact that it advocated for the self-governance of a community, not of a territory as observed in
Ubeydullah’s case.
Sensing a growing Kurdish resistance movement in the east, a detachment of Turkish
troops arrested members of the Sheikh’s entourage in Piran, in an effort to provoke a premature
uprising before the CKI could organize its forces. The subsequent “massacre of the whole
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Turkish detachment by overexcited villagers' ' prompted a series of organically-proliferating
uprisings across most of Northern Kurdistan despite the Sheikh’s efforts to prevent the skirmish
from turning into a premature insurrection. The rebellion made initial gains and briefly seized
control of about a third of Kurdistan in Turkey, but was quashed within a month by a combined
force of over 100,000 Turkish and French troops.191 The relative popularity of the rebellion made
the subsequent repression even more brutal. In September of 1925, not only were Said and
fifty-two of his followers were publicly hung in Diyarbekir, but “thousands of anonymous
peasants were massacred and hundreds of villages were burned to make sure the lesson stays
learnt”, and Kemalists hung hundreds of Kurdish patriots throughout the region in subsequent
months. The Bill Indicting Sheikh Said echoed contemporary claims about the nationalist nature
of the Kurdish movement, claiming that while “the uprising took place under the pretext of
raising the banner of the Prophet, its main goal was to separate off a part of the Turkish
homeland and destroy the unity of the country.”192 The Tribunal further declared the “causes and
origins of the latest revolt… identical to those which flared up in Bosnia-Herzegovina… or those
which pushed the Albanians to stab the Turks in the back”- attributing the conflict entirely to
ethnic, rather than religious or economic, animosity (despite publicly declaring that the Kurds
were merely ‘Mountain Turks’ and not a distinct ethnicity). 193
Sheikh Said’s rebellion was certainly a more definitive reflection of grassroots Kurdish
nationalism than any movement that preceded it, but for all its popularity, “the insurgency did not
attract or hold the various Kurdish constituencies into a solid front” based on the ideology of
Kurdish ethnonationalism. The revolt “did not appeal to or mobilize non-tribals from the plains
nor the urban population of keyn centers as Diyarbakir.” Participation was further limited to
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primarily Zaza speaking tribes, and did not attract any Shia Kurdish support. The Sasunah and
Tatukan tribes, both Kurdish, declined to join Said’s movement and were subsequently attacked
by fellow Kurdish forces.194
Therefore, although support for Said’s rebellion was popular, it was by no means
pan-Kurdish or based entirely on ethnicist claims. Confidential reports of Turkish authorities
regarding the revolt at the time “make it clear that the Kemalist government over-emphasized the
nationalist features of the Sheikh Said rebellion” as a means of supporting their long-term
strategic goal of Turkifying the entire republic. Abbas contends that “for the majority of
participants, the 1925 rebellion conformed to the general pattern of a traditional Kurdish
uprising, and was not fundamentally different from many others that occurred throughout the
Ottoman Empire”.195 In the imperial era, those rebellions served as tools of negotiating, “an
instrument for the renewal of the unwritten contract of rights versus obedience and
legitimization”, but the massive coercion employed by the new Turkish state in the form of
special military rule, massacres, and the prohibition of symbolic resources in Northern Kurdistan
made it clear even to the most traditional leaders that the political landscape had undergone a
profound and irreversible transformation. Hamit Bozarsalan describes how this sudden
realization led to the sudden proliferation of rural nationalism in Northern Kurdistan:
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“many tribal chieftains and sheikhs who joined the opposition against the state only after
the failure of the 1925 uprising… could easily live under the Ottoman Rule without
resistance or opposition to the state. The measures taken against them by Ankara left
them no choice but rebellion. In the course of their move from conformity to opposition,
they opened up a non-modern, ‘traditional’ route towards nationalism. Kurdish
nationalism, previously limited to the intelligentsia, provided both an instrument of
legitimization of their struggle and a universal discourse that could explain their new
situation. Nationalism thus became a narrative code that allowed Kurdish traditional
dignitaries to understand and relate to the meaning of the end of the Ottoman tacit
contract.”196

Although Kurdish identity became ethnicized through the ‘reputational cascade’ process
described by Brubaker in the years following the abolition of the Caliphate, it was suppressed by
Kemalist forces equally effectively through violent policies of ethnic erasure and
mass-deportation. In the winters of 1925-28, almost one million people were deported, primarily
across the southern border to mandate Syria.197 Kurdish nationalists who had fled Anatolia
following the 1925 revolt regrouped on the peripheries of the Kurdish homeland and formed the
transnational organization Khoyboun (Independence) in the Lebanese town of Bihamdun in
1927, which notably also included co-ethnic cooperation with the Armenians in opposition to
Republican Turkey.198
Kurdish nationalists from Turkey enjoyed some success in operating across the border
from the relative safety of Syria under the French Mandate, but their failed attempt to defeat the
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Turkish military in the Mount Ararat revolt of 1930 resulted in a redoubling of violence imposed
upon the Kurdish territories. Firsthand accounts describe “intellectuals sewn into sacks and
thrown into the lake… people shut up in caves and burned alive by Turkish soldiers, and planes
still burning villages several months after the revolt had been crushed.” All of these actions were
legally endorsed by the Kemalist regime, which codified in law No. 1,850 that “[M]urders and
other actions committed individually or collectively, from June 20, 1930 to December 10, 1930,
by representatives of the state or the province… or by any civilian having helped the above
during the pursuit and extermination of revolts which broke out in [Northern Kurdistan] and
surrounding areas… will not be considered as crimes”.199 Ethnic cleansing was further
entrenched in May 1932, when the state established the “Sark Islahat Planı (Plan of the
Reformation of the East)”, a strategy of forceful deportation and dispersion that would never
allow the Kurds “to form more than one-tenth of the total population of a municipal district” and
forbade “those who speak a mother tongue other than Turkish [to] form villages, quarters, or
groupings of artisans and employees”.200 The Turkish military forcibly evacuated and ‘Turkified’
Kurdish villages one by one in an immensely violent process, resulting in up to a million and a
half deaths and displacements by the time the ‘notoriously defiant’ final Kurdish holdout of
Dersim fell after a protracted battle with Kemalist forces in late 1938. Although this event would
mark the end of early Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state, the dialectic of denial and the
violent preemptive suppression imposed upon the Kurds in the early state period fostered a
militant and radicalized Kurdish defensive proto-nationalism that foreshadows the dynamics of
the Northern Kurdish resurgence starting in the 1960s.
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Transversal Dynamics and Kurdish Activism in Mandatory Syria

Although the Kemalist regime’s determination to exploit and subjugate the Kurdish
people was effective in unifying the Turkish citizenry in diametric opposition to the ‘backwards’
Kurds and succeeded in suppressing Kurdish separatism in the short term, the “militarism of
Turkish nationalism” in this self-assertive phase “left a mark so deep during the years of colonial
campaigns in Kurdistan that it can still be felt at every level of Turkish political and social life
today” by imbuing in its Kurdish population an enduring ethnicized and politicized identity
centered around resistance to the state.201 Had the Kurds constituted a geographically isolated
minority contained within the Turkish borders, the ‘quiet years’ of desolation that preceded the
fall of Dersim might have continued indefinitely, perhaps resulting in the eventual extinction of
‘Kurdishness’ as a concept itself. The transnational nature of the Kurdish homeland, however,
provided nationalists ample opportunities to seek refuge in more tolerable political landscapes
and develop cross-border Kurdish partnerships.
It was in this transversal political environment that the Kurdish nationalist political
movement in Syria began. Of the four states containing significant Kurdish minorities, the
Kurdish community in Syria is the lowest in both proportion and absolute number, and has as a
result been excluded from several notable studies of Kurdish nationalism.202 The Kurdish
population in Syria has historically been dispersed between a significant urban minority in
Damascus and several discontiguous territories in the northwest of the country, most notably
Kurd-Dagh, Ain al-Arab, and Jezira, along the Iraqi frontier. 203 During the Ottoman period in
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Syria, as in Anatolia, many urban Kurdish elites were ‘Arabicized’, integrated into the power
structures of the Levant, while rural Kurdish society was characterized by semi-feudal relations
governed by agahwat (latifundists). As a result, there was no strong sense of ethnic solidarity or
Kurdish nationalism widespread amongst Kurds native to the Levant.
On the contrary, a significant portion of the urban Kurdish intelligentsia welcomed the
French administration, and rural Kurds had little sense of belonging to a larger Syrian state, and
their lives “continued to be defined by their tribes and land, far from the centers of power and
economic heartlands of the Syrian state.”204 As such, the main orchestrators of Kurdish
nationalism in the region “were not Kurds native to the Kurdish areas encompassed by Syria, but
Kurds who had fled from repression by the government of the Turkish Republic. These Kurdish
leaders, full of grievances against the new Turkish state, began to organize both culturally and
politically within Syria under the banner of Kurdish nationalism,” empowered by the protection
provided to the Kurds under consociational French mandatory policy. French Jezira in particular
became a major destination for Kurdish refugees from Turkey and Iraq alike, and while the flow
of refugees “caused great resentment among Arab nationalists”, emigrés from Turkey quickly
became the dominant influencers of Kurdish advocacy in the region given the complete lack of
any “Kurdish political organization with a nationalist agenda at that time in Syria”.205
The aforementioned Khoybun organization was established primarily by Kurdish
nationalists residing in Damascus, and although the league incorporated Kurdish intellectuals,
leaders of tribes, sheikhs and rebel fighters from Iraqi and Syrian regions, the single goal of the
organization was “the liberation of the Kurds from Turkish ‘claws’”, since the Arab nationalist
governments that would later threaten Kurdish identity had not yet been established, and the
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mandatory powers were seen as “temporary authorities that maintained a decentralized state” and
did not jeopardize Kurdish survival. In an effort to avoid inflaming regional tensions, Khoybun’s
policy stipulated specifically that “relations with the governments of these countries should be
developed, that in Iraq and Syria the rights granted to the Kurdish people by the mandate
authorities were sufficient and that no demands for other political rights should be made”.206
Thus, while the membership of the league was undeniably transnational, the objective of this
organization was not to establish a sovereign state unifying the Kurdish homeland, but simply to
ensure the survival of Kurds in Turkey. Given the restrictive nature of the Turkish political space
and the ethnic chauvinism of Kemalist policy, these struggles necessarily took the form of
seperatist and independence movements, culminating in the failed organization of the Ararat
revolt. Following the ultimate suppression of that movement in 1930, the tribal and military
leaders of Khoybun retreated again to Syria and were subsequently exiled from the Kurdish
region or put under house arrest by French authorities.207
Although Khoybun itself was short lived as an organization and membership was
primarily comprised of urban intelligentsia, it was notable for its widespread distribution of
nationalist propaganda to Kurdish tribes in an effort to ethnicize Kurdishness in the political
sphere. While this propaganda was “appealing to the Kurdish immigrant population from Turkey
for its strong anti-Kemalist overtones, in Iraq this strategy was less successful” because there
was no need to adopt nationalist objectives when not faced with subjugation at the hands of
British colonial rule.208 Fuccaro notes the externally-shaped nature of early nationalist rhetoric in
Western Kurdistan, noting that “the nationalist literature Khoybun circulated among tribes
expressed ideas of national community clearly influenced by 19th century European nationalism.
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These conveyed the emotional expression by means of strongly romantic imagery, borrowed
from local traditions. In much of Khoybun’s nationalist discourse, the Kurdish people were
portrayed as a uniform and historic national entity, to be ‘revived and reconstituted’ on modern
grounds by the united efforts of Kurdish nationalists”.209 Thus we see the beginnings of a mythic
essentialized Kurdish ethnonationalism extending to a ‘time immemorial’, reflecting the
adoption of Western rhetoric of political groups in the region. A failed attempt by Khoybun’s
central committee to justify Kurdo-Armenian cooperation based on a supposedly common ethnic
origin not only demonstrates the absolute malleability of Kurdish ethnicity, but also the
recognition that ethnonational claims had to be used as the fundamental justification for Kurdish
independence in order to achieve international support or recognition.
The activities of Khoybun did not last long enough to achieve tangible results and
enjoyed only minimal success in its time, but it's ethnonationalist discourse “had a lasting effect
on the subsequent development of Kurdish nationalist consciousness [by] providing the
ideological and political frame within which many Syrian Kurds came into contact with national
ideas.”210 Although the comprehensive defeat of Khoybun’s seperatist goals in Turkey dissuaded
Kurdish nationalists in the region from pursuing armed struggle as a means of liberation, Western
Kurdistan remained an important site of Kurdish intellectual activity throughout the mandatory
period, as a “Kurdish cultural revival” in the open political space resulted in the proliferation of
journals and newspapers “concentrated on propagation of the Kurdish alphabet and the
development of grammar as well as the publication of Kurdish classics, folklore, and historical
and ethnographic studies''. These journals, the most prominent of which were called Hawar (The
Calling) and Ronahî (Light), were printed in Kurmanji throughout what were the ‘silent years’ in
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Northern Kurdistan, disseminated in Syria before being smuggled across the border to Turkey,
thus exposing the population there to the nationalist myths and language so brutally policed by
the state and externally sustaining a Kurdish identity.211

Political Development Without (Explicit) Coercion: The Case of the Kurds in Mandatory Iraq

Although the navigable political space for Kurds in Syria was relatively large and a
Kurdish political identity certainly developed, this identity rarely advocated for full-on
separatism or regional autonomy. This was in part due to co-ethnic opportunity structures
provided by the Kurdish friendly Syrian Communist Party (SCP), founded in 1927 by a Syrian of
Kurdish descent. Geographically speaking, however, the territorial discontinuity of the Syrian
Kurdish homeland acted as an obstacle to Kurdish autonomy movements, since their focuses
were divided between separate enclaves of ‘Kurdishness’ and hampered by pragmatic obstacles
to mobilization.212 Not so in Iraq under the British protectorate, where the Kurdish population
was relatively concentrated in the mountainous and inaccessible Mosul province and was not a
target of widespread oppression in the decades immediately following the partition of the
Ottoman Empire. Concurrent with the denial and violent erasure of Kurdish identity in Kemalist
Turkey, the Kurdish communities encompassed by the newly-formed Iraqi state experienced de
facto autonomy empowered by British mandatory rule. In the aftermath of the First World War,
British troops continued to occupy the former Ottoman vilayets of Mosul and Suleymaniah
throughout the Turkish War of Independence, denying Mustafa Kemal’s claims to the Kurdish
areas south of Anatolia and protecting valuable oil reserves. Despite the military occupation, the
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British maintained a limited political presence in the occupied territory from 1918 to 1926, when
both provinces were officially integrated into the British mandate of Mesopotamia. Source
From the earliest days of occupation, British authorities endeavored to co-opt rather than coerce
the local Kurdish population, having little strategic or material interest in disrupting the status
quo of an ostensibly backward, underdeveloped, and bellicose tribal community. In November of
1918, army Major Edward Noel was sent to the area, his assignment being to “arrange with local
chiefs the restoration and maintenance of order” in the war-torn community while
simultaneously explaining “that there is no intention of imposing upon them an administration
foreign to their habits and desires”.213
Noel set upon his task enthusiastically, gaining the confidence of local Sheikhs and tribal
chiefs by offering them political posts and financial incentives and, critically, through repeated
promises to protect the caliphate- reflecting the salience of religion rather than nationalism as a
means of organization. Exhausted from the many conflicts of the Great War and its tributaries
and experiencing increased isolationism at home, the British authorities “tried to control the
Kurdish tribes with a light hand using only a network of political officers to maintain general
relations [and] ensure the collection of revenue”, interfering in Kurdish political development far
less explicitly than in Turkey or Iran. As a result, ‘Kurdishness’ in mandatory Iraq was not
identified as a threat to the state or something to be violently suppressed.214 Without being faced
by a coordinated attempt at ethnic erasure, the ‘opportunity structures’ provided by the large
political space did not become ‘coercive structures’ encouraging the ethnification of Kurdayetî.
Even though the Kurds in early Iraq were not subjected to violent ethnonational
centralization, it must be noted that more subtle shifts in the political landscape encouraged
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Kurdish leaders to view themselves in increasingly ethnopolitical terms. The 1921 Iraqi
constitution unilaterally “asserted that Iraq was made of two ethnic groups- Arabs and Kurds”,
and the League of Nations made numerous statements aimed at ensuring the safety of the
Kurdish “ethnic minority” in Iraq, primarily through guaranteed language rights. Denise Natali,
in concert with the scholarly consensus on mandatory Iraq, observes that in general, “rather than
neutralizing ethnic and religious differences within the heterogeneous Iraqi society” by fostering
a civic nationalism, the “British reinforced them by elevating Sunni Kurds above other groups”,
in doing so employing tried and true ‘divide and rule’ tactics but also creating a fundamentally
ethnicized political sphere with lasting consequences even to Iraq’s infamously sectarian political
sphere today.215 Although this analysis certainly rings true, I would argue that the British created
new ethnopolitical dichotomies as much as they reinforced them. Although this external
imposition of ethnicity had more immediate and dramatic consequences for Sunnis and Shi’as in
the south of the country, the political sphere it created still guaranteed that any future assertions
of Kurdishness would have to be justified through the rhetoric of ethnonationalism. Even if
Kurdish communities in Iraq faced little material coercion to politicize their ethnicity, global
machinations and colonial practices acted as a form of structural coercion, providing only one
avenue for the maturation of Kurdish political society: ethnonationalism.
This tension between traditional and ‘modern’ forms of authority can be observed in the
exploits of Sheikh Mahmoud Barzanji, a prominent tribal chief in Suleymaniah who was
appointed as regional governor by the British authorities in 1918. Although Barzanji faced
considerable internal opposition, particularly from the southern regions of Kirkuk and Kifri, his
external support and sizable British stipend empowered him to attain near-hegemonic power over
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the Kurdish territories, providing ample opportunities for a state-building project.216 Barzanji,
however, much like Ubeydullah before him, presented his qualifications and objectives as
ethnonational to external actors while primarily advancing his personal interests at home.
Barzanji consolidated his own base of power and bought the loyalty of as many chieftains as
possible to expand his influence. Rather than utilizing this newfound administrative power to
“form a confederation of tribal leaders for the settlement of their public affairs under the
guidance of British officers”, Barzanji determined to “fill every post with his own relations
regardless of their character or capability, and to exclude all whom he did not consider personal
adherents”, requiring every public administrator in the province to declare allegiance to him
personally as a condition of employment.217 These factors make it clear that while Barzanji
wished to lead a community of Kurds, he did so out of his personal interest rather than for the
good of his broader political community. As his power and influence grew in the region, and
Britain continued to vascilate on its commitment to the Mesopotamian mandate, Barzanji
detected an opportunity to expand his sphere of influence and establish full control over the
Kurdish territory. Although Barzanji’s declared objective to create a “free [and] united
Kurdistan” and his public display of Wilson’s Principles of Self Determination in the fly-leaves
of a Quran strapped to his arm certainly imply nationalist movies, historian David McDowall
warns that, like many other retrospectively-dubbed early twentieth-century Kurdish nationalists,
“his vocabulary and style did not appear to the nationalist sentiment.” Instead, Barzanji
advocated for jihad against the external occupiers and the creation of a Kurdish fiefdom under
his own personal control.218 Although his rhetoric was more developed than Ubeydullah and his
navigable political space was more conducive to ethnonationalist claims, it remains clear that
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Sheikh Barzanji was focused more on the control of a territory than a community. This is further
evidenced by the fact that the Jaf and Pizhdar, two of the most powerful Kurdish tribal
confederations in the region, leant military assistance to the British in suppressing the revolt.
Clearly, this was no unified assertion of Kurdish nationalism. Barzanji was exiled to Iran in the
aftermath of the failed uprising, but negotiated his return with the British two years later before
launching a second revolt in 1924. This rebellion, too, was suppressed by British and opposing
Kurdish forces in conjunction. Unlike in the Turkish case, where the Kurds presented a united
(albeit weak) front against Kemalist annihilation, Kurdish elites in Iraq did not see
ethnonationalism as a survival strategy, and therefore adopted it sporadically and in response to
specific contexts. In Iraq, the ethnonational state was not yet established in the Kurdish
consciousness as the only means of ensuring security or self-determination.
In this type of sociopolitical space, a pre-state modality of social organization dominated
by “kinship and marriage practices [and] the lack of formalized offices or even formalized scales
of hierarchy”, no one means of stratification has gained hegemonic power in the political arena.
Without the state or empire as the ‘common sense’ modality of organization, a “normatively or
legally defined ‘right state’ of power” ceases to exist altogether. 219 In such an arena, no unified
Kurdish movement emerged because “when one tribe or tribal leader has mounted a revolt
against central authority… other tribes and leaders fail to support or actually oppose the
movement- to the point of siding with a foreing power against rebelling Kurds, just to restrain
the ascension of the leading tribe.”220 This behavior is obviously counterproductive and
self-destructive from a ‘national’ standpoint, for the simple reasons that political motivations
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were “often not national in any serious way but personal or provincial, aiming at the
aggrandizement of the leader” rather than the establishment of a unified political community.221
Although this ‘fertile ground’ for the development of a Kurdish national movement in
Iraq did not lead to secessionist or ethnonational claims, linguistic and cultural autonomy
fostered a new class of intellectuals educated in the Kurdish language, who had an awareness of
the violence and suppression imposed under the Kemalist regime. Still, while flows of Turkish
refugees into Syria and Iraq and a large political space produced a great deal of Kurdish
scholarship, little of it was nationalist or secessionist in nature. While Syria served as somewhat
of a safe haven and ideological incubator for Kurdish nationalists who had escaped from Turkey,
Kurds in Iraq focused their attention primarily on their own status and that of the newly-formed
state as a whole.
When Iraq became nominally independent under heavy British influence in 1932 during
the reign of Faisal II, very little changed for the Kurdish population in the north. As the political
sphere haltingly liberalized, most educated Kurds with political aspirations were more than
willing to participate in nationwide movements, resulting in a strong alliance between the
Kurdish intelligentsia and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) beginning in the 1930s.222 The vast
majority of rural Kurds continued to adhere to tribal and local loyalties, with little outside
pressure to adopt the rhetoric of separatism or ethnonationalism. It is true that some British
reports describe the Kurdish drive for a state as being stubbornly embodied in their local
contacts, but it seems likely that this observation was heavily influenced by the exaggerated
nationalism of Kurdish elites who wished to benefit from the mandate and the interpretation of a
desire for local autonomy as a grassroots expression of national sentiment. The fragmented
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nature of Barzanji’s tribal coalitions, and the lack of widespread support for or participation in
his attempted uprisings, demonstrate that the Kurds in Iraq did not organically pursue the
establishment of a unified ethnonational community even when the appropriate ‘opportunity
structures’ were present. The open political space in Southern Kurdistan during the mandatory
and Hashemite periods lasted for a duration of several decades but produced relatively few
nationalist projects, further supporting the argument that the ethnification of Kurdish identity in
the political sphere has occurred primarily as a reactionary and protective measure in response to
external developments that can have cascading effects.223

The Republic of Mahabad and its Symbolic Significance

One such external development was the establishment of the Republic of Mahabad in
1946, empowered and essentially created by the Soviet invasion of Iran during the Second World
War. Although the Republic lasted less than a year and had ‘limited resonance’ in the Kurdish
space as a whole at the time, which to date remains the only example of a nominally sovereign
and independent Kurdish state. Empowered and essentially created by the Soviet invasion of Iran
in 1946, the Republic lasted for only a year and had “limited resonance” in the Kurdish space at
the time, in retrospect Mahabad has taken on great symbolic significance for the Kurdish
nationalist movement as a symbol of resistance.224 To date, the Republic remains the only
nominally sovereign and fully independent Kurdish state, and its formation and subsequent
disintegration served as a catalyzing force for the foundation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) in Iraq and Mustafa Barzani’s rise to prominence.
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Prior to the occupation of the region by Soviet forces, Iran appeared perhaps the least
likely of the four states containing sizable Kurdish minorities to yield a sovereign Kurdish
political entity. The Kurdish political movement in Iran was fragmented and underdeveloped,
and rarely made concerted attempts at secession or even territorial autonomy. Eastern Kurdistan
had escaped the post imperial dissection of the Ottoman Kurdish territories under the tenuous
protection of the Qajar dynasty, and as a result was excluded from the Kurdish state promised by
the Treaty of Sevres and many early discussions of the ‘Kurdish question’ in the international
arena.225 Although self-avowed Kurdish nationalist Ismail Agha Simko, leader of the influential
Shakak tribe in Urmiya, made periodic attempts to gain British support from across the border
and mobilize his community around an Islamic Kurdish identity, neither he nor any members of
his ‘grand council’ of Kurdish chiefs made a serious effort to manifest a cohesive ethnonational
sentiment.226 Instead, much like Ubeydullah and Barzanji in Anatolia and Iraq respectively, he
aimed to consolidate his own base of personal loyalty and did not engage in any concerted nation
building efforts. Absent this elite-imposed reorientation of political society, Kurdish society
retained its tribal character, with all the divided loyalties contained therein, and did not
organically adopt nationalist aspirations.
Even after Reza Shah set about centralizing and modernizing the Iranian state by
‘terminating the tribal way of life’ and abolishing the caliphate in 1924 just as Mustafa Kemal
did, the suppression of Kurdish political organization did not catalyze widespread ethnic
solidarity or separatism. Hamit Bozarslan is correct in observing that “Turkey and Iran stand out
for their similarities with respect to their Kurdish policies” in that they both subjected their large
and geographically consolidated Kurdish communities to politics of “denial, forced assimilation,
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and resettlement” in the context of a nationalizing independent state.227 Nevertheless, by the
Second World War, an ethnified Kurdish political identity was “barely existent” in Iranian
political discourse and “rarely manifested itself in the supralocal sphere”.228 There are a few key
reasons accounting for why Kurdishness was not operationalized as nationalism in Iran during
the early state-building period, the most central of which is the fact that the Kurds did not
constitute the largest or most identifiable ‘minority group’ in the country following
independence. Other ethnic communities retained languages and customs that diverged from the
Persian more dramatically than the Kurds’, so the Kurdish people did not present the greatest
threat to ethnic homogeneity. From the state’s perspective, “the problem of Iranian unity centered
not on the Kurds, who were similar to the Persians, but on non-Persian communities racially
linked to Arabs and Turks”. The Azeri people in particular had a larger population than the
Kurds and were repressed more harshly by the state during the early state-building process.229
The Kurds were integrated into the nation building fold more than they were excluded,
with the Shah claiming “natural cultural similarity between Kurds and Persians as descendants of
the Medes and speakers of a shared Indo-European language”.230 Iranian identity was
“de-ethnicized” at politically expedient moments and the Shah incorporated religious and
anti-imperialist rhetoric more readily than Kemal did, allowing Kurdish people to view
themselves as Kurds in the cultural sphere and Iranians in everyday political life. Like colonial
Iraq and unlike Kemalist Turkey, the objective of the state was to “destroy the political and
military organization of the Kurdish tribes, not their ethnic identity”.231 Both rural and urban
Kurds willing to embrace the Iranian project were rewarded for their loyalty, as the Shah
227
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“tempered smaller and settled tribesmen by giving them semi-legitimate authority in their
localities” and placated the Kurdish intelligencia by appointing them to minor government posts
in Tehran.232 Since Kurdish distinctiveness itself was not under imminent threat, it was generally
not viewed as a nexus of political mobilization, much less a justification for territorial
secessionism. The lack of grassroots support for the idea of a Kurdish nation can be observed in
Simko’s 1926 revolt against the Iranian authorities, where more than half of his military force
defected upon contact with state forces.233 Natali’s ultimate conclusion that constitutional Iran
“limited incentives and opportunities for Kurds to manifest their ethnonational identity” is
reasonable, but I believe her rhetorical framing of ethnification again assumes such mobiliation
arises spontaneously. As previously demonstrated, Kurdishness has been ethnified and
politicized as a survival strategy and response to regional developments, not as a spontaneous
process in a liberal political space.
Although the suppression of Kurdish identity in Iran was far less virulent or aggressive
than it was in Turkey, it was nevertheless the case that the Shah’s government demonstrated a
consistent preference for Persian Iranians in state posts and economic policy. Higher offices,
such as that of Provincial Governor, were reserved exclusively for Persians, and many of the land
and market reform policies passed in the early decades of the monarchy further disenfranchised
Kurds in the underdeveloped northwestern region of the country.234 These grievances, while not
sufficient to provoke a separatist movement in itself, found an external supporter in 1941, when
the Soviet Union invaded Iran to prevent the latter from lending its support to Germany during
the Second World War. The Soviets’ true objective was to gain oil concessions from the Iranian
monarchy, but their occupation of Western Iran provided an opportunity for disaffected Kurds in
232
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Iran to exploit the vacuum of power.235 The Soviet army occupied much of Western Iran, and
“actively encouraged Kurdish nationalism in the Mahabad region by disseminating printing
presses, providing military aid, and establishing the Society for the Revival of Kurdistan
(Komalay Jiyanaway Kurdistan) or JK with the assistance of local religious leader and
intellectual Qazi Muhammed”, not only allowing but encouraging local Kurds to establish a
self-governing organization.236 Still, this externally-stimulated ethnification of Kurdishness
initially resulted in the creation of a Kurdish manifesto that only demanded cultural and
linguistic rights within the framework of an Iranian state, but by 1946 under four years of
de-facto autonomy under Soviet Occupation Qazi and his supporters officially founded the
Republic of Mahabad in a relatively small town near the Iraqi border, with it creating the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (retroactively Kurdistan Democratic Party-Iran) or KDPI, to govern
the new ‘state’.237 The Republic quickly took on all the trappings of an established, sovereign
nation state, creating its own constitution, parliament, flag, and police force. By all accounts,
Mahabad became a self-governing territory, even if its territory and population was confined to a
rather miniscule proportion of the greater Kurdish homeland in Iran.238 Led by a group of
educated Kurdish intelligentsia who had learned the modern ideas of equality, democracy,
freedom, and nationalism in the schools established by Reza Shah’s government, the
establishment of the Republic as an ostensibly national community can be viewed as another
instance of passive revolution, wherein the aspirations of a select few elites leads to the creation
of social structures not necessarily reflecting the loyalties of the multitude.239
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This ‘passive revolution’ was indicative of a broader divide in Kurdish political
organization along the axes of urbanism and ruralism, a lasting dichotomy that has continued to
impact the governing style of Kurdish movements to the present day. At Mahabad, that tension
was reflected in Qazi Muhammed’s tenuous alliance with Mullah Mustafa Barzani, a rising
Kurdish nationalist who had been instrumental in establishing the Hawar party in the KRI six
years prior. Barzani and his tribal militiamen had fled to Iran following a failed 1943 revolt
against the Hashemite Dynasty, and subsequently entered into a marriage of convenience with
Muhammed, who begrudgingly allowed Barzani to serve as the military guard for the Republic
but reportedly refused to let Barzani or any of his troops enter the gate of Mahabad itself while
they were stationed outside the city.240
Qazi Muhammed and the KDPI’s doctrine emphasized a non-violent and diplomatic
approach to achieving Kurdish autonomy, and he viewed Barzani and his tribal affiliates as
backwards and bellicose, perhaps even as an obstacle to the realization of a true centralized
Kurdish nation.241Although Barzani and Qazi may have disagreed on aspects of how best to
advocate for Kurdish autonomy and cultural rights, the Mahabad Republic ultimately would not
serve as the Kurdish experiment in statebuilding that its founders may have initially hoped it
would. Less than a year after the foundation of the Republic, and following the Soviet Union
winning oil concessions from Iran, forces rapidly withdrew in 1946 and the Republic was
subsequently surrounded and defeated militarily in a matter of weeks. Mustafa Barzani proved
his military ability and valor in driving back Iranian forces at the beginning of the re-occupation,
but a lack of Soviet support meant that military defeat was an inevitable eventuality. Faced with
overwhelming opposition, Barzani and approximately four hundred of his best fighters from
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Suleymaniah, including some Kurds from Mahabad who preferred Barzani’s more direct
approach to gaining autonomy from the central government, fled to the Soviet Union in 1946
where they would remain, attempting to rebuild the Kurdish movement in Iraq and Iran for over
a decade.242 It was here that Barzani re-formed the Kurdish Democratic Party-Iran as the KDP in
Iraq from exile, much to the chagrin of many Kurdish political leaders in Iraq, who preferred to
continue their alliances with the ICP. Nevertheless, Barzani’s considerable tribal influence led to
the split of Rizgari, the Kurdish contingent of the ICP, between national and regional politics.243
During Barzani’s ten year exile, the KDP enjoyed modest grassroots support and was led
in large part by Ibrahim Ahmed, a prominent leftist Kurd from Suleiymaniah who had played a
significant role in the foundation of JK in Iran directly preceding the Soviet occupation. Under
Ahmed’s rule, the Kurdish democratic party actually continued many of the alliances that carried
over from the ICP, a strategy that led to frustration amongst many tribal aghas and ideological
conflict within the party that only increased between the years of 1947 and 1958, when the next
major chapter in Kurdish history would begin with the toppling of the Hashemite monarchy.244
Although it is true that the early state period contains many examples of transnational
Kurdish relationships sustaining resistance to newly emergent central governments, the
frequency ease with which these cross-border alliances between various Kurdish movements
were formed in the early state period only “attest to a notorious inability of the weak
nationalizing states to control their territory, but also to the existence of a degree of solidarity
among Kurdish tribes and movements transcending the recently established borders”.
Ultimately, however, I agree with Hannes Černy when he argues that “to deduce from this degree
of solidarity common ethnicity as the independent variable determining relations between
242
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various segments of Kurdish societies in all four nationalizing states of Iraq, Turkey, Iran and
Syria, as the ethnic alliance model and related groupist frameworks do in their reification of
ethnic identities, would be a gross simplification of the complex dynamics within the matrix of
interests, identities, and resulting behaviors of actors in this context.”245As the following sections
will comprehensively demonstrate, when political circumstances change such that transnational
Kurdish cooperation is no longer in both parties’ mutual self interest, pragmatic considerations
almost universally overcome ethnic solidarity as a motivator for political behavior.
Therefore I endorse Shahram Akbarzedeh’s depiction of Kurdish “transnational identity
as a form of ‘groupness’, an ‘intensely felt collective solidarity’, which as Rogers Brubaker
contends is not ‘enduring or definitionally present’, and rather emerges “intermittently due to
specific circumstances.”246 In specific instances, the perception of a shared enemy threatening
transnational Kurdish communities in tandem might cause “issues of ethnicity and politics [to]
become entangled”, but, in the laconic words of Charles King and Neil Melvin, “identity politics
is more about politics than identity”. As such, moments of transversal Kurdish cooperation
emerge not in response to essentialist instincts, but in response to political circumstances, which
can change dramatically and without notice.247 Thus, the only way to understand transnational
Kurdish relationships and their motivations without resorting to ‘parochial groupism’ described
by Jordi Tejel is to examine in depth the sociopolitical contexts that lead to the emergence of
Kurdish political movements.248
It is for precisely this reason that this thesis contains such extensive historical analysis. It
attempts to employ a multidisciplinary and non-groupist analysis that “requires we ‘look and see’
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the matrix of identities and interests and the process by which they are gradually transformed
through historical interactions. These interactions do not by definition magnify the difference
between identities; they may also attempt to renegotiate a different type of relationship between
self and other,” both in inter- and intra-group contexts.249 This chapter supports Abbas Vali’s
contention that “Kurds’ minority status and the hegemonic nature of [nationalizing] states create
a dialectic of denial (by states of Kurdish political demands) and resistance (by Kurds),
generating a politics marked by exclusion and/or violence”, but more importantly, it contends
that there is nothing about Kurdish ethnicity itself that is intrinsically political.250 Ultimately, an
analysis of how Kurdish identity became ethnified in four separate political contexts reveals
some similar patterns, but reflects that contexts shape movements, and upholds Černy’s assertion
that the “analytical equation of ethnic groups with states and their presupposed predecessors is
not only demonstrably untenable but should not be made in the first place.”251
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Chapter Four
Kurdish Nationalism in the Postcolonial Space: Competing Spheres of Influence

In the contemporary era, numerous scholars of Kurdish nationalism and identity identify
the emergence of “two main traditions in Kurdish politics grounded in different zones in
Kurdistan, one growing from the east part of Iran and northern Iraq and born from the KDP, and
the other in southeast Turkey and Syria, born from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). 252 The
distinct approaches to Kurdish activism employed by each of these dominant parties can be
attributed to ideological rather than territorial bifurcations, as both schools of thought have
emerged from and been shaped by their respective political contexts. While the previous chapters
have examined the historical underpinnings of contemporary Kurdish nationalist movements,
this section will analyze the emergence of these parties and ideologies in detail, with an emphasis
on the impact of transnational interactions. Ultimately, I argue that while transversal dynamics
can play an important role in rekindling or sustaining some level of Kurdish identity, ‘ethnic
bonds’ have only peripheral relevance to the actual motivations of Kurdish political
communities. Despite a demonstrable lack of co-ethnic collaboration, the assumed fear of such
ostensibly natural alliances has driven states to perceive and respond to ‘ethnic threats’
emanating from their Kurdish populations even when such threats stem from unrelated
grievances or do not exist at all, in doing so driving previously ambivalent Kurds towards
ethnonationalism in a self-perpetuating cycle. Kurdish identity stemming from the ‘dialectic of
denial and resistance’ to the state, critically, does not necessarily correlate to transnational
Kurdish solidarity, as evidenced by the emergence of Northern and Southern Kurdistan as the
dominant and opposing foci of Kurdish nationalism.253
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As noted by Maria O’Shea and Shahram Akbarzadeh, geographic and demographic
factors influence the contours of political organization and relative balances of power in
transversal Kurdish interactions.254 By virtue of their relatively large and territorially
consolidated Kurdish populations, as well as through the imposition of policies that drove Kurds
to view themselves in ethnonational terms, the sociopolitical contexts of Iraq and Turkey in the
first half of the twentieth century set the stage for the emergence of strong national liberation
movements in the modern era, albeit for different reasons. As a result, the Kurdish movements in
these states became the dominant drivers of Kurdish ethnonationalist discourse as a whole, and
the interests of Kurdish nationalists in Syria and Iran became secondary to the policy preferences
of elites in Turkey and Iraq, respectively.255
The ultimate consequence of this dominant/auxiliary dynamic is that transnational
linkages in the modern era of Kurdish nationalism have been lopsided, with a dominant Kurdish
group pursuing its own political objectives even when the consequences have stifled the interests
of its auxiliary Kurdish brethren.256 Ofra Bengio describes Turkish and Iraqi Kurdistan as the ‘big
brothers’ in the region influencing Kurdish political thought and mobilization 257- but, as analyses
of cross-border relations in this thesis demonstrate, if this relationship can be described in any
way as fraternal, political elites in each region certainly play their part in making the Kurds a
dysfunctional family.
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Describing the Two Schools of Thought in Modern Kurdish Politics

The first strand of Kurdish politics identified by Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Hamdi
Akkaya has its roots in the Mahabad Republic and the charismatic leadership of Mullah Mustafa
Barzani, and can be reasonably termed the ‘traditionalist camp’ of Kurdish nationalism for its
willingness to maintain the status quo and advocate for autonomy rather than separatism.258
Influenced by decades of ‘hands-off’ policy towards the Kurds in mandatory Iraq and powerful
enduring tribal and religious structures of authority, the traditionalist camp has generally aimed
to work within the confines of the existing international system by gaining protection and
autonomy for Kurds through clever political maneuvering. The now-dominant KDP is primarily
concerned with the sanctity and governance of its own territory, and pragmatically engages in
trade and diplomatic cooperation with other states in the region to maximize its influence and
opportunities- forging especially close economic ties with Turkey despite historical and popular
animosity. The second strand of Kurdish nationalism, which emerged following the domestic
upheaval in Turkey during the 1970s and was spiritually and militarily guided by the thought of
prominent nationalist Abdullah Öcalan, retains a distinctly more radical flavor.
Inspired by Marxism-Leninism and originally intended more as a tool for socialist
revolution than ethnic separatism, the PKK’s party ideology traditionally called for the creation
of an independent and ethnically Kurdish state, though in recent decades it has advocated for the
transcendence of the [ethnic] state as a nexus of authority altogether in favor of local
administration through ‘democratic confederalism’- a cognitive turn of ideology that will be
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discussed at greater length in chapter six.259 Furthermore, while the KDP has consistently taken
steps to protect the sanctity and security of its borders with neighboring Kurdish populations, the
PKK rhetorically embraces the idea of transnational activism by rejecting the legitimacy of
‘artificial’ borders in the region altogether. From the PKK’s point of view, therefore, ‘transversal’
Kurdish dynamics are not transversal but regional, a philosophy that can be reflected in the
parties' willingness to establish bases and affiliated organizations outside of Turkey’s territory.
Unsurprisingly, this approach has been met with skepticism by other Kurdish groups pursuing
their own objectives in the region, and most aim to minimize the PKK's presence except for in
times of crisis or insecurity.
Just as the conciliatory nature of the KDP’s traditionalist approach stems from an
ambiguous relationship with the state and international system in early Kurdish-Iraqi history, the
radical nature of the PKK’s tactics to achieve national liberation is the natural consequence of a
long history of regimes and political elites Turkey that brutally suppressed assertions of Kurdish
autonomy or advocacy in the political sphere and denied the existence of the Kurdish people as a
whole for decades. Armed with an understanding of the historical construction of Kurdish
identity in its respective sociopolitical environments, it should not come as a surprise that the
policies of ethnic erasure employed by the Turkish state with regard to its Kurdish population
fostered the emergence of a radical liberation movement in Southern Kurdistan and among
Kurdish refugees in Syria employing the rhetoric of separatist ethnonationalism.260
Prominent scholars of the Middle East have long since established a causal relationship
between repression and radicalization in analyses of extremist groups in the region, convincingly
demonstrating that the criminalization of political dissent only drives opposition underground

259
260

Černy 2017, p. 211.
Vali 2003, p. 61.

Constructing Kurdistan: Cross-Border Kurdish Relations and Ethnic Identity

119

and increases the likelihood of violent extremism. In keeping with this pattern, the emergence of
the PKK as an extremist organization was primarily a consequence of Turkey’s deeply embedded
Kemalist ideology, which underpinned the state’s refusal to provide legal avenues for Kurdish
dissent in the multiparty system established after 1961.261 Critically, the ethnification of Kurdish
grievances was not an inevitable conclusion of political liberalization, as evidenced by Kurdish
politicians’ willingness (in fact, preference) to collaborate with nationwide leftist forces in
Turkey in an open political space.
It should be noted before we proceed further that the dichotomy I propose between
‘traditional’ and ‘radical’ Kurdish activism is a generalization and oversimplification of the
many nuances influencing political behavior on both a local and regional level. Establishing such
a broad bifurcation in Kurdish society has the potential to unintentionally contribute to the
‘cliched constructivism’ or ‘groupist ontology’ I aim to repudiate, but to abstain from any
categorization or objective analysis of these parties would make my undertaking an analytical
impossibility. Therefore, I will utilize these spheres of influence throughout my analysis while
simultaneously cautioning my reader that the priorities and ideologies of any political movement
emerge as a function of its specific space and context, and can be subject to rapid change or
evolution through exogenous events.262 There are many examples of peripheral parties from one
‘dyad’ adopting the rhetoric of and collaborating with the other, but the most prominent
challenge to the ideological/regional divide I propose is that posed by the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK), an opposition party formed in response to Barzani’s individualistic power
centralization in the 1960s. The leftist and secular ideology of the PUK stemmed from
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transnational interaction with Iranian Kurds and in explicit opposition to Barzani’s governing
strategies, but like the KDP and KDPI, it views the state itself as legitimate and generally does
not advocate for fully-fledged separatism or revolution.263 Although this broad categorization is
incapable of fully capturing the nuances and contradictions inherent to the Kurdish national
question, it nevertheless serves as a useful conceptual framework through which to examine the
development of contemporary Kurdish political movements.

The Emergence of Modern Kurdish Nationalism in Independent Republican Iraq

Although both movements described above can trace their ideological lineage to the
period immediately following the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, the KDP-dominated camp of
Kurdish political thought was established three decades prior to the formal establishment of the
PKK in 1978, and remains the most practically influential ideology in the region today. Although
the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq has been operating under Ibrahim Ahmed’s leadership
since Barzani’s escape to the Soviet Union after the fall of the Mahabad Republic in 1946, the
year 1958 constituted a ‘watershed moment’ for the Kurds of Iraq and is identified by historian
Ofra Bengio as the beginning of the modern Kurdish nationalist movement.264 When Abd
al-Karim Qasim and his Free Officers successfully overthrew the Hashemite Dynasty in the 14
July Revolution in 1958, Ahmed immediately issued a declaration hailing the new government
and encouraging freedom and equality for Kurdish and Arab peoples. In turn, Qasim -who
viewed the Kurds as a powerful potential ally to be utilized rather than resisted- included in his
provisional constitution an article stipulating that “Arabs and Kurds are partners in the homeland,
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and their national rights are recognized within the Iraqi entity”.265 For the first time, the newly
empowered Kurds of Iraq enjoyed ostensible parity with their Arab compatriots under the
national government. Qasim also made symbolic gestures to convince the Kurds that he was
serious, such as placing the Kurdish sun on the Iraqi national flag, the Kurdish dagger on the
republic’s coat of arms, and releasing political prisoners from jail.266 Intent on centralizing his
authority in an insecure political environment, Qasim invited Barzani to return to Iraq and take
formal and legal control as chairman of the KDP. Barzani gladly did so and facilitated a close
relationship with Qasim during the early years of his rule. Qasim provided Barzani with a car,
villa, and generous federal stipend, and in return received the assistance of Barzani’s formidable
tribal peshmerga (literally translated as ‘those who face death’) forces in political purges. This
partnership proved useful early on, as Barzani’s men played a critical role in quelling a serious
nationalist-Ba’athist uprising in Mosul in March 1959.267 Between the years 1958 and 1962,
there were a full twenty-nine coup attempts levied against the Qasim government- a clear
indicator of how valuable the co-option of Barzani’s powerful forces were to the new leader.268 In
this period of state weakness when Kurdish revolt might have yielded victory or autonomy,
however, Barzani was more than willing to work in partnership with Qasim to form a
multi-ethnic federal state rather than fight for full independence.
The honeymoon period of relations between Barzani and Qasim quickly soured, as Qasim
became suspicious of Ibrahim Ahmed’s continued communiques with his Deputy Prime Minister
Abdul Salam Arif. Fearful that full recognition of Kurdish autonomy in the final constitution
would provide his Arab nationalist rivals with ammunition to overthrow his rule and concerned
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by the increasing ruthlessness of Barzani’s power centralization in the north, Qasim outlawed the
KDP in 1959 and began providing military support to Kurdish tribes opposed to Barzani’s
authority.269 This reversal can be further contextualized in the increasingly ethnified political
space of the country in the region, as Nasserite pan-Arabism swept the post-colonial Middle
East. Across Iraq, the “multi-ethnic alliances that had brought down the monarchy ruptured
and… competing ethno-nationalisms amplified and faced each other in an incrementally violent
struggle over the future of the country”, a political space that further reinforced the Kurdish
conviction that ethnonational mobilization was the only avenue to cultural autonomy.270 Still,
reflecting the enduring effects of a non-coercive early national development, “territorial
separation was not part of Kurdish claims, because most Kurds did not see themselves as a
separate political entity [or] autonomous ethnic group.”271 This rhetoric is reflected in a 1959
article in KDP’s nationalist pamphlet Hetaw, which congratulated Qasim for “bringing freedom
to Kurds and Arabs” through his struggle against imperialism, “a goal of Kurds and Arabs
alike”.272Although it is true that the multivariagated Kurdish tribes of the north were far from
monolithic and that Kurdish nationalism in Iraq was initially cultural rather than political in
nature, as the “boundaries of inclusion and exclusion became ethnicized and politicized, Kurdish
nationalists began to express a highly ethnicized and violent form of Kurdish nationalism” as a
defensive response to external coercion.
In contrast to earlier periods, the defensive impetus for Kurdish ethnonationalism in Iraq
in the 1960s was supported by necessary mobilizing structures- namely a “semi legitimate
national leader, an organized umbrella political party, clandestine networks, external support, and
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financial resources”, all of which increased the salience and significance of their nationalist
projects.273 As a result, the 1958 coup and the resultant Kurdish mobilization and struggle for
autonomy served as a significant source of inspiration for Kurdish political movements in the
region, though the KDP provided minimal material support to Kurdish nationalists in
neighboring countries. Furthermore, a decade and a half of military and political struggle against
Baghdad in explicitly ethnonational terms served as a potent force in disseminating the rhetoric
and ideology of nationalism to the majority of the Kurdish population in Iraq. It was during this
period that the term Kurdayeti first became instrumentalized for political use, and that many of
the mythicized connections between contemporary Kurds and their supposed ethnic antecedents
in the Gutis, the Medes, the Buwayhids, and any number of ancient societies once residing in the
region.274 Barzani’s ambitious power centralization, aided by a now-unimaginable triumvirate of
American, Israeli, and Iranian aid, was effective in disseminating uniform ideology and political
praxis throughout his extensive tribal and urban networks.275 His drive to manifest a united and
autonomous Kurdistan under his exclusive control, however, wrought as many challenges as it
did benefits to the Kurdish movement in Iraq and fostered internal division. His choice to sign a
brief ceasefire and autonomy agreement with Iraqi President Arif “in his personal capacity rather
than as KDP president” served as the last straw for Ibrahim Ahmad and Jalal Talabani, who had
become increasingly frustrated with Barzani’s overbearing control of the KDP and traditionalist
political priorities. After expressing their dissent and being expelled from Barzani’s Sixth
Congress in July 1964, Ahmad, Talabani, and roughly four thousand of their supporters crossed
the border to seek refuge with Kurdish communities in Iran, where they would remain until the
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collapse of the KDP and Barzani’s death created a new political vacuum from which the PUK
would emerge.276
Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s ascension to the status of nationalist icon and unambiguous
leader of the Kurdish political movement in the 1960s and 70s served as a period of intense
ethnification and politicization for the Kurds of Iraq, but the territorial integrity of Southern
Kurdistan was tenuous, and the continuation of a campaign against Baghdad was contingent
upon a) Barzani’s charismatic leadership, b) foreign military assistance, and c) a weak Iraqi state.
All three of these preconditions began to dissolve during the 1970s, beginning with Saddam
Hussein’s rise to power enabled by the Ba’athist coup of 1968.
During the early years of his rule, Saddam, like both Arifs and Qasim before him, was
forced to conciliate Kurdish demands for autonomy based on the significant military threat they
posed to his tenure.277 Negotiations between Barzani and Saddam culminated in a twelve-point
agreement for autonomy known as the March Declaration of 1970, which established Kurdish as
the official language of the region and promised both cultural and territorial autonomy within
four years.278 Both Barzani and the regime appeared satisfied with the terms, and Saddam
oratorically praised the agreement as “a full, fundamental, political, and constitutional solution
which will guarantee brotherhood between the Arabs and Kurds forever.” Saddam’s rhetoric
proved to be pure political posturing, however, as Kurdish autonomy was repeatedly postponed
by an increasingly secure state that no longer felt pressure to capitulate to Kurdish demands.
Saddam walked back his guarantee of territorial autonomy for the Kurds, claiming that liberty
was “given to the people, not the land” in direct contradiction to the agreement signed only one
year earlier. The contentious Kirkuk oil fields were nationalized by the central government in
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1972, inciting widespread Kurdish riots and resulting in some shelling of Kurdish territory, and
trust between Saddam and Barzani eroded as a result of several assassination attempts levied
against the Kurdish leader and his family orchestrated by the regime.279
Although Barzani and the Kurdish peshmerga had the ability to effectively resist
Saddam’s military campaigns with arms and artillery provided by their Iranian, American, and
Israeli allies, this source of external aid dissolved following the 1975 Algiers Agreement (see
below) and Barzani’s subsequent departure to Iran and later the United States. Unsurprisingly
given the extent to which the KDP had come to reflect Barzani’s personal ties and alliances, his
absence combined with foreign abandonment shattered the Kurdish nationalists’ spirits, and the
KDP was temporarily disbanded in 1975. Although the organization was reformed under
Barzani’s nephew Massoud Barzani the following year, the Algiers agreement set the KRI down
a path of repression and state violence that fostered defensive nationalism in a different way
through a dialectic of denial, setting the stage for the eventual resurgence of both the KDP and
PUK in the aftermath of the Gulf War.

The Re-emergence of Kurdish National Sentiments in Quasi-Democratic Turkey

While Mahabad rose and fell and Barzani strategically consolidated his control over the Kurdish
movement in Iraq from exile, expressions of Kurdish identity in Turkey remained dormant, at
least in the national political discourse. No meaningful rebellions or assertions of Kurdish
autonomy had occurred in the country since the destruction of Dersim in 1938, leading some
scholars to deem the period between 1940 and 1960 the ‘silent years’ in Eastern Anatolia and
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propose that Kurdish political identity was dwindling to extinction.280 Although it is true that
Kurdishness was almost entirely absent from the political landscape, Hamit Borzsalan argues that
Kurdish identity was ‘personalized’ rather than eliminated, and merely went underground for
fear of repression by the state.281 According to this account, when the news of the successes of
Southern Kurdistan reached Turkey through refugees and the clandestine distribution of political
journals the embers of Kurdish identity were rekindled and set the stage for a resurgent assertion
of ethnonational separatism. Although this might at first glance appear a reawakening of the
traditional and primordial ties ostensibly uniting the Kurdish nation as a naturally-coagulating
political community, it is more likely that it reawakened memories of Kemalist oppression and
juxtaposed the brutal underdevelopment of northern Kurdistan with the comparatively utopian
conditions in the south.282 This is not to discount the significance of the KDP in fostering
Kurdish political identity in Turkey, but it does suggest in line with my general argument that
historical and political context played a greater role in the ethnification of Kurdishness than
Kurdishness itself.
The most important way news of the Kurdish exploits in Iraq disseminated throughout
the region was through radio broadcasts, which Beatrice Garapon and Adnan Çelik deem “the
most important innovation of that time… in forging Kurdistan as a culturally [but not politically]
unified space.”283 The ease with which ideologies and stories could be shared across borders and
distances was unprecedented, and could even be considered of equal significance to the
emergence of the internet and instant messaging technologies in recent decades. Starting in the
1940s, several radio stations in Baghdad, Yerevan, and Jordan began broadcasting to Eastern
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Anatolia in the Kurdish language, in some cases espousing fiery nationalist rhetoric. Especially
to the Kurds in Turkey, the Kurdish voice in the radio broadcasts was an altogether new
experience. The criminalization of the Kurdish language and ‘Turkification’ of the region aimed
to humiliate the Kurdish culture, but Radio Yerevan in particular “broadcast traditional Kurdish
songs as well as dengbêj songs about their recent history and interpreted these songs by inviting
Kurdish historians”.284 The objective of Radio Yerevan in particular was explicitly politicalcovertly funded and regulated by the Soviets and supported by the KDP, broadcasts frequently
described the nationalist struggle of Barzani to the south in glowing propagandistic terms.
Although the salience and intensity of ‘underground’ Kurdish nationalism increased
following Barzani’s return and the proliferation of ethnonationalism in Iraq, Kurdishness did not
publically re-emerge in the Turkish space until opportunities emerged for them following the
1960 military coup, which (perhaps at first rather surprisingly), ushered in an era of limited
political pluralism under a multi-party constitution.285 Again reflecting the limited popular appeal
of ethnic mobilization in a political space that does not explicitly threaten ethnicity, the Kurdish
‘movement’ that emerged during the 1960s in Turkey was fractured among a plurality of leftist
organizations and did not present a cohesive ethnic or economic agenda286 Still, while the civilian
government established in 1961 did not violently target the Kurdish region and even legalized
the language in limited contexts, it made it clear that any references to the Kurds as a distinct
group or publications espousing Kurdish sentiments were opposed by the state and quickly
suppressed. Though Kurdish people could participate in political life and advocate for their
material interests, they could not publicly mobilize around their ethnicity.
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Anthropologist Jack Eller succinctly captures the changing space by observing the
“minor improvement that people were no longer executed for claiming that the Kurds existed as
they would have been a few decades earlier. But it was still impermissible to write or say
anything about the Kurds as Kurds, about their culture or history.”287 This tension between
liberalization and suppression resulted in the emergence of a new philosophy called doouculuk
(‘Eastism’) through which Kurds and their leftist allies advocated for economic development in
the neglected east without expressing their grievances in explicit ethnic terms.288 Kendal Nazan,
president of the influential Kurdish Institute of Paris, describes Eastism as a “transitory period in
the rebirth of the Kurdish national movement” and a stepping stone to the realization of
ethnonationalism, in doing so capturing the popular consensus on this period of Kurdish
development.289 Although it is true that the constrained liberalization of the 1960s denied Kurds
opportunities to ethnicize in the legal political sphere and several illicit Kurdish organizations
emerged throughout the decade, I believe depicting the evolution of ‘Eastism’ into
ethnonationalism as an inevitable result of liberalization again makes a groupist assumption
about Kurdish mobilization not grounded in actual reality.
Instead, it was the consistent denial of any public expression of Kurdishness whatsoever
that drove Kurds in Turkey to radicalize and rally around the revolutionary thought of Abdullah
Öcalan. The state’s suppression of a Kurdish alphabet book and an objective study by prominent
Turkish sociologist Ismail Besikci on the “socioeconomic and ethnic foundations of Eastern
Anatolia” illustrated to the Kurds that their participation in political life was inherently limited.290
The socialist Workers Party of Turkey (TWP) proved a highly popular party for Kurdish voters
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in the 1960s, and provided the first opportunity for Kurds to participate in the national assembly
for decades. As a result, the TWP eventually became the first party in Turkey to acknowledge the
Kurds as a distinct people with grievances and legitimate demands in Turkish society, and
eventually adopted a motion calling on the party to “support the Kurdish people’s struggle for the
realization of all its democratic aspirations and demands” and condemning the “fascist
authorities representing the ruling class [who] have subjected the Kurdish people to a policy of
assimilation and intimidation which has often become a bloody repression”.291 For the first time
since the founding of the republic, a legal political party had come to recognise the existence of a
Kurdish minority within national borders, and it had done so in the context of an intra-ethnic
coalition based on ideology rather than identity. Of course, the expression of Kurdish grievances
in such a public setting was deemed unacceptable by the state and was subsequently banned a
few years later.292
Kurdish-Leftist alliances proved instrumental in rekindling a political consciousness
amongst the Kurdish elite and multitude, but Gerard Chalihand cautions us against overstating
the extent to which Kurdish grievances were addressed through multi-party cooperation. Despite
the divergences of opinion and robust debates surrounding foreign and economic matters, “the
threat of repression and the deep-rooted legacy of Greater Turkish chauvinism made the Kurds
an issue to be avoided if possible”.293 The best a revolutionary Kurdish party could do was form
an alliance with progressive Turkish forces and join the struggle for democratization and
federalism- though their interests were frequently peripheralized by their Turkish partners.
Frustrations naturally arose from this unequal alliance, culminating in a series of local
demonstrations across Northern Kurdistan in the fall of 1967, the first massive movement against
291
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state authority in the Kurdish region since 1938.294 The increasing threat socialism and eastism
posed to the established status quo was at last rejected by Turkish elites in 1970, when another
military coup rolled back the civil liberties established in the 1961 constitution and re-instituted
martial law in the eastern provinces. In the decade that followed, the Turkish political space
descended into factional chaos, with “unprecedented political violence reaching almost civil war
like dimensions… pitting the state apparatus and the ultranationalist, paramilitary Grey Wolves
against a myriad of radical leftist movements, who after 1974 came out of hiding and fought for
such diverse ideals as enhancing civil liberties, workers’ rights and economic equality, defeating
the capitalist- imperialist nexus, or outright socialist world revolution”.295
Given this violent political sphere where no hierarchy of ‘right authority’ is established
and the rejection of Kurdish interests by mainstream Turkish parties, it is no surprise that a
radical secessionist Kurdish party emerged. Thus, Jongerden and Akkaya suggest that “the PKK
does not have its political background in Kurdish politics… but [was] born from the polarized
revolutionary left in Turkey”, under combination of a complex of manifold but interrelated
socioeconomic and political factors, cursorily summarized by Černy as “wider global
phenomena, [and] the imposition of laissez-faire capitalism and top-down modernization
programmes that fuelled inequality in agrarian Eastern Anatolia.” 296 Lending support to this
claim is the language of PKK’s founding congress , in which Öcalan and his followers clearly
perceived the Kurdish peasants of rural Eastern Anatolia, analogous to the proletarian worker in
Marxist- Leninism, in class terms first and ethnic terms second, and understood them as a
vanguard in a class- based revolution turning Turkey as a whole into a socialist utopia”.297
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Öcalan himself preferred political activism based on economic inequality rather than
ethnic liberation, as evidenced in the fact that the PKK’s practical and ideological predecessor
the Ankara Democratic Higher Education Association (ADYÖD) advocated for socialist
revolution on purely a class basis and was led by three ethnic Turks and Kurds in conjunction.298
It was only the suppression of ADYÖD, culminating in a police raid that arrested 163 student
‘sympathizers’ and the closure of the association in 1975, that Öcalan ultimately determined that
“effecting revolutionary change by legal means and as part of an official movement was doomed
to fail,” choosing instead to go underground in East Anatolia in the hopes of catalyzing a
nation-wide workers revolution by utilizing Maoist and Guevarist foco-theory-inspired guerrilla
warfare tactics that put the disenfranchised peasants at the vanguard of the revolutionary
struggle.299 Although it is true that some of Öcalan’s writing and PKK rhetoric throughout the
1980s played up the ethnic aspect of their liberation struggle, this again reflects the deployment
of ‘strategic essentialisms’ rather than genuine ideological conviction.
This point is supported by the fact that Öcalan has, since 1999, again rejected the ideal of
the nation state in favor of his Bookchin-inspired project of ‘democratic confederalism,’ which
advocates for governance based on the interests of local rather than imagined communities. The
PKK was certainly ‘born from the left’, and party doctrine only emphasized the ethnic seperatist
aspect of Kurdish liberation for a small minority of its existence- thus calling into question the
extent to which the organization can be perceived as a wholly ethnonationalist group in the first
place.

298

Jongerden, Joost, and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, Ahmet Hamdi. 2010 "Born from the Left," chapter in Nationalisms
and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism and the Kurdish Issue, edited by M. Caiser and J. Jongerden.
London, Routledge, p. 124.
299
Černy 2017, p. 143.

Constructing Kurdistan: Cross-Border Kurdish Relations and Ethnic Identity

132

This economic and ideological underpinning of Kurdish seperatism in Turkey does not in
itself make the PKK’s objective anti-nationalistic in itself- after all, it was Lenin himself who
first advocated for the establishment of the nation-state as a means of resisting imperialist
domination-300 but it certainly problematizes groupist assumptions that its formation as a radical
Kurdish ethnonationalist NLM reflects “ethnically determined social action”, which, as Weber
cautions, “subsume phenomena that a rigorous sociological analysis would have to distinguish
carefully.”301

Repression Contagion and the Spread of Kurdish Suppression

Interpreting these non-violent protests against economic marginalization and cultural
erasure as a threatening expression of Kurdish nationalism, the Turkish government led by
Cevdet Sunay responded to the protests with violence, and “was particularly repressive even
against harmless demonstrations of ‘Kurdism’”, returning to Kemalist policies of Kurdish
erasure and denial.302 As mentioned above, a central reason for this continued insistence on the
myth of an ethnically homogenous Turkey was the entrenched influence of Kemalism in
nationalist discourses. Another key factor, however, was the threat posed by the Kurdish national
movement in Iraq, which continued to pick up steam throughout the course of the 1960s. The
threat of Kurdish nationalist rhetoric seeping into Turkey from Mullah Mustafa Barazani’s
movement was a major concern for the Turkish elite, although evidence for meaningful
cooperation between the two groups other than a short lived KDP offshoot in Turkey is scarce. 303
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Nevertheless, an assumption that the Kurds would espouse ethnically secessionist claims also
contributed to the stubborn refusal of Kurdish grievances during the liberalizing period.
Kristen Braithwaite provides a theoretical framework through which to view this
dynamic in her ‘repression contagion’ model of ethnic conflict, which ultimately argues that
ethnicity itself plays a minimal role in the spread of separatism, rather “it is state responses to
perceived ‘ethnic threats’- even when such threats stem from unrelated grievances or do not exist
at all, that cause the most violence and ethnonationalist conflict”.304 Arguing against mainstream
theories of international relations espoused by the likes of Huntington that argue “actual ethnic
links to the group in the conflict zone make a state more likely to have its own conflict” due to
the tendency of “secessionist movements in neighboring countries… to join their ethnic kin in
the creation of a new ethnically homogeneous state”, Braithwaite asserts that “understanding the
spread of ethnic conflict requires understanding the dynamic interaction between state
perceptions of security threats, repression, and ethnic group behavior.”305 This stance echoes
Hannes Černy’s conviction that ethnicity can only be understood in relation to “complex
dynamics within the matrix of interests, identities, and resulting behaviors of actors in [each
specific] context”, and ultimately leads to an endorsement of Bruce Gilley’s conviction that
ethnic conflict as currently operationalized in explanatory IR serves as little more than “a messy
descriptive label for a bunch of unrelated phenomena”.
Through the use of several case studies, Braithwaite convincingly demonstrates that
“ethnicity does not play a motivating factor” in the behavior of transnational Kurdish
interaction.306 The state’s perception that ethnicity does play a motivating factor in Kurdish
behavior, however, has made all the difference- another example of ethnonationalism’s
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discursive reification. Throughout the 1960s, “Turkish leaders tended to interpret any political
unrest in its Kurdish areas as secessionism and as having spread from Iraq or Iran, even when the
movements themselves had more to do with economic than ethnic demands,” another reason why
Turkish leftists were generally reticent to lend recognition to the Kurdish question.307 Kurds in
Syria and Iran, too, were subject to the negative reactions to an emergent Kurdish proto-state in
Iraq by their own governments. From when the British and French troops withdrew from the
Syrian territory in 1946 to the Qasim revolution of 1958, “Arab-Kurdish relations were still
fairly good”, albeit threatened by the increasing salience of pan-Arab nationalism.
The establishment of the United Arab Republic in conjunction with Nasser’s Egypt
combined with the aforementioned ‘repression contagion’ mechanism resulting from Barzani’s
struggle resulted in the Syrian government perceiving its miniscule and disjointed Kurdish
population as a threat. In part motivated by fears of Kurdish migration across its shared borders
with Iraq and Syria, the Ba’athist government in 1961 conducted an unannounced census in the
Kurdish regions, requiring all citizens to provide paperwork and documentation of their Syrian
citizenship. Although apparently only intended to affect those who had crossed into Syria
illegally, the decision deprived over 120,000 Kurds in Syria of their citizenship, and with it any
opportunity for state subsidies or public employment.308 Similarly, the Arab Cordon Plan of 1963
aimed to plant Arab settlers along the Syrian frontiers to act as a buffer between Kurdish
communities displaced as many as one hundred thousand Syrian Kurds, and was intended to
produce demographic change and reduce the apparent threat of co-ethnic alliances.309
Muhammad Talab Hilal, the Syian Arab official in charge of spearheading the establishment of
the forty-kilometer Arab belt (hizam `Arabi), concisely captured the groupist approach to
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ethnonationalism employed by state elites when he asserted that “for all their conflicting
tendencies and the enmities and rivalries between them, the Kurdish tribes in al-jazira [the
region in north-east Syria in which they are concentrated] are united by … ‘the Kurdish
race’…and the dream of national homeland”.310
Hilal’s assertion of ‘organic ties’ between transborder Kurdish communities posing an
ethnic threat, when no evidence for such a threat had yet arisen, perfectly reflects Braithwaite’s
thesis that states perceive ethnicity as a greater source of political contestation than it is- and that
by reifying ethnicity as a politically-relevant source of identity, states therefore contribute to the
development of defensive ethnonationalism.311 The Syrian position that a “common religion,
Islam, could not be the glue between Arabs and Kurds since for the latter, Kurdish national
identity had first priority” is altogether ahistorical as previous analysis has euclidated, and in this
instance again we see a state with a Kurdish minority pursuing ethnonational homogeneity
prompted by exogenous factors.312
The preemptive measures taken in Syria to stunt the ostensibly natural development of
Kurdish nationalism, while stopping short of the drastic military measures employed by other
states in the region, reflect the repression contagion described by Braithwaite in that the
September Revolution in neighboring Iraq caused the Ba’athists in Syria to fear a Kurdish
problem that presented no real or pressing issue- in this way, they also set the stage for a later
radicalization of Kurdish nationalism in that state when the political space allowed for its
emergence.313 Kurds in Iran continued to be subjected to periodic state suppression and the denial
of their cultural or territorial claims, and though the Mahabad Republic had ignited a wave of

310

Bengio in Stansfield and Shareef 2017, p. 82.
Braithwaite 2014, Brubaker 2009.
312
Bengio in Stansfield and Shareef 2017, p. 83.
313
Braithwaite 2014.
311

Constructing Kurdistan: Cross-Border Kurdish Relations and Ethnic Identity

136

support for Kurdish nationalism during the 1950s it was blunted somewhat by the Shah’s
repressive policies and SAVAK security services. Although this continued repression was
undoubtedly brutal and had dramatic consequences for Kurds engaged in the nationalist struggle
in Iran, it did not have the same galvanizing effects throughout the multitude as it did elsewhere,
due in part to the factors discussed in the second chapter of this thesis (namely, the fact that
Iranian nationalism was somewhat inclusive of the Kurdish ethnicity and that the suppression of
ethnic minorities was the general modus operandi of the Shah’s regime.)314
In his attempted suppression of Kurdish national sentiments in Northwest Iran, Reza
Pahlavi found an apparently unlikely ally in Mustafa Barzani and the KDP. Following the fall of
Mahabad, a number of prominent Kurdish nationalists had fled to Iraqi Kurdistan during
Barzani’s exile, where they initially enjoyed safe haven under the leadership of Ibrahim Ahmed,
himself a founding member of the KDPI. After the September Revolution, the Shah cracked
down on underground KDPI cells throughout the region and imprisoned many hundreds of party
members in what has subsequently been referred to as the Year of Destruction (salî qr̄ an). 315 This
repression led to another mass exodus of refugees to Iraqi Kurdistan, which was now coming
under the control of Barzani with Qasim’s early support. The Shah perceived an opportunity to
advance his interests on two fronts by providing “a safe haven, financial and military support,
and even radio and other publishing and communication technologies” to the Kurds of Iraq to
antagonize his rival neighbors- on the condition that the KDP assist him in suppressing the KDPI
and Kurdish national movements in Iran. 316 Faced with the opportunity to gain valuable
international support, Barzani readily assented and quickly set about removing all KDPI bases
from Iraqi territory by consent or by force. Historical accounts describe how “Barzani forces,
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alongside the Iranian army in areas such as Piranshar, Sardash, and Banê, hunted members of
the KDPI inside Iranian Kurdistan.”317 In the 1960s, KDPI members living in areas under
Barzani’s authority suffered from persecution and assassination, their bodies frequently handed
over to SAVAK authorities for public display in Kurdish Iranian villages.318 This cold betrayal of
fellow Kurds came in spite of the fact that Barzani’s ascendency and indeed his party itself was
enabled by Kurdish nationalists in Iran at the very moment he most needed their assistance.
Of course, in the rapidly shifting and complex landscape that is global politics,
particularly in the Middle East during the 1970s, alliances and positions have the potential to
shift overnight, and a Kurdish ‘imagined community’ dependent on external military assistance
was, as previously discussed, fundamentally unsustainable. This proved to be the case in 1975,
when Iraq and Iran temporarily normalized their relations in the Algiers Agreement at an OPEC
conference, agreeing to a formal settlement on outstanding border disputes in the Shatt al-Arab
region and pledging to cooperatively “maintain border security and prevent subversive
infiltration in either direction”- a thinly-veiled reference to the threat of Kurdish conflict
contagion and transnational aid. Overnight, Iranian forces were withdrawn and supplies to Mulla
Mustafa suspended, and a subsequent Iraqi offensive was successful in driving Kurdish forces
into the mountains.319 Entirely defeated and dejected, Barzani developed lung cancer the
following year and gained medical care in Iran, where he was provided amnesty by his former
ally the Shah but kept under house arrest and forbidden from engaging in political activities.
After seeking advanced treatment in the United States, he eventually succumbed to his illness on
March 3rd, 1979 and was subsequently buried in Mahabad.320
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Clearly, the historic emergence of Kurdish parties and their interaction is no reflection of
a deeply embodied or enduring sense of collective ethnic solidarity. In contrast, it reflects the
limited relevance of shared ethnicity in determining political behavior or mobilization, a theme
that runs true throughout transnational studies of Kurdish activism. In this relationship, while we
see some examples of transnational collaboration in the Mahabad republic and the brief safe
haven provided to the KDPI in Southern Kurdistan, even these cases remain historically
contested. Some scholars, including prominent Professor Ofra Bengio, have exhibited a tendency
to downplay the extent to which Kurdish parties have contributed to each others’ suppression and
extermination- reflected in her euphemistic assessment that the Kurds of Iraq have ensured their
survival “by turning a blind eye to persecution of their Kurdish brethren” in other countries.321
Instead, I believe an objective historic analysis demonstrates that, particularly in the bellicose
relationship between the KDP and KDPI, Kurds have advanced their interests by participating
in, often with great zeal, the persecution of their Kurdish rivals. An assessment that concludes
otherwise, in my view, overemphasizes rhetorical ‘strategic essentialisms’ while peripheralizing
actual historical events which better portray true motivations. Overwhelmingly, we see pragmatic
considerations overcoming ethnic solidarity as the drivers of Kurdish elite behavior, even as the
rhetoric of ethnonationalism matured and the ideology spread throughout the multitude.
This fact, along with the relatively insignificant role of ethnic identity or solidarity in
determining the ideological emergence of the PKK from revolutionary Turkey, indicates that the
behavior of Kurdish nationalist groups is the result of a complex co-constitutive relationship
between the Kurds and the state in specific temporal and territorial contexts. Contrary to
enduring depictions of solidarity in the discourse on Kurdish nationalism and ethnic separatism
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more broadly, objective ethnic ties have played a very minimal role in the emergence and
maturation of diverse Kurdish political identities.
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Chapter FiveTransversal Dynamics in an Era of Kurdish Tragedy and Resurgence
Following the concurrent blows to Kurdish nationalist aspirations across the region dealt
by General Kenan Evren’s 1980 coup, the dissolution of foreign aid to the Kurdish parties in Iraq
following the Algiers Agreement of 1975, and Ayatollah Khomeini’s rebuffing of Kurdish
autonomy claims following the 1979 revolution, Kurdish movements across the region were in a
position of great instability and were central targets of their respective states. As a result, a
number of prominent Kurdish nationalists from Iraq and Turkey were forced to seek shelter in
the hands of the regimes of the states containing their marginalized ‘auxilliary’ Kurdish brethren.
Immediately following the temporary collapse of the KDP in 1975, the defeated Barzani became
the Shah’s ‘guest’ at one of his villas under SAVAK guard until his health worsened and he
moved to the United States before dying in 1979.322 The dissolution of Barzani’s party presented
a window of opportunity for Ibrahim Ahmed, Jalal Talabani, and roughly four thousand of their
followers, who had been taking refuge in Western Iran since their expulsion from the KDP in
1964.323 These nationalists codified their rejection of the KDP’s methods by establishing the
PUK with assistance from the Assad regime in Syria in 1975. 324 As discussed briefly in the
previous chapter, the bifurcation between the KDP and PUK is often depicted as an
ethnoterritorial one between speakers of the Kurmanji and Sorani dialects. While the
demographic preferences of Kurds in Iraq and the de facto political partition of Southern
Kurdistan is impossible to deny, the actual factors precipitating the breakaway and formation of
the rival political entity are primarily ideological and political. The competing governing
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strategies, and the extent to which both parties have converged in their ultimate goals somewhat
over recent decades, will be a subject of analysis later in this section.

Early Stages of Cross-Border Diplomatic Contact

For now, though, it suffices to say that in a period of Kurdish weakness following the
Algiers agreement, Talabani and the PUK were given a lifeline in Syria and Lebanon, from
where the party headquartered much of it’s politiebureau, disseminated propaganda, and pursued
strategic alliances. Such was the context in June of 1979, when Öcalan and one of his
compatriots fled the increasing violence of martial law in East Anatolia to pursue their strategy
of national liberation from abroad. With the assistance of Iranian agents, Öcalan made his way to
Beirut through the Syrian border, where he was introduced to Adel Murad, a co-founder of the
PUK working for the party in exile. Murad, though entirely unfamiliar with Öcalan or the
mission of his fledgling PKK, nevertheless provided the young man with ten kalashnikovs and,
more importantly, a meeting with Nayif Hawatmah’s Syrian-backed Democratic Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).325 Although this incident appears at first a clear-cut example of
ethnic solidarity in transversal Kurdish cooperation, interviews conducted with Murad himself by
Hannes Černy comprehensively dispel any notion that ethnicity played a central role in the
PUK’s decision to lend minor assistance to the as-yet-insignificant PKK. Describing his first
meeting with Öcalan, Murad recounts:
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“One evening I met with two of my Iranian contacts who told me that two persons had
come from Turkey, that they were the new left there… we met then in my apartment at
night, that was the first time I met Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan started talking, for an hour
he kept going, but I could barely understand anything, his Kurdish was difficult [to
understand], the Iranians, who spoke Turkish, had to translate. I let Öcalan stay with me
until I could find a translator ... Öcalan did not like the Iranians [translating] our talks,
he later said he wanted to talk to me directly because I’m a Kurd ... so I got a translator,
and Öcalan stayed with me ... in the end he stayed for three months in my apartment.”326

From this description, it seems quite clear that Murad conceived of Öcalan and his
followers in political terms first and ethnic terms second- just as Öcalan viewed the Kurds in
Turkey as representing the dispossessed proletariat more than as a subjugated ethnic
community.327 The fact that Murad says this group (which he described as a “Turkish group” in
his communiques to Talabani), represents the ‘new left’ rather than the ‘Kurds’ in any
meaningful way is revealing. It is further evident that the two men did not feel an immutable
ethnic bond upon introduction- even their ostensibly similar language had to be translated into
Turkish by Iranian mediators, a third-party intervention about which Murad did not appear to
share Öcalan’s concerns. Nevertheless, it is still true that Murad and the PUK were instrumental
in ensuring the survival of the PKK during this time of vulnerability- but to attribute this short
friendship to ethnic solidarity alone would be to discount the innumerable other factors
influencing the decision to assist. First and foremost, at this point in Kurdish history each party
had suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of their respective states and found it necessary to
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engage in mutual alliances and make external contacts. Both the PUK and PKK were “political
refugees, leading a paltry existence in exile, with little to lose from working together and equally
dependent on the charity of others”, especially states nominally friendly to the Kurdish cause in
the region.328 Furthermore, Öcalan in 1979 was a ‘nobody’, and no one could reasonably have
foreseen the PKK’s meteoric rise to prominence and the decades-long insurgency that would
ultimately result from this brief collaboration. It is important to remember that the assistance
Murad provided was at the time viewed as a “simple act of charity and hospitality towards an
ideologically related Kurdish organization in need” rather than concrete political assistance- he
himself ‘saw no great difference’ between offering Öcalan a couch to sleep on and facilitating
contacts with the DFLP, since the consequences and extensive impact of his doing so were
impossible to anticipate in that moment.329 Although the fact that Öcalan was a Kurd may have
played a limited role in Murad’s hospitality towards him, it was the “concurrence of two
ideational factors, ethnicity and a radical leftist ideology” that allowed for the initial
communication between the PKK and PUK.
Once the meeting with the DFLP had occurred and been successful, however, Kurdish
groups in Syria and Lebanon played a negligible role in the militarization and training of PKK
insurgents, and Öcalan himself forged ties with the Syrian state and Palestinian NLMs more
readily than he did with his fellow Kurds. Assad viewed the Kurdish movements in Syria as too
weak and fragmented to pose any threat to his power and, like the Shah throughout the 1960s,
determined to “shrewdly manipulate the Kurdish movements in Turkey and Iraq” to destabilize
rival governments and leverage his own regional interests.330 As a result, Assad and the
Palestinian groups under Syrian control welcomed this new insurgent movement with open arms,
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establishing an extensive training facility for the PKK in Lebanon’s Beqqa Valley and providing
considerable financial and military support to Öcalan’s group.331 Although it is true that the PUK
‘opened the door’ for the PKK’s resurgence, it was really Assad and Palestinian NLM’s that
made the group an effective fighting force, as reflected in PKK official Selahettin Çelik’s
assessment that “in reality, [the PKK was] finished as an organization after 1980… but in Syria
we could gather ourselves together. From the Palestinians we learned things. We learned about
making demonstrations for martyrs, about ceremonies. We did a lot of reading on a people’s war
[together], we also had armed training. They gave us clothing, cigarettes. We owe the
Palestinians something.”332 Clearly, while the PUK and PKK had some limited links on the
highest level of party communication, the lion's share of support for the PKK’s cause came from
Syria and Palestine, and the majority of insurgents viewed their partnership as such. Even Öcalan
fostered close ties with the Syrian state, owning a villa in Damascus, “traveling around in a red
Mercedes provided for him from Syria and protected by Syrian Kurds who [were] his only
bodyguards. In every way, he was living the life of a Syrian official,” facilitating the interests of
the Syrian state despite its history of Kurdish subjugation. Given the ease with which these
intra-ethnic ties were discarded for inter-ethnic ones, it is difficult to make the case for ethnicity
as the determining variable in this early showing of transversal solidarity.
The collaboration of the PKK and Syrian state, beyond being a means by which Assad
could destabilize or at least irritate his regional rival in Turkey, also served as a convenient outlet
to alleviate the grievances of the domestic Kurdish population in Syria. As discussed in previous
chapters, the Kurdish movement and national sentiment in Syria was relatively weak and
fragmented owing to a small and geographically discontiguous Kurdish population and the
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relatively late emergence of a Syrian nationalism following the end of the French Mandate.
Although it is true that the “weak capacity of the Syrian Kurdish parties to mobilize did not
require Damascus to initiate harsh repressive methods” in the form of military intervention as
was the case in Turkey and Iraq, the Kurds were still marginalized from a state ideology built
upon Arab nationalism, as codified in the Ba’athist constitution of 1973. 333 Though the exclusion
of the Kurds and the Kurdish language became an official aspect of state doctrine, the regime had
to “tone down its official ideology in order to become socially viable”, and in reality the state
fostered local alliances with Kurdish notables to keep the Kurdish ‘problem’ under control and
depress revolt.
This “balance between redistribution and coercion” was successful in placating enough of
the Kurdish population to avoid collective rebellions throughout most of the twentieth century,
but police raids, arrests, and economic marginalization still caused alienation particularly among
younger members of the Kurdish community.334 The PKK’s prominence in Syria following 1979,
while actually collaborating with the regime, still fought for the cause of Kurdish liberation and
therefore served as a means by which disaffected Kurds could attain economic and social
advancement. Again reflecting Assad’s security in his ‘Kurdish problem’, the recruitment of
Syrian Kurds to the PKK was actively encouraged by the regime- government officials worked
shoulder to shoulder with PKK recruiters in Kurdish villages, and fighting with the PKK recused
an individual from mandatory service in the Syrian forces.335 Here too, pragmatic considerations
outweighed ethnic solidarity in driving Syrian Kurds to participate in the PKK, but it should also
be noted that many of the Kurds recruited had familial ties to refugees from Kemalist ethnic
cleansing a half century earlier and therefore an additional motive for bellicosity against the
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Turkish state.336 While ethnicity might have played a role in the mobilization of Kurds in Syria
around the PKK, it was only made possible through state assistance, which in turn only came
because the Syrian state did not view its Kurds as a mobilized or threatening political force.
Furthermore, Öcalan, despite his rhetoric about liberating all Kurds from subjugation, viewed the
Kurdish population
For several years after the PKK’s relocation to the Beqqa Valley, the group focused
primarily on rebuilding its military forces and preparing for guerilla warfare. Increasing
militarization and subjugation of the Kurdish region under Evren’s military government,
however, made launching a revolution from Turkish soil a near impossibility. Though the PKK’s
stronghold in Syria provided a valuable base of operations near the Turkish border, the flat
desert-like landscape along the boundary made it a poor location for military mobilization.
Furthermore, the Assad regime, cautious of provoking Turkish intervention, refused Öcalan’s
request to launch attacks on Turkish positions directly from Syrian territory.337
In need of a new international sponsor, Öcalan turned back to Iraq and began negotiations
with the newly-re-formed KDP, now under the control of Mullah Mustafa’s nephew, Masoud
Barzani. Although the actual content of the initial communications between the KDP and PKK
remain obscured from scholarly study, the cooperation culminated in a joint declaration of
“Principles of Solidarity”, signed by both Massoud Barzani and Abdullah Öcalan at a meeting in
Damascus during October 1984.338 This eleven-article declaration authorized the PKK to
establish military bases of operation in Southern Kurdistan and pledged a joint effort,
“depend[ing] on the force of the Kurdish people” against “every kind of imperialism and the
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struggle against the plans and plots of imperialism in the region”.339 On the surface, this
formalized and highly publicized expression of ethnic solidarity appears the most concrete
example of transversal Kurdish cooperation in the modern era, but again a detailed analysis will
reveal that each party entered into this agreement suspiciously, and only to the extent they felt it
could advance their own domestic interests. Article ten of the declaration reflects this trepidation
and clarifies that “the organizations would not side with actions which could damage the unity of
the parties and that they should respect the organizational and political independence of each
other”, with stipulations that the alliance could be terminated if one of the parties withdrew their
support.340 The PKK’s motivations for entering the alliance are self-evident- without the ability
to operate along the inaccessible and mountainous Turkish-Iraqi border, their objective of
guerilla warfare against the Turkish state would have been unachievable. Despite the fact that the
KDP sat on the opposite end of the ideological spectrum to the PKK and Öcalan’s repeated
denigrations of the Barzani’s ‘primitive’ and ‘defeatist’ ideology in speech after speech, Öcalan
now depended on collaboration with the KDP to achieve his strategic goals. For the KDP,
motivations for the alliance are less easily discernible. Barzani himself played up the ethnic
component of the collaboration, boasting that

“For us, it is always a source of pride that in the regions that we have liberated with the
cost of our blood, we have opened the area as a fortress for every Kurdish fighter. We signed the
alliance with the PKK with this logic and for these reasons.”341
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As with the earlier PUK-PKK collaboration, this declaration would appear a clear
expression of pan-Kurdish nationalism and ethnic solidarity, but it is critical to recognize that
Barzani here is employing ‘strategic essentialisms’ to portray his motives as noble to the Kurdish
multitude. Reflecting Brubaker and Černy’s emphasis that as ‘analysts of naturalizers’ we must
not become ‘analytic naturalizers’, it is important not to take such instances of ‘ethnic
outbidding’ at face value but instead subject them to strict scrutiny. Hannes Černy proposes that
the KDP’s decision to enter the alliance was a fundamentally strategic one, motivated in small
part by increased cross-border mobility during the ongoing Iran-Iraq war and in larger part by
Talabani’s attempted rapprochement with Saddam in Baghdad in 1982. Talabani aimed to regain
an autonomy agreement similar to the 1970 manifesto, and pursued military aid from Saddam
which never materialized. His brinkmanship backfired, and the PUK was evicted from its safe
haven in Syria for changing sides in 1983.342
Faced with the prospect (and indeed, the reality) of PUK-Ba’athist cooperation against
KDP forces as well as empowered by aid from Khomeini’s Iran, Barzani and his peers likely
viewed the PKK fighters as a useful bulwark against their own domestic opponents, Kurdish and
Arab alike. The KDP also recognized the need for allies given the inherent instability of their
political context, in which relative freedom was only possible because of the ongoing conflict
with Iran.343 This repudiates the depiction of events furthered by prominent scholars of the
Kurdish nation including Denise Natali and David McDowall, both of whom also assume the
alliance was a strategic move, but one to play up Barzani’s ‘pan-Kurdish’ credentials in his own
constituency.344 While this might be at least in part true, it seems unlikely that Barzani would
invite the PKK, the Kurdish group most radically opposed to his own leadership and ideology,
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into his territory had he not felt a compelling military and strategic need to do so. In sum, the
‘Principles of Solidarity’ should be viewed as two independent entities entering a tenuous
partnership based on mutual self-interest, not shared culture or ethnicity- in this way, it is not
dissimilar to alliances entered between disparate nation states, a fact that challenges the
relevance of ethnic solidarity in transnational party interaction.

The Breakdown of Relations Between the PKK and KDP

From the earliest months of the PKK presence in Southern Kurdistan, it became
immediately clear that the group’s sole objective was to mobilize in a campaign of guerilla
warfare against the Turkish state, regardless of the consequences for Kurdish populations on
either side of the border. In early 1983, “Turkish intelligence sources had identified a force of
some 12,000 Kurdish guerrillas in an area stretching approximately 70 kilometers along the
Turkish-Iraqi frontier”, composed of a mix of KDP and PKK forces. 345 Forces from the PKK and
its ally the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASLA) conducted frequent
raids into Eastern Anatolia, stealing money, food, and other supplies from Kurdish villages and
attacking Turkish patrols. Following a lethal attack in May 1983, the Turkish state invoked the
‘hot pursuit’ agreement signed with Baghdad five years earlier permitting Turkish forces to
travel up to forty kilometers over the border in search of insurgents and conducted air raids that
destroyed Kurdish camps and killed between one and several hundred Iraq Kurds, depending on
which side’s propaganda is to be believed.346 These Turkish incursions proved an altogether
unwelcome distraction to Barzani’s KDP, which continued to engage in periodic skirmishes with
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the PUK, Baghdad, and its proxy the embattled KDPI. Having initially underestimated the
capability of Öcalan’s group to wage guerilla warfare in Turkey, the KDP from 1984 began
trying to convince the PKK to abstain from operations that could provoke Turkish raids, but the
PKK was uninterested in what it perceived as more ‘defeatism’ from the KDP, who’s authority or
territorial sovereignty it did not recognize within it’s Marxist-Leninist ideological framework.
This attitude is reflected in the testimony of Selahettin Çelik, who attended one of these meetings
with the KDP in 1984 in Iran. By his account, PKK representatives “listened to Barzani[‘s
delegation], assured them of our good intentions, and then chose to ignore them,” continuing to
escalate attacks and establish an insurgent presence in Turkey throughout the 1980s.347
Eventually, tensions reached a breaking point in May 1987 when, after another severe Turkish air
raid causing KDP casualties, Barzani issued a formal warning to the PKK before declaring the
‘Principles of Solidarity’ null and void under the provisions laid out in article ten. 348 At this
point, however, the tide of the Iran-Iraq war had turned decisively in Iraq’s favor and there was
very little the KDP could do to root out the PKK ‘occupiers’ entrenched in several camps in Iraqi
Kurdistan under their own exclusive control, where some fighters remain to this day.
In fact, the Kurds in Iraq by 1987 were in a desperate struggle for their own survival, as
Saddam’s increasing confidence in victory allowed him to turn some of his focus to eliminating
the ‘Kurdish problem’ in the north once and for all. With the backing of the United States and the
international community in his fight against the threatening Islamic Republic of Iran, Saddam
felt empowered to engage in a campaign of brutal ethnic cleansing and resettlement in the
Kurdish region that has come to be referred to as the al-Anfal campaign, a misappropriation of
the Quranic term meaning ‘spoils’ (of war). 349 Although Saddam attempted to negotiate with
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both the Talabani’s and Barzani’s in 1982, when concrete aid from the United States began
trickling in from 1984 onwards, it became clear that making Kurdish concessions were not
necessary to achieve Iraqi victory.350 Consequently, Saddam began a campaign of aggression
against the north. By November 1985, “199 Kurdish villages had been razed, and as Iraq’s
advantage in the war solidified, over one hundred thousand civilians and peshmerga were killed
in a series of shelling campaigns and deadly gas attacks”.351 In the wake of increasing Kurdish
persecution, Talabani’s PUK realized the futility of partnership with Saddam and ‘reluctantly
reconciled’ with Barzani and his Iranian backers in 1986, when the tide had already turned
against the Kurds’ favor. 352 In Baghdad, genocidal intentions reached their xenith when Saddam
appointed a cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, secretary-general of the Baath Party’s Northern Region
on March 29, 1987. Al-Majid, now infamously known by his nom de guerre ‘Chemical Ali’, was
instructed to “take care” of the Kurds using all necessary measures to clear a twenty-kilometer
buffer on the Iraqi side of the Iraq-Iran border of its Kurdish residents.
He accomplished this through the implementation of Directive SF/4008, which
established “prohibited zones” in the Kurdish populated areas of Iraq. Al-Majid ordered that “all
persons captured in those villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services, and
those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been
obtained from them, of which we should be duly notified,” making as explicit as is possible a
campaign of state genocide against the Kurds.353 The al-Anfal campaign was a years-long
endeavor that comprised dozens of aerial strikes, but the most significant event by far and the
one that lives most poignantly in the Kurdish cultural memory is the Halabja Massacre on March
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16th, 1988. On that day, up to five thousand Kurdish civillians, primarily women and children,
were murdered with mustard, VX, and sarin gas from chemical shells launched by the Iraqi
army.354 One week later, al-Majid initiated ‘Anfal II’, a campaign intended to destroy everyone in
the Kurdish region of Qara Dagh, south of Sulaimani. Again, “chemical attacks on one village
after another preceded ground action”, driving fleeing Kurds north into the mountains where all
male citizens were subsequently rounded up and summarily executed.355 Similar scenes occurred
in the five subsequent campaigns, and especially in areas where Kurdish resistance was fiercest,
women and children were not exempt from extermination, beatings, and rape. Exact estimates for
the number of Kurds who were massacred during the genocide are difficult to determine, but the
scholarly consensus places it somewhere in the range of one to two hundred thousand, with
millions more displaced and traumatized by the conflict. Clearly, even if the KDP and PUK were
unified in their intention to evict the PKK from Southern Kurdistan in mid-1987, the horrific
domestic conditions and lack of external support precluded any such action.
In an act that should absolutely disintegrate any vestigial conception that ethnic ties play
a significant role in motivating the actions of the Kurdish political parties examined in this study,
both the PKK and some Kurdish tribes in Iraq aligned themselves with Baghdad during the
brutal campaigns in an attempt to advance their own self interest. As has been the case
throughout the history of Kurds in Iraq, neither Barzani nor Talabani had a monopoly over their
respective constituencies, and a number of individual chiefs retained their political autonomy and
leant their tribal support to whatever party they deemed most expedient. Pejoratively deemed by
Kurdish nationalists as the jash, these forces primarily consisted primarily of villagers and local
townspeople who pursued lucrative rewards for their services and “were willing to assist in any
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way that would ingratiate themselves with an oppressive regime”.356 On the whole, David
McDowall suggests that these collaborators “were dutiful servants of the Anfal”, and
demonstrated little solidarity with the Kurds they assisted in rounding up and executing. Clearly,
even within the relatively coherent national community of Southern Kurdistan, ethnonationalism
was far from a ubiquitous sentiment.357
While one could argue that the jash were merely apolitical or antiquated adherents to
their prior ‘tribal loyalties’, a similar characterization cannot be made of the PKK, who also
directly benefited from Baghdad’s Kurdish repression. By 1988, the KDP, PUK, and any
organized Kurdish resistance to Saddam had been comprehensively broken, and the PKK with its
several thousand guerilla fighters gained uncontested control of Southern Kurdistan.358 Viewing
an opportunity to co-opt a rival Kurdish group, Saddam pursued lines of communication and
military aid to the PKK as early as 1985, a gesture the PKK reciprocated by sharing their own
estimates of troop positions and emphasizing their readiness to assist in putting down the KDP.
Secret Iraqi documents published by the Turkish Daily News in 1992 revealed that by
1987 “the PKK, in exchange for equipment, weaponry and the Iraqi army turning a blind eye to
the their activities, provided the very regime that [was in the process of committing] genocide
against the Iraqi Kurds with intelligence on them, indeed, even offered to fight them for
Baghdad.”359 This development, which is entirely absent from the literature other than in Černy’s
detailed analysis, runs entirely in contrast to assumptions scholars of explanatory IR make in
their depictions of ethnic group solidarity between the PKK and KDP. Even optimistic analyses
that posit increasing transnational Kurdish links in times of instability and violence, such as that
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of William Gourlay in his article entitled Pan-Kurdish Solidarity and Cross-Border Links in
Times of War and Trauma, fail to hold up to a strict historical analysis.360 As the development of
transversal relations between the aforementioned ‘spheres’ of Kurdish influence in the 1980s
comprehensively demonstrates, Kurdish parties enter into intra-ethnic partnerships to advance
their material and strategic interests. Nothing more, nothing less. If that alliance apparently
continues to serve both parties it may prevail, but if it does not, ‘ethnic ties’ have little weight in
motivating collaboration. The early alliances formed between the PKK and the PUK/KDP,
though they at first appear textbook examples of ethnic solidarity and primordial confluence, in
fact reflect the specific political circumstances in which they were formed, and had no lasting
relevance in motivating ‘we-ness’ or ethnic groupism.

New Structures of Opportunity and Coercion Stemming From the Gulf War

The Kurdish national movement in Iraq following the conclusion of the al Anfal
campaigns in 1989 was comprehensively defeated, abandoned by the international community,
and incapable of violently resisting the Iraqi state. Both the KDP and PUK held no territory and
were forced to retreat to secluded mountain caches of food and weapons, making only limited
lightning raids and ambushes against Iraqi forces. The PKK reigned supreme in military might
throughout the region, continuing to terrorize Turkish forces and Kurdish communities alike in
Northern Kurdistan from their bases to the south, now tacitly permitted by Saddam’s regime.361
Regional dynamics, however, shifted suddenly as a result of Hussein's ill-advised decision to
invade Kuwait in August of 1990. To explore the factors that led to this invasion and the
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resultant coalition response is beyond the scope of this thesis, but it is a fair generalization to
make that the incursion stemmed from a combination of Saddam’s hubris and Iraq’s crippling
economic debt to the oil-rich gulf states following the taxing eight year conflict with Iran.362
Regardless of the motivations, the immediate consequence of this action was the withdrawal of
all Iraqi troops from the Kurdish region, with the exception of ‘sensitive points’- namely the
Iran–Iraq–Turkey border triangle and several border crossings in the north.363
Although Kurdish leaders were hesitant to openly declare allegiance with the U.S. led
coalition invading Iraq in response to the Kuwait incursion in January of 1991, they did take
advantage of the vacuum left by reassigned troops by remobilizing as many as 3,000 peshmerga
fighters and establishing strongholds in a few towns across southern Kurdistan. After Saddam
had been crippled by a resounding defeat at the hands of the combined military might of the
West, the United States was ironically reticent to adopt a policy of enforced regime change in
Iraq to avoid the country falling into chaos, and ultimately the Iranian sphere. Still, the Bush
administration wanted Saddam out, and the President of the United States in February 1991
called upon “the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the
dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations’ resolutions and rejoin the family
of peace-loving nations,” an explicit encouragement and implication of American support for
dissident groups in Iraq to revolt against the weakened regime.364 Two weeks later, on March 4th,
1992, Shi’ite’s revolted en masse after decades of marginalization under the Ba’athists in the
Sha’aban Intifada, which directly inspired uprisings in Southern Kurdistan only one day later.365
Although both Barzani and Talabani (and subsequently some scholars) portrayed the protests as
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spontaneous and it is certainly true that the events of the prior decade had sparked an intense
defensive ethnification of Kurdish identity, it is also true that the PUK and likely the KDP had
deliberately placed ‘sleeper agents’ in communities across the region, who were ready to lead an
uprising should exogenous events lead to such a possibility.366
This strategy was effective in mobilizing Kurdish civilians en masse against Saddam,
who transparently viewed the Kurds as a threat to be permanently exterminated and had by now
betrayed both the KDP and PUK too many times to make any overtures for reconciliation.
Kurdish forces were further bolstered by a joint PUK/KDP declaration that all those who had
collaborated with Saddam during Al-Anfal would be forgiven if they joined the present uprising.
According to McDowall, this unconditional amnesty ballooned the Kurdish forces by nearly
ten-fold over the span of only a few days, an estimate which if true reveals the extent to which
Kurdish militants were divided over the question of national liberation as well as the
effectiveness of the Iraqi state’s efforts in decimating the capabilities of the Kurdish front.367
Given this numerical superiority and the two-front revolt Baghdad faced in 1992, the popular
revolt made significant initial progress in capturing contested territory in the North, taking Kifri,
Kalar, Chamchal and even Kirkuk, the oil-rich ‘jewel in the Kurdish crown’.368
The state, however, demonstrated that its ability for retaliation was not yet entirely spent,
and by the end of March government forces had re-seized most of Kurdistan with further
chemical attacks and helicopter raids, killing up to twenty thousand more Kurds in their
suppression of the revolt and causing the flight of another two million.369 This brutality
re-traumatized the Kurdish population who had experienced the horrors of al-Anfal only a few
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years earlier, but this time their subjugation occurred “under the spotlight of many international
TV channels”.370 Unlike in 1988, when the West preferred to turn a blind eye to Saddam’s war
crimes amid fears of regional instability, the massacre of Kurds in 1991 fit in well with
post-Gulf-War portrayals of Sadam as a frenetic and murderous madman, and the international
sympathy that the Kurds had been denied for the prior decade at last materialized. The United
Nations Security Council passed Resolution 688, establishing a ‘safe haven’ north of the 36th
and south of the 32nd parallel in the Kurdish region of Iraq that came to be known as ‘Operation
Provide Comfort’, providing air security and military assistance to the victimized Kurds.
This resolution and protection bestowed upon the Kurds by the West was not, however,
an instance of genuine good will towards the Kurdish people or even a desire to instill ‘soft
power’ in the region. Instead, it was directly in response to pressure exerted by the Turkish
President Turgut Özal, who was fearful of letting the refugees accumulating on his border into
the Kurdish region of Turkey but simultaneously wanted to avoid “CNN broadcast[ing] the
Turkish military refusing a million civilian refugees entry into Turkey and safety – thus leaving
them at Saddam Hussein’s mercy or freezing to death in wintry mountains”, something the state
could get away with during al-Anfal in 1988 but not in the international spotlight in 1992.371 Özal
personally appealed to the leaders of Britain, France, and the United States, and ultimately
proved instrumental in the establishment of the ‘safe zone’ and therefore, the establishment of
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the most powerful and independent Kurdish
political entity emerging from the region to date.372 This sudden reversal of Turkish policy
towards the Kurds of Iraq, which until 1991 was one of denial mixed with animosity, reflects not
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only the liberalizing nature of the Turkish political space under Özal but also the changing
loyalties of the KDP and PUK vis a vis the PKK and Turkey.
As mentioned above, the PKK had gained military superiority throughout most of the
KRI following their partnership with Baghdad in 1987, and continued to launch periodic attacks
against villages and perceived ‘collaborators’ across the border. Although the PKK certainly
made some gains in its military objectives and gained a foothold in some villages across Eastern
Anatolia, “most Turkish Kurds seemed to resent PKK's violent tactics and began to view it as
brutal, reckless, and irresponsible”, meaning that the movement had limited mass appeal in
Northern Kurdistan. In response to PKK raids, the Turkish state “introduced the system of
‘village guards’, Kurdish villagers armed, paid, or at least as often press-ganged into the service
of the army, to defend remote villages against guerrillas operating in the area”, yet another
example of intra-Kurdish fighting that undercuts presumptions of ethnic solidarity. Kurds were
also given increased opportunities for participation in legal political movements during Özal’s
tenure, most notably in the formation of the Halkın Emek Partisi (HEP or People’s Labor Party),
the first explicit Kurdish political party in Turkey’s history.373
Özal also called for a lift on the ban on the use of Kurdish language in public everyday
but not official discourse, indicating a halting effort at liberalization aimed at ameliorating
Kurdish dissent in the East.374 He enthusiastically advocated for a political resolution to the
Kurdish issue by facilitating dialogue with the HEP and moderate Kurdish leaders, while
simultaneously militarily occupying the Kurdish region and forcefully relocating all citizens
within a “fifteen to forty kilometer wide ‘security corridor’ along the border with Iran, Iraq, and
Syria.”375 Such a contradictory policy fomented contradictory resistance as evidenced by the
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Serhildan uprisings beginning in 1990, when a funeral procession of a fallen PKK insurgent
“turned into an outpouring of public anger, which law enforcement tried to muzzle by force,
lighting a spark that triggered a wave of public demonstrations in the tens of thousands.”376
Despite a brief period of mass popular resistance wherein “the number of guerilla fighters
multiplied [and] there was no part of Kurdistan in which the [PKK] could not operate and carry
out raids”, the PKK’s violent tactics limited its capacity for mass mobilization and Özal’s limited
reforms presented an alternative venue through which to express Kurdish grievances.377 As the
power of the PKK waned and that of the KDP strengthened in accordance with domestic
dynamics and regional changes to the balance of power, Özal recognized a powerful potential
ally in the Kurds of Iraq, who had already broken off ties with the PKK and denounced them as
occupiers and enemies of the Kurdish cause.
In March 1991, just under a year before he advocated for Kurdish protection in the
international arena, Özal sent out feelers to representatives of both Barzani and Talabani, both of
whom responded enthusiastically to his proposal to form a partnership. Talabani himself and a
representative of Barzani met with the under-secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador
Tugay Özceri, on Özal’s behalf at an airport in Ankara, culminating in an agreement that Turkey
would ensure steady flows of military and humanitarian aid to Southern Kurdistan if both the
PUK and KDP agreed to counter the PKK’s influence in their territory. These terms proved
amenable to all parties involved, given the Kurds’ dire need for assistance and the fact that they
already viewed their relationship with the PKK as more of a rivalry than an alliance, as well as
Özal’s declared intention of bringing the former vilayet of Mosul back into Turkey’s economic
sphere of influence.378 This new alliance bore fruit immediately for the Turkish state, as Talabani,
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ever the statesman, quickly tried to play the role of mediator between Özal and Öcalan, who had
begrudgingly acknowledged that he might be open to a diplomatic solution given Turkey’s ‘first
step’ liberalization efforts. Negotiations quickly fell apart, however, when Turkey continued
raids against PKK positions during the talks themselves and Talabani tried to pressure Öcalan
into making concessions through an ultimatum warning that “if the PKK failed to cease activities
against Turkey [from Iraqi Kurdish territory], it would be purged from the region”, something
that only enraged the PKK leader further.379
In response, Öcalan accused both Barzani and Talabani of “trying to stab the PKK in the
back by cooperating with Turkey... The first thing we must do is remove these leeches, [who]
espouse the views of the fascist Turks. These two leaders are now our enemies”- taking on an
indignant tone that seems rather less genuine considering the PKK-Baghdad cooperation that had
occurred only a few years earlier.380 Just as the Öcalan had absconded ethnic ties for
opportunistic ones with the Iraqi state during the al-Anfal period, Barzani and Talabani shrewdly
cooperated with the Turkish state rather than their ethnic brethren, for the simple reason that they
had disparate goals and ideologies. Conflict was bound to erupt given these rhetorical
escalations, and did so in June 1992 when the KDP reportedly ordered the killing of tribal leader
Sadik Omer for joining a PKK affiliate group, setting off a cycle of retaliatory assassinations
culminating in a coordinated attack against PKK camps at the Turkish border.381 In response,
Öcalan’s men bombed border crossings in the region, effectively placing an embargo on foreign
aide and exports to all of Southern Kurdistan and threatening the region’s survival. By
September, the situation had become dire and the Iraqi Kurdish Front joined together in an
all-out assault against the PKK across the region, aided by considerable assistance and
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coordination with Turkish forces.382 Faced with an insurmountable conglomeration of its enemies
and former allies, the PKK formally surrendered to the PUK on October 30th, 1992, when it
signed a capitulative ceasefire agreeing to “cease all activities of a military nature [and] abandon
all it’s camps along the Turkish border” in Kurdish Iraqi territory. Much to Barzani’s frustration,
Talabani allowed about 1700 PKK fighters to remain a camp in PUK territory north of
Sulaymaniyah, where “they were allowed to keep all their weapons, ammunition, and supplies,
as well as to continue their peaceful political activities for as long as they did not oppose the
activities and policies” of the PUK or KDP.383 In this instance, we again see the PUK stepped in
to save the PKK in its hour of need, another ostensible showing of ethnic solidarity. However,
Hannes Černy, one of the few scholars who has examined this period of transversal Kurdish
dynamics in detail, proposes that this too reflects pragmatic self interest and the PUK’s desire to
retain a weakened PKK presence was intended to be used as a bargaining chip against both
Turkey and the KDP.384 It might also be true that the PKK and PUK, by nature of their apparently
shared ideological pedigree, had a mutual interest in blocking the rise of a hegemonic KDP, just
as the KDP allied with the PKK to minimize the risk of a PUK ascension a decade earlier.
Clearly, this complex and interconnected matrix of intra-ethnic cooperation and betrayal,
and alliances made and broken between Kurds and neighboring states fighting their own ethnic
kin, does not reflect an analytical framework that provides ethnicity any meaningful weight as a
determinant of political behavior.
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The Establishment of the KRG and a Struggle for Control of the KRI

Despite violent contestation for territorial and ideological supremacy between the
aforementioned spheres of influence in Kurdish politics following the vacuum created by the
Gulf War and Operation Provide Comfort, the KDP and PUK managed to briefly put aside their
rivalry in May of 1992 when they united to run democratic elections and codify their autonomy
in the form of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). This proto-state apparatus established
a formalized parliament and executive committee, and further intended to create a “unified
peshmerga force of about 80,000 men and a police force of 20,000 to replace the estimated
400,000 or so fighters at large on the streets of Kurdistan.”385 The election itself took place on
May 19th, and despite a few discrepancies took place without excessive violence or political
interference from Kurdish elites- thus resulting in a great deal of international attention and
praise lavished upon the Kurds of Iraq for conducting a ‘free and fair election,’ something the
international community perceives to be especially rare and valuable in the Middle East.
The election was organized on the basis of proportional representation, with parties
requiring at least seven percent of the vote to qualify for office. Smaller opposition parties
including the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan and the Society of Kurdish tribes enthusiastically
agreed to this arrangement, confident that they could meet the threshold and break up the
KDP/PUK hegemony dominating political life and discourse in Southern Kurdistan. Such
aspirations of a multi-pluralist governing body, however, were rebuked when the KDP and PUK
won 45 percent and 43.6 percent of the vote respectively, a distribution that given election
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irregularities was judged a dead heat.386 Instead of creating a parliamentary system that
incorporated diverse political projects and encouraged the formation of multi-party coalitions,
the KRG election codified and entrenched the bifurcation of the territory into PUK and KDP
camps, a two-party polarization that is inevitably unsustainable to the productive maintenance of
any democracy.
In light of the apparently equal popularity of both parties, the KRG implemented an
apparently elegant penj-a-penj (50/50) power sharing agreement, in which “governmental posts
were shared equally. Where a minister belonged to one party, his deputy belonged to the other, an
uneasy condominium with two parallel administrations reaching down to the police on the street
or the teaching staff in a school. Joining one or other party became the essential prerequisite to
advancement, [and] the patronage role of both political parties became disastrously entrenched in
the sociopolitical fabric of Iraqi Kurdistan.”387 While this system was effective in gaining
legitimacy across the Kurdish population, it also “had within it a built-in power struggle between
KDP and PUK cadres. It would take very little in the tense atmosphere of Kurdistan in the
mid-1990s to see this animosity erupt into violence.”388
Escalating local clashes between the military and political wings of both parties resulted
in what Gareth Stansfield deems an “internecine civil war” by 1994, in which the KDP
controlled territory in the West of Basur and the PUK in the East. Each party “ran a KRG in their
respective zones; each had a prime minister, and each claimed legitimacy in a setting where,
arguably, legitimacy remained with the Iraqi state” as a result of the fragmented nature of the
Kurdish space. The conflict reached its peak in 1996, when Barzani actively enlisted the
assistance of Saddam and the Iraqi army for assistance in driving Talabani’s supporters out of the
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contested town of Erbil.389 As should not be surprising at this point, Barzani’s choice to
collaborate with the Iraqi state against fellow Kurds even in a political space that privileged
Kurdish autonomy is yet another repudiation of ‘ethnic solidarity’ as an explanatory variable.
Many scholars decry the ‘patrimonial’ structures that emerged as a result of this political
contestation, reducing Massoud Barzani’s actions of power centralization to a political
phenomenon described by McDowall and others as ‘neotribalism.’ One must consider, however,
whether that terminology would be employed to describe the KRG if it had the status of a
sovereign state, since many contemporary states also retain legitimacy through structures of
personalistic and patrimonial authority. Hannes Černy problematizes this depiction through a
comparison of Barzani and Ben Ali of Tunisia, making the case that while “it would not be a
gross exaggeration to view the KDP as a vehicle for the power politics and political ambitions of
the Barzani clan,” such a prioritization of personal interest in political society is not unusual for
states with a single charismatic leader, particularly those empowered by a rentier economy.390
Still, Barzani’s power aspirations differ from those of Barzanji, Ubeydullah, and Simko before
him, because his ultimate objective is the control of a political community, not personal territory
or financial resources as was the case in previous manifestations of Kurdish political
organization. The struggle between the PUK and KDP in the 1990s can therefore be considered
political rather than personal, with the objective of each respective group being to attain
hegemony in the region. A further consequence of their continued clashes was the retrenchment
of the PKK in their mountainous bases in the North of the region, which remain a thorn in the
side of PUK and KDP leadership alike in the contemporary era.
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To explore in depth the relations between the PUK and KDP in the statebuilding period
during is somewhat beyond the scope of this thesis given its focus on transnational interactions,
but the specific leadership styles employed by each party have relevance to the ideological
grounds of contestation in contemporary Kurdish politics, as reflected in the contemporary
Kurdish project in Rojava. The KDP’s political structure can be identified as one of “dynastic
republicanism,” a term coined by Sadiki to describe a ruling complex sustained by “labyrinth of
dependent or “parasitic” social forces… that have come to directly benefit from the preservation
of the status quo and the continuing power of the ruling house. [These patronized elites] form the
very basis on which the power of the ruling house rests, and they are handsomely rewarded for
their ‘supportive function ... with the distributive rewards the system has to offer, “deepening and
nurturing their [lasting] dependence.”391 Though the PUK rhetorically adheres to the Leninist
system of ‘democratic centralism’ similar to that of contemporary China, wherein potential
political can be contested only prior to a decision by the ruling party, it too embodies the
patrimonial and rentier approach to nation building, only with a less overt emphasis on tribalistic
and hereditary leadership. In fact, parties themselves have congruent more than opposing goals
in the majority of their political objectives, and even Omar Sheikhmous, a co-founder of the
PUK, acedes that “today the ideological differences between PUK and KDP are minimal – both
promote a separatist Kurdish ethno-nationalism with the aim of wrestling ever greater autonomy
from the Iraqi state,” and both have pursued increasing economic rapprochement with the
Turkish state in recent decades.392 Although the 1999 Washington Agreement and subsequent
renegotiations of consociational frameworks following the 2003 Iraq War have been broadly
successful in pushing the tensions between the parties to the non-violent political sphere (with
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the effect of pervasive governmental deadlock within the KRG), even today the grounds of
political power and contestation in the region are primarily defined by the dichotomy between
these two parties.393
A historical analysis of transnational Kurdish party interaction in the 1980s and 1990s
definitively repudiates depictions of ethnically motivated cross-border Kurdish collaboration as a
“particular hallmark of Kurdish identity and important source of solidarity between Kurds in
different regions,” as asserted by Allan Hassaniyan. 394 Although transversal dynamics fostered
the early emergence and sustenance of the PKK, its ideology and political priorities clearly arose
from the revolutionary political context of Turkey’s domestic space. When the PKK did gain
meaningful political capital, it used it to advance its own priorities, even at the detriment of
Kurds in Iraq, just as the KDP subjugated the KDPI throughout the 1960s and 70s. Even within
one region of Kurdistan, historic rivalries and political contexts eclipsed solidarity and even
pragmatism to affect a lasting conflict that is not only intra-Kurdish, but intra-Kurdish within the
boundaries of one territorial state. This historical analysis of transversal Kurdish interaction
conclusively asserts that disparate ethnonational movements across the divided regions of
Kurdistan, while impacted by cross-border exchanges of ideology, arms, and people, do not act
under the aegis of pan-Kurdish nationalism or even solidarity. Such a conclusion might be
obscured by a groupist reading of Kurdish history, in which instances of nominal Kurdish
alliance and collaboration are emphasized and the true dynamics of interaction are obfuscated.
By delving into the complex matrix of events and competing hierarchies through which
ethnopolitical identity ‘happens,’ I have aimed to present a more nuanced depiction of Kurdish
interaction, wherein objective ethnicity has little relevance as a variable for analysis.
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Chapter Six
A People Beyond the State? Rojava and the New Frontiers of Kurdish Identity

Over the course of the past two decades, the Kurdish political sphere, and that of the
Middle East more broadly, has undergone a dramatic period of structural transformation
exceeded in significance only by the initial partition of the region one century ago. The protests
and revolutions of 2011 known in amalgam as the Arab Spring and the rise and fall of the
Islamic State in the Levant and Syria serve as the two central factors influencing a shift in the
political discourses of the region, challenging not only the unjust ‘ruling bargains’ imposed by
elites in the region but also the legitimacy of Sykes Picot and the nation-state system in its
entirety.395 These existential threats posed to the status quo of the region’s political landscape
have contributed to rampant state instability and the rise of numerous sub-state political actors,
particularly in the context of the Syrian civil war. Challenges to the state system in the Middle
East present opportunities and challenges for Kurdish movements in the region, who have
alternatively embraced or rejected traditional forms of governance in the instability wrought by
regional developments.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Arab Spring, and ISIL all combine to make an analysis of
Kurdish collaboration (or lack thereof) in the contemporary era an even more complex than
examinations of it in previous eras, a fact that is made even more confusing by the fact that much
of the practical information about Kurdish parties and activity remain unknown or sources of
contestation. As a result and as previously mentioned, the prioritization of this thesis is to
examine the historical emergence and interactions of Kurdish parties, but prior to my conclusion
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I wish to very briefly depict the emergence of Rojava and the new grounds for political
contestation in the Iraqi-Syrian Kurdish borderlands.
The Kurdish organization perhaps best poised to inherit the title of symbolic inspiration
for subjugated Kurds in the contemporary era is the PYD, a Syrian organization that is frequently
portrayed as a mere offshoot of the PKK. While the extent to which the PYD serves as either an
ideological adherent to the PKK’s ideology or as a puppet party in ernest is the subject of
ongoing intense debate both in the scholarship and on the ground, but it is demonstrably true that
the party derives substantial military and political aid from its ‘parent party.’396 Still, The KDP,
for its part, has also aimed to gain influence in Rojava through the establishment of a ‘Kurdish
National Council,’ comprised of ideological and political allies of the Barzani family. Although
this division reflects that Kurdish politics are never monolithic and that the two spheres of
influence identified earlier cannot serve as an immutable bifurcation, the PYD has quickly
ascended to prominence in the region following its relatively recent founding in 2003.397
This is in part due to its aid from the PKK, but also due to the long-standing linkages
between Kurds in Syria and Turkey and the anarchical political space that led to Rojava’s
emergence. Just as the PKK was born from the left in revolutionary Turkey, one might
reasonably assert that the PYD was born from the Syrian civil war and resultant social turmoil.
Although the PYD explicitly espouses the ideals of ‘democratic confederalism’ advanced by
Ocalan in his post-1999 thought, the rejection of Sykes Picot and leftist nature of the Arab
Spring as a whole led to the establishment of non-Kurdish as well as Kurdish sub-state
organizations in Syria built around the concept of local self-governance and autonomy,
demonstrating yet again that while transnational links can serve as inspiration for Kurdish
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mobilization, domestic political contexts dictate the contours of political emergence.398
Furthermore, the extent to which the autonomous administration in Syria serves as a true utopian
project in self-governance is a topic of great contestation. For all its rhetoric about emancipation
from the nation state and the authority of imagined communities as ‘colonies of capital’,
numerous scholars have identified a distinct authoritarian streak in the PYD, wherein it wins the
loyalty of local notables through coercion and the threat of violence, and actively suppresses
voices dissenting against its increasing authority. This form of organized hypocrisy is nothing
new in the field of International Relations or the history of Kurdistan, but it demonstrates that
even this liberal contemporary manifestation of Kurdish nationalism retains a significant gap
between supposed policy and practice.
Nevertheless, the project of Rojava still has to be identified as an overall success, and
despite challenges from the Syrian state, ISIL, and Turkey, it remains the pre-eminent political
actors governing the lives of Kurds and Arabs alike in Northeast Syria. The PYD has engaged in
power centralization and retains tenuous control of the region’s borders and political economy,
something of particular note on the eastern border shared with the KDP. The PYD has now
controlled the boundary it shares with Iraq for a full decade, a long enough period that patterns of
behavior between the two groups have emerged and can be identified. The KRG, for its part, has
continued to ascend in prominence and power over its population, though not without
considerable internal strife. Both the KDP and PUK were the objects of mass protest during the
2011 Arab Spring demonstrations, as Kurds took to the streets to reject their parties’ leadership
and protest corruption, violence, and the suppression of dissent in Southern Kurdistan. Although
both parties continue to primarily advocate for autonomy within Kurdistan, Massoud Barzanji
attempted a snap referendum for independence in 2017 in a move that some scholars speculate
398
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was a shrewd attempt to play up his Kurdish nationalist credentials for an upcoming KRG
election. Although the referendum received lukewarm support from both the PUK and Gorran,
both reticent to explicitly oppose Kurdish independence, the successful vote for secession instead
triggered a dramatic response from the Iraqi government that erased what territorial gains the
KRG had made in its fight against ISIL.399 Still, even though the grounds of debate are slowly
shifting in Southern Kurdistan and the failure of the independence referendum is likely to have
the effect of pushing the movement left and ‘beyond the state,’ the Barzani-led KDP continues to
exercise outsize influence in the administration and political action of the KRG.400
This can be reflected in the autonomous region’s continued interactions with the
autonomous federations, which have endeavored to toe the tenuous line between rhetorically
supporting Kurdish emancipation while simultaneously advancing the KDP’s own self interest
and relationship with the Turkish state. Both the KDP and PKK appear willing to aid in the
plight of Kurds in Syria through political and military support, but the KDP explicitly excludes
the PYD from any collaborative action and refuses to acknowledge it as a legitimate political
entity given its ideological or practical links to the PKK. Again, this prioritization of self-interest
and ideology over ethnic solidarity reflects ethnicity’s lack of explanatory significance as a
variable of analysis, and suggests that the KDP would prefer Rojava dissolve altogether than fall
into the hands of a rival Kurdish party. Although the Kurdish Supreme Council, established in
2012, is apparently intended to unify representatives of the National Council and PYD, this
expression of solidarity is undermined by reports that Barzani ordered members of his own
delegation “to attack PYD checkpoints, using weapons supplied from Turkey, and to use
propaganda against them.”401 The veracity of this claim cannot be accurately determined given
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the temporal proximity and covert nature of such an assignment, but the fact that it appears an
entirely possible eventuality again illustrates the extent to which ethnic solidarity is absent from
the Kurdish political sphere.
As for the boundary between the sub-state entities itself, the KRG and PYD control
several border crossings in tandem designed to facilitate the flow of goods and personnel
between the two countries. This territorial proximity and Kurdish regulation has facilitated the
transversal exchange of ideas and personnel, but the checkpoints themselves are subjects of
contestation and have periodically been closed in response to political disagreements between the
two parties. Despite factors of water policy and mutual energy interests facilitating the creation
of collaborative Kurdish policy between the KDP and PYD, there is little evidence that these
groups have attained meaningful consensus in their grand strategies, and the KDP’s prioritization
of Turkish demands over Kurdish rights have caused a fundamental schism in their relationship.
This can be evidenced in the KRG response to the Turkish operation ‘Euphrates Shield’, which
on 24 August 201 6 invaded the Sinjar region for the proclaimed objective of countering ISIL,

but also the secondary aim of “reviv[ing] the area’s character before the Syrian civil war…
ensuring that the Turkmen and Arab population that was driven away from this area
by the PYD-YPG and ISIS, can return to their villages, towns and cities.” This campaign
happened not only with Barzani’s assent but assistance, as he withdrew support from Rojava and
shuttered border crossings while Turkish forces carved out a military enclave of operation across
the Syrian border. Although PKK, KDP, and PYD forces fought arm-to-arm in the conflict
against ISIL, the cooling of relations following the retrenchment of the state provides cursory
indicators that optimistic scholarly depictions of pan-Kurdish nationalism in the past decade
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reflect only a temporary mobilization of ‘groupness’ as emerging “intermittently due to specific
circumstances, rather than as a quality of Kurdish politics itself.402
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Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have engaged in a historical analysis of Kurdish
ethnonational movements and the parties that emerge from them in four distinct historical
periods: late imperial, early state, postcolonial, and contemporary. By examining the
‘Kurdish question’ in chronological rather than territorial perspective, I placed at center
stage the extent to which transversal dynamics have supported or suppressed Kurdish
political identity and emancipation, a question that is frequently relegated to the
periphery of Kurdish analyses in the state-centric approaches dominant in the literature.
Analyzing Kurdish ethnic identity is an especially challenging scholarly undertaking,
given not only the Kurds’ position in one of the more nuanced and paradoxical regions in
geopolitics, but also their dispersion across the territories of four separate states with
disparate nation building practices, ideologies, and political environments. In spite of and
precisely because of this question, examining how Kurdishness has been differentially
adopted, ethnified, and operationalized in accordance with political space elucidates
several key themes that have relevance not only to the future of the Kurdish story, but
also to studies of ethnicity and nationalism in the field of International Relations more
broadly.
I propose that we can draw three central and interdependent takeaways from the
above analysis of Kurdish ethnicity and cross-border interaction: first, that Kurdish
ethnonationalism has been adopted in almost exclusively a defensive capacity, in
response to exogenous coercive structures threatening the material interests of Kurdish
communities. Second, I conclude that ethnicity has rarely served as a natural societal
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coagulant of the Kurdish people. When it appeared practically possible, the multitude of
Kurds preferred local, tribal, and religious frameworks of social organization and
authority to that proposed by the ethnonational project. It was only in the second half of
the twentieth century, where the establishment of the state as the ‘right’ modality of social
organization was made possible through increasing Kurdish control in Iraq, that
ethnonationalism became salient in broad swaths of the population. Even still, significant
portions of the Kurdish political community reject the ideal of the nation state,
particularly in the explicitly anti-statist and anti-ethnicist autonomous administration of
Rojava.
This fact dovetails into the third and final central conclusion of this thesis, namely
that Kurdish parties do not foster Pan-Kurdish sentiments or ethnic solidarity in their
political priorities and objectives, particularly in a transnational context. In fact,
transborder Kurdish party interactions most frequently run in direct contrast to
frameworks like the ethnic alliance model, and Kurds have subjugated their peers in
neighboring states more frequently than they have uplifted them. This fact challenges
depictions of isolated incidences of ‘misconducted’ cross-border Kurdish interaction as
an exception to the groupist whole- transversal Kurdish bellicosity should be seen as the
normal result of two distinct parties interacting with separate interests, not as an
externally-stimulated perversion of natural ethnic solidarity.403
In the literature review, I laid the epistemological foundations for understanding
the ‘cliched constructivism’ I contend permeates many contemporary studies of ethnic
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conflict and international relations. Although most scholars of identity are now
self-declared modernists, I echo Rogers Brubaker’s assertion that many still implicitly
subscribe to invisibilized essentialisms that subtly influence the grounds of debate in our
political discourse. As a result, many scholars reify ethnicity as an operational variable
underpinning the modern state, and afford it far greater analytical and objective relevance
than is reasonable- particularly given studies problematizing the concept of ethnicity
itself in sociology and anthropology, which explanatory International Relations largely
excludes from its macro developmentalist theoretical approach. These issues impact the
field of Kurdish studies, which, despite momentous advances in recognizing the
discursive nature of all social constructions in recent years, still frequently makes
groupist assumptions about the Kurds as a cohesive sociocultural unit in amalgam and
provides too much legitimacy to the ‘strategic essentialisms’ deployed by party elites in
their rhetorical analyses.
This thesis has aimed to fill part of that gap in the literature through an objective
(as is possible) analysis of how Kurdish identity has come to be from the breakup of the
Ottoman Empire to the current day, thus attempting to somewhat bridge the gap between
the historicist camp and post-structuralist camps of Kurdish analysis, which have
developed effectively in their respective spheres but been less frequently integrated into a
single narrative. Of course, this is a rather gargantuan undertaking given the complexity
of the Kurdish question and the diverse nature of scholarship on the topic. It is absolutely
true that by analyzing the Kurds themselves, I am “participating in the discourse on
ethnic conflict by way of studying, analyzing, categorizing, explaining, or writing about
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it,” therefore making me “intrinsically part of the discursive formation on ethnic conflict
and actively part of the construction and creation of the forms of identity” I aim to
analyze.404 Still, this is the case for any scholar who undertakes an analysis of this topic,
and I have done my very best to present Kurdishness in as objective a social science as I
can. I do believe that my work is therefore a coherent analysis of how Kurdish political
parties have emerged in the crucible of the Middle East and interacted with each other
from a historical perspective, a valuable contribution to the literature that has not been
undertaken in amalgam elsewhere. Still, despite my efforts to integrate Fierke’s ‘diverse
matrix’ of factors, my analysis is narrow in scope and should not be viewed as an
authoritative depiction of Kurdish political culture. An examination capturing the true
dynamics of Kurdish subjugation would require a developed understanding of not only
political science and ethnicity, but also economics, ecology, gender, religion, language,
and geography. Whether writing a truly pan-disciplinary study of Kurdish relations within
a single cohesive narrative is even possible is a question that I think remains an open one
in the field of Kurdish studies, my epistemic foundations of analysis and practical
capabilities are not yet sufficient to undertake an analysis of that complexity and scope.
Another significant factor in Kurdish movements that is absent from this thesis is the
increasing significance of diasporadical Kurdish organizations and NGOs, which in the
modern era have played a significant role in shaping Kurdish political ideology and
raising awareness about Kurdish subjugation in the global community. While good work
has been done on the means by which these organizations increase transversal interaction,
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particularly by Denise Natali, I remain unconvinced that these organizations have
dramatically impacted the contours of Kurdish political party behavior on the groundthat does not discount their significance for Kurdish movements as a whole, but
somewhat lessens their applicability to the research objectives of this thesis.
Reflecting upon this project and the potential future directions my own research or
those of scholars in this field could take, I identify two key areas that I believe require
further analysis for elucidation. Firstly, applying the theoretical frameworks I establish in
this thesis to the past decade of Kurdish interaction in greater detail than I was able to in
Chapter Six might answer the question of whether the last decade has constituted a
genuine sea change in the nature of Kurdish liberation movements, or whether it
represents yet another period of state stability to be followed by retrenchment and
Kurdish bellicosity as has so frequently happened in the past. The increasingly contested
relationship between the PYD and KDP in the aftermath of ISIL’s withdrawal from the
region provides an early indicator that the latter is correct, but Kurdish history is still
being written, and it is true that many scholars of Kurdish politics who are frequently
pessimistic about ‘pan-Kurdish solidarity’ have exhibited a recent optimism about the
‘rising tide’ of Kurdish collaboration. This is largely stipulated by the increasing
relevance of mass politics to Kurdish political movements, particularly in the political
space of the Middle East following the Arab Spring. The ‘new media’, the ostensibly
autonomous cantons under the PYD, and the emergence of the Gorran (change) party in
the contemporary KRG suggest that the sentiments of the multitude are becoming more
relevant to Kurdish party behavior than they have been in the past. This observation leads
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into the second central area for future research that I believe would expand on the claims
of this thesis, namely a detailed study into the extent to which Kurdish political party
activities reflect the desires or priorities of the multitude. The fact that many leaders
employ ‘strategic essentialisms’ with reference to Kurdish unity before betraying that
rhetoric suggests that the Kurdish populous finds intra-ethnic mobilization a compelling
possibility, but the rejection of the state system in Öcalan’s post-1999 thought might
mean that ‘ethnic solidarity’ as a whole will have decreasing relevance in contemporary
Kurdish political discourse. Such a study on the disconnect between elite and mass
politics in Kurdistan would likely be even more challenging than the above undertaking
and require extensive field research, but it would be an invaluable contribution to the
literature and a promising avenue for further inquiry.
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